VZCZCXRO8077
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0599/01 1071408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171408Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6874
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0106
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0035
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0144

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000599 
 
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SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017 
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BASHIR 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000599  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CDA C. HUME, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On April 15 Deputy Secretary Negroponte met 
with Sudanese President Omar El Bashir for over an hour. 
Negroponte emphasized USG concern over Darfur, including the 
fragility of the humanitarian situation, the need to 
transition to a UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping operation, and the 
challenge of restarting a political dialogue.  Bashir 
concentrated on two points: the UN role in peace-keeping 
should be limited to providing financing, logistic support, 
and technical advice to the AU; and, while he would like to 
improve relations with the United States, he was skeptical 
that the USG would ever move in that direction.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) President Bashir welcomed the Deputy Secretary and his 
delegation with the hope this meeting would have a more 
positive outcome than previous meetings with American 
visitors.  Deputy Secretary Negroponte said he was on his 
first trip to Sudan.  He had visited Juba and met First Vice 
President Salva Kiir; then he had gone to Darfur and met with 
the AMIS Force Commander, leaders of an IDP camp, and North 
Darfur Governor Kibbir.  He appreciated the welcome extended 
to him by Sudanese hosts. 
¶3. (C) Bashir said he wanted the visit to be positive and to 
create real understanding as a basis for improved relations. 
He sought positive cooperation to solve the problem of Darfur 
by peaceful means.  With the positive cooperation extended by 
Senator Danforth and former Deputy Secretary Zoellick, Sudan 
had achieved the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA ) and the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  The DPA could have led to 
peace, but rather than supporting the DPA, AMIS, and the role 
of the AU, action had been shifted to insistence that 
international forces replace the AU and to support for the 
parties who had refused to sign the DPA.  These actions had 
hurt the prospects for peace.  Now the March 28 agreement 
between Sudan, the UN, and the AU on the UN,s Heavy Support 
Package for the AMIS could relaunch the peace process. 
¶4. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte said he had met with 
several of Bashir,s top advisers to explain the USG position 
in detail, so he would now concentrate on a few main points. 
The DPA addressed humanitarian, security, and political 
issues, all of which now faced some serious issues of 
implementation.  The humanitarian situation had for now 
stabilized, but security and political problems endangered 
that fragile stability.  The AMIS Force Commander said the 
situation was "unpredictable" and "unstable."  The United 
States hoped that the March 28 humanitarian agreement would 
be implemented as agreed, and the USG would monitor this 
situation. 
¶5. (C) Negroponte said security required moving to the hybrid 
African Union and United Nations force.  The USG supported a 
hybrid force, with an African commander in a single chain of 
command who would take orders from a Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) appointed jointly by the UN 
and the AU.  His/her appointment should come as soon as 
possible so that additional forces could be deployed.  The 
USG concurred that the large majority of this force would be 
African, and the size of the force should be determined by 
the UN/AU joint assessment.  If African governments could not 
supply all the troops required, the force should include 
troops from elsewhere.  Because the 5,000 troops of the AMIS 
were too few, more forces were needed. 
¶6. (C) Bashir said the first action needed was UN financing 
for the African troops.  He had agreed to the Heavy Support 
Package; now the UN had to provide financing; and, next, 
African governments should be asked to provide forces.  The 
two million soldiers in Africa were more than enough, if the 
financing were available.  The ball was now in the UN,s 
court. 
¶7. (C) Negroponte said that, according to the UN/AU report, 
first recourse would be to African troops, but international 
forces could make an important contribution.  Organization of 
the force had to be consistent with UN practices and 
standards.  The United Nations was not just a bank.  It had 
valuable experience and success in organizing peace-keeping 
missions in Africa, and issues relating to the hybrid force 
had to be discussed in an urgent way, such as during the 
meeting between AU Chairman Konare and UN SYG Ban on April 16 
in New York. 
¶8. (C) Bashir said the UN could finance the African troops 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which provided for 
entrusting the operation to a regional organization.  In that 
way the UN could arrange the financing.  The forces would be 
African; the UN could provide financing, technical advice, 
and logistic support.  With agreement on the Heavy Support 
Package, the UN could now provide financing.  Negroponte 
 
