VZCZCXRO7958
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0506/01 0981235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081235Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8728
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR DS/ATA, S/CT, NEA/APR, EB/ESC/IEC; DOE FOR 
KOLEVAR; NSC FOR JESSEE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2017 
TAGS: EPET ASEC PTER KCIP KU
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES CEIP NEXT STEPS WITH INTERIOR 
MINISTRY, COAST GUARD, AND KUWAIT OIL COMPANY 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 419 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 431 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 448 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 460 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This cable contains an action request, see paragraph 
¶4. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  On April 7 and 8, CDA and 
Econoff met separately with Ministry of Interior (MOI) Under 
Secretary Nasser Al-Othman, Deputy Director of the Kuwait 
 
SIPDIS 
Coast Guard (KCG) Colonel Abdullah Bin-Naji, and Kuwait Oil 
Company (KOC) Chairman and Managing Director Farouk Al-Zanki 
to discuss next steps for Critical Energy Infrastructure 
Protection (CEIP).  CDA briefed all interlocutors on the 
preliminary findings and recommendations of the Dept-DOE-DHS 
team, which conducted a CEIP assessment in Kuwait from 14-21 
March.  CDA explained that the team's detailed final report 
would be made available in about three weeks, but emphasized 
that there were several recommendations that could be acted 
on immediately.  He provided them with a written summary of 
short-term and medium-to-long-term recommendations, referred 
to significant CEIP efforts being undertaken by other Gulf 
oil producers, and emphasized that the USG wanted to ensure 
that Kuwait did not become the softest target in the Gulf in 
terms of CEIP.  Al-Othman of MOI thanked CDA for the 
Embassy's support and recommendations but pointed to the 
K-companies (Kuwait's various state-owned petroleum 
companies) as the source of most of the security gaps.  He 
promised to organize a "joint staff" to study the final 
report and discuss implementation.  Bin-Naji of the KCG said 
he was eager to work with the K-companies to close security 
gaps, and welcomed Kuwait National Petroleum Company's (KNPC) 
proposal to establish a service level agreement with the KCG 
(Ref. D).  He emphasized the importance of having all of the 
relevant agencies sitting at the same table to receive and 
comment on the final report.  Al-Zanki of KOC said that his 
company had been working closely with British security 
contractor ArmorGroup to install additional surveillance 
cameras, enhance perimeter security around tank farms, and 
increase the number of patrols around pipelines and gathering 
centers.  He suggested that the K-companies were resisting a 
previously stated objective to consolidate all K-company 
security functions within a single subsidiary (Oil Sector 
Services Company or OSSCo), as they lacked confidence that 
OSSCo would adequately protect their facilities.  Al-Zanki 
said he and his K-company colleagues were in favor of 
retaining ownership and control of security within each of 
the individual companies.  Within this framework, OSSCo would 
retain responsibility for training security personnel and 
coordinating security activities among the individual 
K-companies. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) The meetings highlighted the MOI's continued 
resistance to taking ownership of its security obligations at 
critical facilities, and the K-companies' reticence to 
handing over control of their security decisions to another 
agency.  Post's experience has been that the K-companies, 
while far from perfect, are much more forward-leaning than 
the MOI when it comes to CEIP.  Many of the most significant 
vulnerabilities noted during the assessment concerned 
security around the perimeter of oil facilities, which falls 
under the purview of the MOI, not the K-companies.  END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  ACTION REQUEST: Most of the Ambassador's and 
CDA's discussions with Kuwaiti agencies following the CEIP 
assessment (reftels) have indicated that Government agencies 
and the K-companies will want to discuss the findings and 
recommendations of the USG team's final report in fine 
detail.  Since we expect that the Kuwaitis will seek 
clarification and amplification of a number of the 
recommendations, as well as advice on implementation, Post 
requests that USG CEIP experts be made available to present 
the final report to the Kuwaitis and address specific 
technical questions that arise. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  On April 7, CDA and Econoff met with MOI Under 
Secretary Nasser Al-Othman to discuss CEIP next steps. 
 
