VZCZCXRO2241
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHLZ RUEHPOD
DE RUEHMZ #0218/01 1010934
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110934Z APR 07 ZDK
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3895
RUEAWJB/DOJ WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUNICH 000218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KCRM KISL GM
SUBJECT: BECKSTEIN LEADS BAVARIA'S GET-TOUGH APPROACH TO ISLAMIC 
EXTREMISM 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
REFS: (A) MUNICH 28, (B) MUNICH 196 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) Guenther Beckstein, Germany's longest-serving state 
Interior Minister and presumptive future Bavarian Minister President 
(REF A), has for years identified Islamic terrorism as the greatest 
risk to domestic security in Germany.  According to Beckstein, about 
50 people living in Bavaria have direct links to Islamic terrorist 
networks while another 500 Islamic extremists support violence as a 
means to achieve their political goals.  More than any other German 
state, Bavaria has developed innovative strategies and instruments 
to cope with this challenge, particularly through the programs known 
as AKIS and BIRGiT.  While Beckstein's success at fighting crime, 
including Islamic extremism, is noteworthy, this success comes with 
the perception that Bavaria is unfriendly toward Muslims in general. 
 Additionally, there remains the danger that Bavarian officials may 
have become over-confident about their ability to prevent a 
potential terrorist attack.  End summary. 
 
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ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN BAVARIA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) According to the latest Bavarian Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution (OPC) report published on March 28, about 9,000 
"extremist" foreigners are currently living in Bavaria.  Ninety 
percent of them are Turks (including Kurdish Turks).  Approximately 
half are believed to be involved with Islamic fundamentalism (Note: 
There are believed to be approximately 317,000 Muslims in Bavaria, 
out of a total population of about 12.5 million.).  According to 
Beckstein, there are only about 50 people in Bavaria directly 
affiliated with terrorist networks, mainly individuals independent 
from fixed organizational structures.  However, Beckstein said, 
another 500 persons are willing to resort to violence to achieve 
their political goals.  The threat from the extremists is primarily 
targeted at their home countries, rather than Germany, he added, 
when he presented the latest OPC report to the media. 
 
¶3.  (U) Some have questioned Beckstein's use of the word 
"extremist," which they say he applies too liberally.  Such liberal 
use of the term would be true-to-form for Beckstein, who as an 
adherent of the proactive "Broken Window Theory" of law enforcement, 
seeks to shine a spotlight on all and any criminal activity in 
Bavaria.  When it comes to deterring and solving crime, Beckstein 
can rightly claim success.  Notably, he announced earlier this year 
that his police had not only solved every murder in the state, but 
had actually achieved a case-closing rate in excess of 100 percent 
in 2006 (the statistic actually includes a case from a prior year 
which had not been solved until 2006, distorting the number). 
Regardless of occasional statistical distortions, Bavaria has, in 
fact, achieved a remarkably low crime rate - the lowest in Germany, 
and one of the lowest in Europe. 
 
¶4.  (U) Bavarian prosecutors are also known for their pro-active 
measures.  They were the first in Germany to achieve a conviction 
(in the case of Ansar al-Islam member Lokman Amin Mohammed) under 
the new (2002) section "129B" of the Germany penal code, which gives 
authorities the ability to prosecute individuals for membership in a 
foreign terrorist organization.  Another trial of two Iraqis, also 
pursuant to section 129B, is currently underway in Munich.  In a 
January 2007 decision, the Bavarian Administrative Court upheld the 
Bavarian government's September 2006 closing of the so-called 
"Multi-Cultural House" in Ulm on the grounds that it was serving as 
a haven for Muslim extremists.  In one instance, the Bavarian 
government has even taken action to head off the spreading of 
extremist ideas via film.  When the Turkish film "Tal der Woelfe" 
(Valley of the Wolves), with its graphically negative portrayal of 
the U.S. military, was scheduled to be shown in several theaters, 
the Bavarian government requested that the theaters voluntarily 
curtail the film's engagement (most did), out of concern that it 
could stoke violence and anti-western feelings among certain 
audiences. 
 