KHARTOUM 00000599  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
cautioned that it was important to know the outcome of the 
current conversations at the UN.  Darfur needed additional 
security forces, and the Force Commander needed international 
forces to help him. 
¶9. (C) Bashir said the African forces under African command 
would need only international support.  Changing an AU green 
beret for a UN blue beret would do nothing.  They needed only 
financing, technical advice and logistic support.  The UN 
should provide the financing, then troops should be raised in 
Africa.  If troops were not available, only then should one 
look into the possibility of international troops.  There 
could be international support elements for the AU forces, 
with a unified command.  Bashir insisted that the hybrid 
operation be based on African forces, supported by the UN. 
¶10. (C) Negroponte said that the SRSG, appointed jointly by 
the UN and AU, would give the instructions to the force 
commander, providing the single chain of command.   Bashir 
said he had no disagreement on the appointment of the SRSG, 
or the terms of reference, or the mandate.  But the force 
commander had to be an African and the forces on the ground 
had to be African.  The UN could provide financing, technical 
advice, and logistic support, the kind of arrangement 
contained in the Heavy Support Package.  Negroponte hoped 
Bashir was not raising new problems that would hinder the 
launch of the hybrid force.  Action was needed soon to raise 
forces, and for this UN procedures and standards had to be 
applied.  Bashir said it was up to the UN to raise the 
forces. 
¶11. (C) Negroponte addressed another security issue, the 
obligation of the Sudanese government to disarm the 
Janjaweed, who could not operate without the active support 
of the Sudanese government.  Bashir replied that in Darfur 
some people in small groups were acting as criminals and 
bandits, but the government did not support them.  None of 
these groups had ever asserted that they received government 
support.  The major criminal activities were conducted by the 
parties who rejected the DPA.  Those groups operated out of 
camps in Chad, where they got military support and recruited 
among the refugees. 
¶12. (C) Bashir said that Libya, Eritrea, Jan Eliasson and 
Salim Ahmed Salim were trying to restart peace talks. 
However, the rebels refused to negotiate because they were 
waiting for the United States to impose new sanctions against 
the government.  The government wanted peace in Darfur, but 
the U.S. rush to sanctions had the consequence that the 
rebels would not now negotiate.  As long as the U.S. and UK 
were threatening sanctions in the UN, the rebels did not want 
peace.  Ending these threats would put pressure on the rebel 
position. 
¶13. (C) Negroponte warned all parties to speed up 
implementation of the DPA.  Peace efforts by Eliasson, Salim 
and Salva Kiir could all help restore security to Darfur.  If 
the government went ahead to fund the Transitional Darfur 
Regional Authority (TDRA) at $300 million this year, people 
in Darfur would see a benefit of peace, and that step could 
improve the political situation.  Bashir said the government 
had acted to stand up the TDRA, to fill all of the senior 
positions, to provide it with a headquarters, and to provide 
funding.  Tenders had been advertised for initial projects. 
The funding would be provided throughout the year. 
¶14. (C) Negroponte explained that most USG assistance had 
been for humanitarian purposes, given the conditions in 
Darfur, but it would prefer to support development projects. 
Bashir welcomed that preference, asserting that if the same 
amount of money were spend on development, there would be 
peace in Darfur.  Before the war Darfur did not need 
humanitarian assistance, and USAID had carried out 
development projects.  Negroponte said he was pleased to hear 
Bashir,s vision of a peaceful Darfur, but without security 
it would be difficult to return to that path. 
¶15. (C) Bashir insisted that not all of Darfur was insecure. 
80 percent of Darfur was safe, including areas such as Jebel 
Marra, which had not been affected by the war.  Such areas 
were secure and returning to normal.  The new governor of 
West Darfur, who had been a rebel, had taken effective 
measures to improve security. 
¶16. (C) Shifting to a new topic, the Deputy Secretary said he 
had just visited the construction site for the new U.S. 
embassy.  The USG was investing there $110 million, a vision 
of a different future for bilateral relations.  However, now 
the relationship was in difficulty.  Presidential Adviser 
Nafie had told Negroponte that, even if the Darfur crisis 
were resolved, the USG would find some other reason not to 
improve relations.  Negroponte had explained that the USG has 
good relations with most countries and was not seeking 
excuses to have bad relations.  The USG could envisage a 
 
KHARTOUM 00000599  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
different future if the Darfur crisis were solved. 
¶17. (C) Bashir appreciated this statement, but he charged 
that the Darfur crisis was "one hundred percent caused by 
USAID."  At the start there were a few tribal problems, but 
then John Garang interfered with the help of USAID and Roger 
Winter.  Sudanese officials remembered and wondered what the 
United States might do again.  Bashir said many thought peace 
with the south was impossible, but Vice President Taha 
persevered with Senator Danforth.  That success should have 
impelled the bilateral relationship forward.  Danforth had 
promised that peace with the South would bring normal 
relations, no sanctions, and a waiver for debt.  Deputy 
Secretary Zoellick promised the same for signing the Darfur 
 
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Peace Agreement.  Sudan signed, but then the USG shifted the 
goal posts by insisting that the UN replace the AU in Darfur. 
 
¶18. (C) Bashir said he had agreed to the Heavy Support 
Package.  The next step was up to the United States.  He 
hoped events would prove Nafie,s pessimistic view wrong. 
Turning to the construction of the new embassy, Bashir said 
that some people in the government thought welcomed this 
step.  However, many opposed the construction because they 
saw the policies of the USG to be to oppose the government 
and to change the regime.  After much experience, such was 
the view in Khartoum.  As Bashir had stated previously, 
although President Bush cared about peace in Sudan, others in 
his administration worked against Sudan.  Negroponte 
responded that the embassy was being built for normal 
diplomatic purposes and that USG policy was well-considered. 
¶19. (C) Bashir said his government cared about its relations 
with the United States and wanted to solve its problems.  The 
two sides had worked together to achieve the CPA and DPA, but 
bilateral relations had not improved.  Negroponte reminded 
him that agreements must be implemented.  If rapid progress 
were not made on implementing the DPA, bilateral relations 
would not move forward.  The way forward would have to be 
built brick by brick, and the crucial point was to make 
progress in Darfur. 
¶20. (C) In conclusion Bashir repeated that his government had 
signed the DPA, but then the USG insisted that responsibility 
for implementing it be shifted from the AU to the UN.  The 
DPA provided otherwise.  Why had the debate been shifted to 
the issue of rehatting peace-keeping forces?  Sudan wanted 
the agreement implemented as signed.  Zoellick had said that 
those parties who did not sign the DPA would be punished, but 
they were not.  Sudan would like to turn a new page and 
cooperate with the USG.  Despite sanctions on Sudan, 
permission was given to build the new embassy.  Sudan was a 
poor country, and the United States was rich. 
¶21. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Deputy Secretary 
Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affaires 
Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security 
Council 
Colonel Dennis Giddens, DoD advisor 
Gustavo Delgado, D staff 
 
Government of Sudan: 
President Omar El Bashir 
Lam Akol, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ambassador Abdel Basit Badawi Al Sanousi, Director of America 
Affairs, MFA 
Abdulrahman Sharfie, Minister Plenipotentiary 
HUME