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DE RUEHMU #0905/01 1002239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 102239Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
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INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1053
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000905 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PHUM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: LIBERAL UNITY OR DISUNITY COULD DETERMINE OUTCOME OF NICARAGUA,S 2008 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, COUNTRY,S FUTURE
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0745 
 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 0616 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 0577 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  According to a recent New Link study, the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) could win 77 of 
the 153 municipalities in Nicaragua's 2008 municipal 
elections if the two estranged liberal parties run 
separately.  This outcome would boost the FSLN's chances to 
win the 2011 presidential race.  On the other hand, if the 
liberals ally for the mayoral races, combined they stand to 
win 124 out of 153 municipalities.  In the event the 
Sandinista dissident party joined a liberal alliance, the 
opposition could win up to 18 additional races, and guarantee 
solid victories in strategic departmental capitals, including 
Managua, Matagalpa, and Leon.  President Ortega's 
determination to keep the liberals divided enabled him to win 
the presidential election and offers him the most viable 
route to remain in power.  We expect Ortega will do whatever 
it takes to keep the status quo, including delaying the 
municipal elections until 2011 to coincide with the national 
election calendar if the liberals start uniting.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) According to projections by a New Link Political 
senior consultant Gilberto Valdez, who recently met with 
PolCouns, if Nicaragua's two estranged liberal parties run 
separately for the November 2008 municipal elections, the 
FSLN could win 77 of the 153 municipalities.  Basing his 
projections on the results of the 2006 presidential race, 
Valdez warned that this outcome would enhance the FSLN's 
chances to win the 2011 presidential race.  On the other 
hand, if the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) and the 
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) ally for the mayoral 
elections, combined they stand to win 124 out of 153 
municipalities, including 13 of the 17 department capitals. 
This second scenario would favor the opposition and greatly 
diminish the FSLN's chances to remain in power, opined 
Valdez. 
 
¶3.  (C) Valdez, who later forwarded an electronic copy of the 
results (forwarded to desk on 10 April), highlighted the 
following two scenarios to make his point: 
 
    Divided Liberals Scenario   United Liberals Scenario 
 
 
FSLN: 77                          29 
 
PLC:  54                          73 
 
ALN:  22                          51 
 
Department Capitals 
 
FSLN: 11                           4 
 
PLC:   2                           4 
 
ALN:   4                           9 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) New Link's projections do not factor in other 
considerations that could benefit Ortega's party.  In the 
past, the lower voter turnout for municipal elections has 
advantaged the FSLN, as its disciplined supporters are more 
likely to vote than their liberal counterparts.  Further, the 
current government will certainly play its patronage card to 
the hilt to gain municipal support. 
 
¶5. (C) While the study does not highlight the possible effects of the Sandinista dissident party (MRS) joining an ALN-PLC alliance, according to the data, MRS support could add an additional 14 to 18 municipalities to the opposition's belt and probably ensure solid victories in the departmental capitals of Managua, Leon, Matagalpa, and Ocotol (Nueva Segovia). On the other hand, if the ALN allied solely with the MRS, this alliance could stand to win 7 or 8 additional races, including the strategic department seats of Managua, Leon, Carazo, and Chinandega.
 
¶6.  (C) Ortega's determination to keep the liberals divided 
is understandable.  The split vote enabled him to win the 
presidential election and offers him the most viable route to 
remain in power.  His government's recent decision to grant 
PLC caudillo/convicted money launderer Arnoldo Aleman 
country-wide "house arrest" was likely driven by this 
calculation.  We expect Ortega will do whatever it takes to 
keep the status quo, including delaying the municipal 
elections until 2011 to coincide with the national electoral 
calendar if the liberals start uniting.  We also expect 
Aleman will do his utmost to maintain his hegemony over the 
PLC, even attempting to thwart allied/consensus candidacies 
if necessary. 
 
¶7.  (C) Former MRS presidential candidate Edmundo Jarquin has 
publicly and privately called for a strategic alliance 
between his party and Eduardo Montealegre's ALN for the 
municipal elections.  The two leaders have discussed the 
possibility, and it has gained some traction among a number 
of supporters in the two parties.  According to a pro-ALN 
member of the Liberal Forum (Foro Liberal), an association 
comprising a mix of ALN and PLC sympathizers, the ALN should 
first ally with the MRS to build the critical mass required 
to draw popular support from disaffected PLC militants who 
feel betrayed by Aleman's complicity with Ortega. 
TRIVELLI