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AKIS 
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¶5.  (U) For Bavarian law enforcement authorities, September 11, 2001 
served as a wake-up call.  Following the attacks, the Bavarian 
Criminal Office (LKA) created a "Strategic Innovation Center" -- a 
think tank of academics and police to examine the problem of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  In June 2002, the LKA set up a new division named 
"Investigation of Criminal Extremist Islamic Structures," know by 
 
MUNICH 00000218  002 OF 003 
 
 
its German acronym "AKIS."  AKIS units were set up in all police 
headquarters in Bavaria, coordinating cooperation of police, 
prosecutors, the OPC, tax authorities and other agencies.  AKIS' 
mission is the early identification of Islamic extremists, 
particularly "sleepers," and terrorist planning using a variety of 
tools ranging from direct surveillance to electronic eavesdropping 
and financial investigations.  A key element of AKIS is 
information-sharing with other state and federal agencies, including 
the German Intelligence Service (BND). 
 
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BIRGIT 
------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Following the success of AKIS, the Bavarian Interior 
Ministry set up a new program in November 2004.  The program has the 
unwieldy name of "Accelerated Identification and Expulsion of People 
Considered Dangerous in Conjunction with Islamic Terrorism and 
Extremism," and is known by its less-unwieldy German acronym 
"BIRGiT."   BIRGiT is a task force of specialists from police, 
immigration authorities, the OPC, and other agencies.  While AKIS 
gathers information, BIRGiT's mission is to act on the information. 
Simply put, BIRGiT aims to take Islamic extremists off the streets 
of Bavaria through prosecution or deportation (either voluntary or 
forced). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) BIRGiT can be very aggressive with respect to those 
alleged extremists that fall under its gaze.  Those identified as 
extremists can expect to find authorities overtly following their 
every move and listening-in on every conversation.  One of the 
implied objectives of the program is to make Islamic extremists feel 
so unwelcome in Bavaria, that they will leave the state willingly 
(although perhaps not leave Germany).  Presenting the latest OPC 
report for 2006, Beckstein said that with the help of BIRGiT, his 
ministry was able to obtain 65 expulsion orders against potential 
terrorists last year.  In 40 cases, people were deported and 
permanently denied reentry into Germany. 
 
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MUSLIM POLICE OFFICERS 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Beckstein has recognized that native-Bavarian police 
officers would not be able to successfully penetrate Islamic 
extremist groups.  He was one of the first in Germany to understand 
that incorporating foreign-born police officers into the force could 
be an asset both in penetrating extremist groups and in helping 
build confidence and understanding between foreigners and the 
police.  Beckstein explained that, when he opened the police to 
non-citizens in 1993, he did so in order to help foreigners identify 
with German society.  Since 1993, about 100 foreigners of various 
nationalities have been employed by the Bavarian state police, about 
half of them Turks.  They are admitted upon successful completion of 
the normal test required of all police recruits.  Additionally, they 
must posses a valid residence permit - German citizenship is not 
required -- and be fluent in both German and their native language. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (SBU) Given the thorough scrutiny that Bavarian authorities give 
any individual or group that could be perceived as "extremist," 
officials here are confident that a "Hamburg Cell" could not operate 
unfettered in Bavaria today.  When it comes to preventing and 
fighting crime (perhaps with the exception of white-collar crime - 
see Ref B on the Siemens corruption scandal), Bavarian authorities 
are in the forefront.  Still, it is possible that the past successes 
and supreme self-confidence of the Bavarian law enforcement 
community have bred a bit of complacency.  There is a real sense 
that "it can't happen here" in Bavaria - not unlike what many 
Americans felt prior to September 11, 2001. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) We also note that the line between ensuring a secure 
society and protecting civil-liberties can be a thin one.  While 
Bavaria's secure streets are a significant factor in the quality of 
life of its citizens, the scrutiny of non-western outsiders and 
their ideas can make many uncomfortable.  Bavaria's Interior 
Minister Beckstein has clearly tilted the scales toward security 
(and thus-far managed not to run afoul of the German or Bavarian 
constitutions in the process) -- and there is no reason to expect he 
will alter course when he moves into the State Chancellery this 
fall. 
 
¶11.  (U) This report has been coordinated with Embassy Berlin. 
 
¶12.  (U) Previous reporting from Munich is available on our SIPRNET 
website at www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/ . 
 
MUNICH 00000218  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
NELSON