SIPDIS 
Al-Othman welcomed the CEIP team's recommendations but 
suggested that many of the security gaps identified were the 
fault of the K-companies.  He said that the problem was with 
the "mentality of the leaders of the oil companies," who were 
 
KUWAIT 00000506  002 OF 003 
 
 
"too relaxed because of the favorable security situation in 
Kuwait."  Saying "One hand cannot clap alone," Al-Othman 
insisted that the Government cannot provide perfect security 
without the active collaboration of the K-companies, which he 
characterized as unwilling to invest their windfall profits 
into security enhancements.  Al-Othman pointed to recent 
actions that the MOI had taken to improve CEIP including the 
construction of a security control center at Shuaiba refinery 
and the restructuring of the MOI's Vital Installations Group. 
 He said that the MOI was conscious of the threat, but 
considered this threat to be exclusively external.  Al-Othman 
strongly supported the USG team's recommendation that each of 
the K-companies should appoint an executive-level security 
manager with his own budget and staff.  He expressed his 
desire to continue the MOI's cooperation with the USG on CEIP 
and promised to create a "joint staff"  to study the USG 
team's final report and discuss implementation. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Later on April 7, CDA and Econoff met with KCG 
Deputy Director Colonel Abdullah Bin-Naji to discuss the 
Coast Guard's role in CEIP.  Bin-Naji welcomed the team's 
recommendations and agreed that early and significant action 
was needed to improve the maritime security around Kuwait's 
export facilities and refineries.  Bin-Naji and Flotilla 
Department Director Colonel Saleh Al-Fodari explained that 
the KCG currently has one patrol boat and one speed boat 
assigned daily to patrol the maritime exclusion zone around 
the oil facilities.  Both officers acknowledged that the 
exclusion zone is currently too large and the KCG too 
under-resourced for patrolling and interdiction in this zone 
to be effective.  Bin-Naji said the KCG would want to study 
the final report before making any decisions about redrawing 
exclusion areas.  Al-Fodari said that, in addition to the 
need for better communication and coordination across 
agencies, there was a clear need for better intelligence 
sharing.  Bin-Naji said that the KCG meets weekly with the 
K-companies and that both were working together to close gaps 
in maritime security. He stressed the importance of having 
all of the relevant agencies sitting at the same table to 
receive and comment on the final report, and he welcomed 
KNPC's suggestion that a service level agreement be 
established between KNPC and the KCG to clearly delineate 
security requirements (Ref. D). 
 
¶7.  (S/NF)  On April 8, CDA and Econoff met with KOC Chairman 
and Managing Director Farouk Al-Zanki to brief him on the 
initial findings from the assessment and discuss KOC's next 
steps.  (Note:  KOC is the upstream K-company responsible for 
drilling and exploration in Kuwait.  It owns and operates 
wells, gathering centers, crude pipelines, crude tank farms, 
and crude export facilities.  It does not own or operate the 
refineries, which belong to KNPC.)  Al-Zanki said he had been 
made aware of the CEIP assessment by his security officer, 
and he welcomed the preliminary recommendations.  Al-Zanki 
said KOC was working closely with British security contractor 
ArmorGroup to install additional surveillance cameras, 
reinforce perimeter security around the North and South tank 
farms, and increase the number and frequency of private 
security patrols around pipelines and gathering centers. 
Al-Zanki identified the mixing manifold, the South tank farm, 
and the export terminals as being KOC's most critical points 
to protect.  Contrary to what Post has been told previously 
about security responsibilities within the K-companies, 
Al-Zanki said that it was unlikely that the Oil Sector 
Services Company (OSSCo) would assume control of all 
K-company security functions.  Al-Zanki explained that the 
individual K-companies were pushing back against this policy 
since they found physical security too critical to be 
outsourced to another subsidiary.  CDA agreed, pointing out 
that the USG team recommended that each of the K-companies 
establish an executive level security manager with his own 
staff and budget.  Al-Zanki said OSSCo's role in security 
would likely be limited to training K-company security 
personnel and coordinating security activities among the 
individual K-companies. 
 
********************************************* * 
 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
 
 
KUWAIT 00000506  003 OF 003 
 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
 
********************************************* * 
Tueller