VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0875/01 0932308
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 032308Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9719
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000875 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NU XG
SUBJECT: EU ELECTIONS REPORT MIXED BAG OF VALID 
RECOMMENDATIONS, SKEWED CRITICISM 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0627 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The European Union's final report on 
Nicaragua's national elections -- belatedly released on March 
30 -- contains several useful recommendations, but 
soft-pedaled direct criticism of the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) while unjustifiably bashing the USG 
and Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN).  The reports key 
conclusions, which are in line with our post-electoral 
assessment and dovetail with CEPPS extension activities, 
focus on de-politization of the Supreme Electoral Council 
(CSE) and reform of the civil registry and citizen/voter ID 
application process.  With the likely intent of making the 
report more palatable to the current administration, the EU 
chose to highlight USG "interference" in the electoral 
process over the much more direct subsidies and endorsements 
offered by Venezuela.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) European parliamentarian Claudio Fava, head of the 
EU's Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) in Nicaragua, 
released the EU's final election report to the public on 
March 30.  Only about a dozen individuals from the diplomatic 
corps various civil society groups attended the 30-minute 
briefing, which seemed to have been deliberately down played 
and indeed was rescheduled at the last minute.  No one in the 
U.S. mission received an invitation to the briefing (USAID 
Democracy Officer attended anyway), which had been originally 
set for February, but shifted because of Fava's alleged ill 
health. 
 
EU Recommendations Track With Others 
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¶3. (SBU) The EU EOM's recommendations focus largely on 
de-politization of the CSE, controlled at every level by the 
two majority parties, and reformation of the citizen/voter ID 
(cedula) and civil registry process.  The report also 
criticized the CSE for the extremely slow release of voting 
results after the election and its failure to publish a full, 
final vote count.  The report implies, however, that the 
secrecy surrounding the final vote tally by voting station 
did not substantially impact the final results because of the 
relatively low number of challenges registered by the 
political parties.  (Comment: The Europeans failed to make 
the connection between the challenges and the reality of 
incomplete information from the CSE, which likely affected 
the outcome of several deputy races.  Moreover, the 
challenges were difficult to file without full input from the 
CSE.  End Comment.)  The summary notes CSE efforts to hinder 
cedula issuance/distribution to Nicaraguan's not affiliated 
with the ruling parties, but does not correctly identify the 
significant magnitude of the problem. 
 
¶4. (U) The following is a summary of key recommendations in 
the EU report: 
 
¶A. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION: 
 
-- Reform electoral law to guarantee selection of 
professional, qualified, apolitical CSE magistrates. 
-- Apply Civil Service and Administrative Career Laws to the 
selection of CSE officials at all levels. 
-- Reform process of selecting voting station officials to 
ensure equitable representation from all political parties. 
-- Ensure detailed regulations are in place to compensate for 
ambiguities in electoral law. 
-- Encourage greater transparency of electoral administration. 
 
¶B. CIVIL REGISTRY: 
 
-- Update, simplify, and standardize civil registry 
procedures for all municipalities, including computerizing 
entire registry process. 
-- Highlight importance of cedula as a general identification 
document rather than simply a voter ID card. 
-- Enhance CSE supervision of municipal level registration 
process. 
-- Develop safeguards to prevent double inscription and 
ensure deaths and other status changes are registered. 
-- Implement campaign to educate rural population on 
importance of registering. 
 
¶C. VOTERS REGISTRY (PADRON ELECTORAL): 
 
-- Simplify process to request, produce and distribute 
 
cedulas. 
-- Remove political party control over CSE municipal offices. 
-- Open permanent municipal cedula offices. 
 
¶D. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS: 
 
-- Identify clear rules for publishing preliminary results to 
ensure transparency of process, including detailed breakdown 
of voting station results. 
-- Final results, including detailed voting station results, 
should be published on the CSE web site. 
 
¶E. ADJUDICATION OF ELECTORAL CHALLENGES/APPEALS: 
 
-- Establish independent mechanism to resolve electoral 
challenges and appeals. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Note: On March 12, the U.S., German, and Japanese 
Ambassadors met with CSE president Roberto Rivas to discuss 
the CSE's planned cedula reforms.  Rivas claimed that the CSE 
is open to many of the suggested reforms regarding the civil 
registry and cedula process, but lacks the funds to fully 
implement them (reftel).  End Note. 
 
Report Equates U.S. with Venezuela and ALN with PLC 
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¶5. (SBU) The EU report highlights alleged U.S. "external 
interference" as a negative factor affecting the electoral 
campaign.  According to the EOM, this interference came 
"mainly from U.S. Government officials and U.S. deputies 
(sic) against the FSLN presidential candidate and, to a 
lesser extent, against the PLC candidate and in favour of the 
ALN candidate."  The Venezuelans also interfered, the report 
admits, but "on a lower level... by providing some fertilizer 
and petrol to FSLN-run municipalities and institutions on 
preferential terms, and by expressions of its support for 
Ortega and the FSLN."  Interestingly, while minimizing the 
actions of the Venezuelan government, the report is able to 
detail specific examples of Venezuelan meddling while only 
making vague statements about USG interference. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The summary points out that "the PLC and ALN 
presidential candidates used inflammatory language against 
each other and against the FSLN presidential candidate, who 
focused his campaign on reconciliation and avoided 
confrontation."  However, it does not clarify that the PLC's 
attacks on the ALN were much more frequent and vicious, or 
that the CSE specifically sanctioned the PLC for releasing a 
fake announcement that the ALN candidate had withdrawn just 
days before the election.  Nor did the report mention that 
Ortega's campaign was also directed at buying off and/or 
extorting candidates from rival parties. 
 
Comment: Too Soft on Chavez 
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¶7. (C) While the EU report certainly includes some valuable 
recommendations, it downplays or omits some notable 
transgressions and unjustifiably criticizes the USG.  The 
summary only alludes to Chavez' direct endorsement of Ortega 
and misrepresents/distorts our role, which never included an 
endorsement of a specific candidate and conveniently omits 
mention of our support for all reformist parties, including 
the left-leaning MRS.  Unfortunately, the orientation of the 
report and its (deliberately?) underwhelming release may well 
foreshadow the Europeans' continued reluctance to call the 
FSLN to account on upholding democratic ideals. 
TRIVELLI