VZCZCXRO4863
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0291/01 0941715
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041715Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5114
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1674
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2146

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PREF CD SU CRS
SUBJECT: SUDANESE REBELS STILL A LONG WAY FROM UNIFYING 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 70 
 
Classified By: S/CRS Charles Wintermeyer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
 ¶1. (C)  Summary.  NRF officials, including two ex-pat 
political representatives from the UK, indicated frustration 
at the slow progress of unifying the Sudanese rebels in a 
meeting with them April 4.  They said they see the United 
States as an important friend and ally and urged diplomatic 
pressure to encourage the rebel groups to unite for 
negotiations on a Darfur settlement. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Tadjadine Bechin Niam, National Redemption Front 
(NRF) Secretary for Reconstruction and Development, and also 
its representative to the AU, met with Ambassador and PolOff 
on 4 April.  He was accompanied by Bahar Idriss Abougonda, 
Vice Chairman, Secretary for Darfur; Professor Mahamoud 
Suliman Abaakar, Deputy Chairman of the General Congress, and 
Dr. El-Thair El-Faki, Speaker for the UK and Ireland. 
Abaakar, a psychiatrist, and El-Faki, a surgeon, both based 
in London, were finishing up a short trip to meet the NRF's 
military forces and brief them on what the political side of 
the NRF was doing, and also assisting them with medical care. 
 Niam emphasized that Khalil Ibrahim (now in Sudan) wanted 
them to have this appointment with the Ambassador. 
 
JEM Not Islamist 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The delegation thanked the United States for its 
support, and helping to publicize the plight of the Darfur 
people.  They described the United States as an important 
friend and ally for their movement.  They claimed they were 
peace-loving but that they felt war was necessary, adding 
that President Bashir would not negotiate with anyone who was 
unwilling to fight for their cause.  They also claimed to be 
"bitter" that the U.S. portrayed the JEM as an islamist or 
jihadic movement, which they claimed was not in fact true. 
However, they noted there had been some Islamists in the JEM 
in the past, and that some JEM members have their own 
"regional agenda" in addition to the JEM's national agenda. 
 
Not Seeking Independence 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  Niam stated the JEM was "happy" that the South had 
achieved the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and that they 
would try to help make it work.  However, for the JEM, he 
described its goal as a CPA without independence from Sudan. 
Their objective was to remain part of Sudan, but no longer be 
marginalized.  One idea he proffered was for each of the six 
parts of the country to take turns leading for five years, so 
that no part of the country would be marginalized (Note: The 
EU alternates leadership in a similar manner, but Niam's 
proposal would have a 30 year cycle.  End Note.). 
 
Unification Still A Long Way Off 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Niam admitted frustration at the lack of progress in 
unification, and observed that time was running out.  The 
delegation suspected some international organizations and 
regional powers (whom they would not identify) of opposing 
rebel unity and secretly supporting President Bashir.  The 
political leaders asked that the United States apply 
diplomatic pressure on splinter groups and on these suspect 
organizations and states to get them to support rebel 
unification. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Niam estimated that the NRF was about 65-70 percent 
unified, but that the 13 elements within the SLA were still 
fragmented.  The delegation complained that there was some 
NRF participation in an ongoing SLA Commanders Conference, 
but that political leaders were not included along with 
military leaders.  Supposedly Abdul Shafi participated in the 
meeting, which Khamis and Adam Bakhit claimed was "illegal." 
They said Sharif Harir is also attending the meeting in a bid 
to take on a leadership role.  However, Niam claimed these 
leaders were still working together along with Adam Shogar. 
 
¶7.  (C) Niam claimed the SLA wanted the chairmanship and the 
military leadership of a unified rebel movement, which he 
felt should rest with the JEM.  He also expressed hope that 
the status of things would be "clearer" in seven to ten days, 
and said that a JEM-NRF joint statement would be coming out. 
 
¶8. (C)  The doctors noted the need to move on a political as 
well as a military track, and noted that most political 
leaders came from the Darfur Diaspora (Note.  After the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000291  002 OF 002 
 
 
meeting, in response to Poloff, they indicated it had been 
decades since they personally had last been in Darfur before 
this visit.  End note). 
 
Diplomatic Considerations 
------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Niam said the JEM had told Special Envoy Elliason 
that they would accept him as a mediator.  However, he said 
he had warned him that the African Union (AU) has no 
credibility in its view, since it "failed" by coming up with 
the DPA.  However, he did state that part of the DPA was 
acceptable.  He also claimed the JEM was ready to attack 
militarily, although ready to enter negotiations.  Concerning 
the UN, the JEM supports a UN force only if there is a peace 
treaty first (not the DPA). 
 
¶10.  (C) Niam once again criticized the February conference 
held in Tripoli, saying there was no substantive plan; the 
attendees were just 'herded' there.  However, there is a 
follow-on plan to continue negotiations in Eritrea. 
 
¶11.  (C) Niam described the GoC as "helpful" at this time, 
and warned that it would be bad for the NRF's interests if 
Chad were taken over by a pro-GoS regime. 
 
Military Activities at Oure Cassoni Refugee Camp 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶12. (C)  When questioned by Poloff about military activities 
at the camp, which threatened the camp's humanitarian status 
and could make it a legitimate target, the political 
representatives claimed that the JEM follows the Geneva 
Conventions and had in fact just trained its soldiers 
therein.  Niam suggested that even if such activities might 
have occurred in the past, they were not occurring now. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  While the JEM genuinely appreciates U.S. support 
concerning Darfur, and its political representatives said the 
right things about the DPA as a starting point,and 
negotiations in general, the bottom line is that rebel 
unification still looks as remote as when SE Natsios 
discussed it with rebel leaders back on 19 January (reftel). 
The kind words for the United States expressed by these 
representatives did not appear to reflect concerns or even 
awareness of impending announcements of measures directed at 
their leadership, but it cannot be ruled out. 
 
WALL