VZCZCXRO1067
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0455/01 0911047
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011047Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8642
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP, S/WCI, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2017 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PHUM KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: U.S.-GOK DISCUSS SECURITY MEASURES NECESSARY FOR 
GUANTANAMO DETAINEE TRANSFER 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 319 
     ¶B. 06 KUWAIT 4582 
     ¶C. 06 KUWAIT 4429 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  A visiting USG interagency delegation 
discussed concerns about possible transfer of the four 
remaining Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo with GOK officials 
on March 24.  USG delegation told the GOK officials that the 
remaining detainees were significantly more dangerous than 
those previously released to Kuwait.  The delegation stressed 
that the need for heightened post-trial GOK measures aimed at 
mitigating the likelihood that the detainees would "return to 
the fight" was the key USG concern rather than heightened 
focus on successful GOK prosecutions.  GOK officials detailed 
the monitoring and mitigation actions taken against the 
previously released detainees as some options for dealing 
with additional transferees.  The GOK stressed the importance 
of family interaction in rehabilitating detainees already 
transferred, claiming that none had engaged in extremist 
activities since their return to Kuwait.  GOK officials 
described assistance it provided to former detainees and also 
GOK disincentives aimed at the detainees and their families 
for detainees' failure to meet expected standards of 
behavior.  The USG delegation stressed the importance of 
heightened and robust measures above what was already in 
place against detainees already transferred to Kuwait.  The 
USG delegation invited the GOK to send a delegation to 
Guantanamo to assess how best to structure the heightened 
mitigation measures necessary.  The meeting concluded with 
the expectation that the GOK would attempt to formulate the 
heightened measures it would take toward the remaining four 
detainees and communicate the measures to the USG.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (S) On March 24, U.S. delegation members Christopher 
Camponovo (NSC), Alan Liotta (DoD), Andrew Morrison (DoS), 
and Marisa Porges (DoD) met with GOK's Khaled Al-Maqamis, 
Director of Coordination and Follow-up, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Sultan Abu Jarwa Assistant Undersecretary, Ministry 
of Justice;, and three Kuwait State Security officials: 
Abdullah Al-Kandari, Counterterrorism Department Director; 
Abdullah Al-Rashid, Counterterrorism Department Deputy 
Director; and Hamdi Al-Abdullah Counterterrorism Department 
Deputy Director, and discussed measures needed to allow the 
possible future transfer of the remaining four Kuwaiti 
nationals detained at Guantanamo Naval Base. 
 
¶3. (S) Camponovo said at the outset of the meeting that the 
remaining four Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo were 
substantially more dangerous than previously released Kuwaiti 
detainees and had not yet been approved for transfer. 
Camponovo said that the U.S. was concerned given that all 
previous detainees had been released following acquittals by 
Kuwaiti courts on terrorism charges.  (Note: All eight 
detainees returned to Kuwait thus far have been prosecuted 
and found not guilty.  The GOK is currently appealing to 
Kuwait's highest court the not guilty verdicts of five of the 
detainees.  The GOK officials also reported that one of the 
previously transferred detainees, Nasser Al-Mutairi, had 
recently died. End note.) 
 
Prosecution Option 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Camponovo said that prosecutions were only part of the 
equation, noting that in other countries only a few detainees 
transferred to their home countries had been successfully 
prosecuted.  For this reason, the U.S. is particularly 
interested in what measures, beyond prosecution, the GOK 
could take to mitigate the threat that these detainees would 
"return to the fight."  Liotta concurred with this, noting 
that in many countries counter-terrorism laws had not proved 
effective in obtaining convictions against known terrorists. 
 
¶5. (S) The MOJ's Jarwa said that GOK actions must adhere to 
Kuwaiti law.  He said that 95% of the evidence used in the 
prosecutions of detainees already tried by the GOK had been 
statements provided by the USG from questioning at 
Guantanamo.  He said the defendants refused to admit the 
truth of the USG-supplied statements in the Kuwait trials. 
He said that the defense attorneys cited reports of detainee 
abuse at Guantanamo and that this seriously undermined the 
credibility of the statements.  Jarwa underscored this point 
by stating that the evidence supplied to the GOK to date 
 
KUWAIT 00000455  002 OF 003 
 
 
lacked credibility. 
 
¶6. (S) Morrison asked if the courts had considered sending 
officials to Guantanamo to take depositions from potential 
witnesses.  Jarwa was not sure if this would be possible 
under Kuwaiti law or logistically practical.  Liotta asked if 
there were ways to maximize the pre-trial and trial periods 
by bringing multiple charges against each defendant.  Abu 
Jarwa replied that multiple charges would be combined into a 
single case if they were considered related.  If considered 
unrelated they might be tried in separate trials. 
 
¶7. (S) Al-Maqamis said that the GOK had a program aimed at 
all prisoners in which imams "well-schooled in the Quran" 
sought to spread the understanding that Islam does not 
support extremism.  He also described the GOK's broader 
efforts to educate religious leaders and the general public 
on principles of moderation.  He said there was no program 
specifically directed at Guantanamo returnees. 
 
