VZCZCXRO8184
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #0328/01 0990559
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 090559Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6693
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000328 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2027 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR BA POL HUMRIT
SUBJECT: PROMINENT SHIAS PAINT GLOOMY PICTURE OF SHIA 
OUTLOOK IN BAHRAIN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe.  Reason: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary. Prominent Shia cleric Shaikh Hussein Najati, 
in an April 4 discussion with the Ambassador, painted a 
gloomy picture of Shia prospects under King Hamad.  At the 
top of his concerns was an allegedly expanding policy of 
"political naturalizations" of foreign Sunni aimed at 
redressing the sectarian imbalance in the country. 
Additionally, he decried continuing examples of 
discrimination against Shia, most notably a recent ban on 
purchases of property in his home governorate of Muharraq 
(allegedly aimed at preventing Shia from expanding its 
presence in the mixed governorate), and continuing bans on 
hiring of Shia in Bahrain's military and security agencies. 
Surprisingly, he suggested that policies towards Shia under 
King Hamad are leading some Shia to re-think their views of 
Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa, long viewed as anti-Shia.  In 
the 30 years when the PM was at the peak of his power (before 
the accession of King Hamad), he said, there were no 
"political naturalizations" and Shia held prominent positions 
in Bahrain's state-controlled corporations (many are now 
being replaced).  Shaikh Najati said that Shia are getting 
restless about the performance of the Shia Al-Wifaq bloc in 
the parliament, assessing that Al-Wifaq has so far done 
little to advance Shia interests.  He predicted that the 
government will actually seek ways to increase support for 
the rejectionist Shias in order to split the Shia and weaken 
Al-Wifaq.  He emphasized that Bahrain's Shia are loyal to 
Bahrain, not Iran; want justice and respect, not power; and 
are friendly to the U.S.  While Shaikh Najati represents a 
relatively small portion of Bahrain's Shia, and competes with 
but does not threaten leading Shia cleric Shaikh Issa Qassim, 
his sentiments do in many ways reflect concerns that are 
being felt, and often articulated to varying degrees, by many 
Shia in Bahrain these days.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Bahraini religious cleric of Iranian origin, Shaikh 
Hussein Najati, asked to meet with the Ambassador recently to 
discuss his frustrations in particular, and Bahraini Shia 
frustrations more generally, in the current political climate 
in Bahrain.  The discussion was hosted by prominent Shia 
businessman Faisal Jawad, and also attended by Abdul Hussain 
Faraj, a retired senior BAPCO official (also Shia). 
 
¶3. (C) Najati, who lives in the Muharraq governorate, opened 
the discussion by complaining about the government's decision 
to ban the sale of property to Shia in Muharraq.  (Note: the 
issue first surfaced in January when the press reported that 
Shia, allegedly with Iranian support, were buying up property 
in Muharraq in order to alter the sectarian balance in the 
governorate.  The Governor of Muharraq subsequently declared 
a ban on the buying and selling of real estate in the old 
town area of Halat Abi Maher.  He claimed that this decision 
was not sectarian-based and aimed only at preserving 
historical sites.  The Governor's statement notwithstanding, 
it is widely believed in Bahrain that the decision was aimed 
at preventing Shia from buying property in the area.  Najati 
maintained that the ban encompassed all of Muharraq, and not 
just Halat Abi Maher.  End note.)  Najati told the Ambassador 
that he delivered a critical Friday sermon on the subject, 
comparing the situation in Muharraq to that in Palestine. 
This clearly hit a raw nerve, generating a fierce reaction 
among Sunni Islamists, and sharp editorial attacks in the 
non-Shia Arabic press, including Al-Watan, Akhbar Al-Khaleej, 
and Al-Ayam. Najati, echoed by Jawad and Faraj, decried this 
continuing example of discrimination against Shia. 
 
¶4. (S) Turning to the labor situation, Najati complained 
about the lack of trust of Shia shown by the government in 
its failure to hire Shia in the armed forces.  Jawad then 
described an incident that in his view highlighted the depth 
of the problem.  He said that Minister of Labor Majeed 
Al-Alawi, himself a Shia who had returned from exile in 
London after the King introduced his reform program, 
approached the head of the National Guard, Shaikh Mohammed 
bin Issa Al-Khalifa (brother of the King), to request that 
the National Guard hire one or two Shia as a symbolic step to 
help ease pressure in the Shia community.  Shaikh Mohammed 
refused, and allegedly added that the Shia should understand 
and appreciate that he could have -- but didn't -- let go of 
all Sunni in the National Guard who were married to Shia. 
Jawad scoffed at the government's distrust of Shia in the 
security forces, claiming that the police have hired numerous 
Shia to work undercover in the villages, and these Shia have 
always worked loyally for the government. 
 