Post-trial Options 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (S) KSS Director Al-Kandari said that post-trial release 
mitigation efforts on detainees/returnees already released 
consisted of: 
 
- Monitoring their travel abroad through arrangements with 
their counterparts in neighboring countries.  (He said that 
thus far none of the eight detainees already returned had 
traveled outside Kuwait.) 
- Daily monitoring of their activities in Kuwait including 
who they met, where they went; 
- All information collected was entered into a database; 
- Families sign oaths that they will monitor the actions of 
the returnee; 
- Returnees also sign oaths that they will abide by the laws 
of Kuwait; 
 
¶9. (S) MFA Al-Maqamis stressed that the key to 
mitigation/rehabilitation was the families of the returnees. 
He said previously the families were unaware of the 
returnees' extremist activities but that now they were very 
aware and concerned particularly about avoiding further 
punishment for their family members.  He said that family 
interaction played a key role in rehabilitating these 
individuals noting that none of the former Guantanamo 
detainees had engaged in any extremist activities since 
returning to Kuwait.  He claimed that they were "changed 
persons" who were now "rational and calm."  Morrison asked 
how the KSS would characterize the families of the remaining 
four detainees at Guantanamo: i.e. whether they would be 
likely to support rehabilitation efforts.  Al-Maqamis said 
the four families had grown close over the years but did not 
provide any details on their possible willingness to help 
wean the returnees from the extremist Islamist cause. 
 
¶10. (S) Al-Maqamis said that the GOK provided assistance to 
the returnees to help the reintegration process including 
finding jobs.  Al-Maqamis said the level of compliance by the 
returnee and the families determined the level of support 
provided by the GOK and that inadequate compliance resulted 
in less assistance.  In more serious instances, the GOK would 
make it difficult for the returnee and his family to find 
jobs, obtain necessary official documents, including 
passports, and to receive other forms of government services. 
 But he did not provide examples of cases where this had been 
effective in the past.  In response to Camponovo,s 
questions, the KSS officials noted that they were limited in 
the sort of monitoring they could carry out; for example, a 
court order is required to search bank records.  Porges asked 
how restrictive the GOK could be in denying passports.  He 
replied that the Ministry could defer issuance for up to five 
years in cases of lost passports.  However, individuals could 
challenge delays in passport issuance; this has not yet 
become an issue, as none of the returnees have applied for 
passports. 
 
¶11. (S) In response to a question from Maqamis, Liotta said 
that the assurances given by the GOK in the agreement to 
transfer previous detainees would not change.  He stressed 
that the implementation measures in support of those 
assurances would need to be substantially more robust to 
permit the transfer of the remaining four Kuwaiti detainees. 
He said that the USG would provide further information to the 
GOK on the remaining detainees but reiterated that 
prosecution was only part of what should be a comprehensive 
 
KUWAIT 00000455  003 OF 003 
 
 
approach to preventing the detainees from returning to 
terrorism. 
 
¶12. (S) In response to Camponovo's inquiry, the GOK officials 
said that it might be possible to craft an agreement between 
the detainees and the GOK that conditioned their return on 
acceptance of heightened requirements for the detainees after 
their return to Kuwait such as regular meetings with GOK 
security officials, restrictions on movements/activities, 
regular meetings with "moderation counselors."  Camponovo 
said that a similar agreement had been reached between the 
United Kingdom and one of its nationals detained at 
Guantanamo.  The GOK requested a copy of that agreement. 
 
¶13. (S) Liotta invited the GOK to send a team of GOK 
officials to Guantanamo to visit the detainees for the 
purpose of evaluating how the GOK mitigation plan might be 
strengthened.  The team could include officials from the 
Ministries of Interior, Justice, Religious Affairs and 
others.  He noted that this visit was not a precondition to 
transfer of the detainees but that it would give the GOK an 
opportunity to evaluate the detainees individually and 
determine an appropriate response in each case. 
 
¶14. (S) At the conclusion of the meeting, the US delegation 
agreed to provide additional releasable information on the 
detainees.  The GOK will then provide a response to the 
invitation to visit Guantanamo and a comprehensive proposal 
of measures they would plan to take with regard to the 
remaining detainees. 
 
¶15. (S/NF) DELEGATION COMMENTS: While the meetings increased 
GOK,s awareness of the importance of post-transfer security 
efforts, it was clear that the GOK has limited, if any, 
capability to effectively implement additional security 
measures.  Prosecution is not a viable option, so ultimately 
any assurances will rest on the credibility of the 
organization offering them.  For example, the KSS was quite 
straightforward in their limited ability to monitor and keep 
track of returned detainees once released from GOK control, 
despite a willingness to do so based on the threat the 
detainee presents.  The delegation was convinced that 
although the MOJ, MOI, and KSS officials understood the basis 
for our heightened security requirements, follow-up will 
likely be required at more senior levels to ensure 
Minister-level support for these efforts. 
 
¶16. This cable was cleared by the interagency delegation. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
 
Tueller