¶5. (C) Najati stated that the biggest concern for Shia in 
Bahrain at the current time is the increasing naturalization 
of Sunnis aimed at restoring the Sunni-Shia sectarian 
balance.  Najati claimed that as many as 100,000 Sunni have 
 
MANAMA 00000328  002 OF 003 
 
 
been naturalized since the King came to power in 2000. 
(Note: In a country of an estimated 430,000 Bahrainis, this 
figure appears wildly exaggerated.  During the election 
campaign last fall, there were complaints that some 5,000 
Sunnis had their naturalization rushed through.  An Al-Wifaq 
official recently put the overall figure at 38,000 in recent 
years.  The government maintains that naturalizations have 
been limited and according to the law.  There are no 
statistics available, but anecdotally there does appear to 
have been an effort to push through naturalizations of Sunnis 
-- many with long-standing applications - in recent months. 
End note.)  Najati alleged that Sunnis are being drawn from 
several countries, including villages in Syria.  He said 
that, for him, the problem of "political naturalization" of 
Sunnis is of higher concern at the current time than 
political reform. 
 
¶6. (S) In discussing the current Bahraini leadership, Najati 
stated that recent moves by the government are causing some 
Shia to rethink their attitude towards Prime Minister Shaikh 
Khalifa, who has long been viewed as squarely in the 
anti-Shia camp.  It has been noted, he stated, that however 
bad things were for Shia in the past during the entire 
30-year period when Shaikh Khalifa was running the country as 
Prime Minister before King Hamad acceded to the throne, there 
were no political naturalizations of Sunni during that 
period. Now, Sunni naturalizations are continuing unabated. 
Further, during the entire period when Shaikh Khalifa was at 
the peak of his power, qualified Shia occupied powerful 
positions in Bahrain's major state-controlled corporations 
such as BAPCO and Batelco (Abdul Hussein Faraj, one of the 
interlocutors in this discussion, is a good example, having 
worked for many years at the oil company BAPCO). Since King 
Hamad took over, these senior Shia are being systematically 
replaced by Al-Khalifas and other Sunnis, a trend that is 
also being seen in regulatory boards and similar agencies. 
Najati stated that, while Shia supported the King fully when 
he introduced his constitutional reforms, now 98 percent of 
Shia do not trust him.  He alleged that the Crown Prince, 
despite his seemingly professional and technocratic approach 
to issues such as economic reform, is already demonstrating a 
familiar Al-Khalifa tendency to enrich himself in personal 
business deals (especially involving property). 
 
¶7. (C) Regarding the parliament, Najati said that Shia were 
getting restless about the performance of the 17-member 
Al-Wifaq bloc, assessing that Al-Wifaq has done little so far 
to advance Shia interests.  He said that Shia will give 
Al-Wifaq more time, but that patience will run out.  He 
speculated that the government will not proactively reach out 
to help Al-Wifaq, but will rather help build up Al-Wifaq 
rival Hussein Mushaima (who rejected participation in the 
2006 parliamentary elections) so that his Harakat Haq group 
could serve as a counterweight to Al-Wifaq and divide the 
Shia movement in half.  One way the government could do this, 
he added, would be to arrest Mushaima, helping make him a 
hero to the rejectionist Shia. 
 
¶8. (C) Najati concluded the discussion by making three 
points.  First, the Shia are loyal to Bahrain, not Iran as 
the government often alleges.   Second, the Shia do not want 
power, they want justice and respect.  He returned to that 
point several times.  Third, the Shia are friendly to the 
United States. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: Shaikh Najati is not the leading Shia cleric 
in Bahrain, and has considerably less overall influence than 
Shaikh Issa Qassim.  Some of his points are clearly 
exaggerated, most notably his figures on political 
naturalization.  Nonetheless, the fact that this meeting was 
brokered by two successful, rather mainstream Shia in Bahrain 
underscores that his sentiments reflect concerns that are 
being felt, and often articulated to various degrees, by many 
Shia in Bahrain.  On the Sunni side, there are those who 
favor a hard-line approach towards the Shia, especially in 
the royal family.  But there are many others who do recognize 
the need to work together to develop a more harmonized 
Bahrain.  At this point, it is not clear who ultimately will 
get the upper hand among the Sunni leadership as it charts 
its policy towards the Shia majority. 
 
¶10. (C) Biographic information on Shaikh Hussain Najati: 
Shaikh Najati is a Bahraini religious scholar of Iranian 
origin.  He and his family are long-time residents of 
Muharraq in Bahrain, although he was in exile in Iran for 
many years and did not return to Bahrain until 2001.  He has 
considerable influence among the Shia community in Muharraq, 
and the majority of his followers are Shia of Iranian origin. 
 He is somewhat isolated from religious scholars of Arab 
origin.  He in some ways competes with leading Shia cleric 
 
MANAMA 00000328  003 OF 003 
 
 
Shaikh Issa Qassim, but has a considerably smaller number of 
followers and so is not a threat for overall leadership of 
the Shia community in Bahrain. He claims that he was given 
the ranking of Ayatollah in Qom, but many in the Shia 
community in Bahrain question this.  He reportedly has had 
good relations with the Prime Minister's Court and the Crown 
Prince's Court. 
 
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Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
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MONROE