VZCZCXRO7510
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0596/01 1070633
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170633Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6868
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0104
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0033
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0142

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S 
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SECURITY SERVICES 
CHIEF GHOSH 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000596  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On April 13, Deputy Secretary of State 
Negroponte met with Sudanese National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) Director General Salah Ghosh.  The 
Deputy Secretary opened by thanking Ghosh for Sudan,s 
counter-terrorism cooperation.  He then outlined U.S. 
expectations and urged Sudanese actions that would improve 
Sudan,s standing in the international community.  Ghosh 
emphasized that Sudan had a desire to solve the Darfur issue, 
noting that while active U.S. engagement was essential, 
placing too much pressure on the central government would be 
counterproductive.  End summary. 
 
-------------- 
CT COOPERATION 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary opened the meeting by thanking 
Ghosh for Sudan,s efforts in the greater war on terrorism. 
He added that he hoped such cooperation would continue into 
the future.  Ghosh agreed, saying that Sudan also had 
favorable views of its counter-terrorism cooperation with the 
U.S.  He added, however, that within some quarters there were 
calls for a reduction in the level of cooperation over a 
perceived lack of benefits for Sudan.  He acknowledged, in 
response to the Deputy Secretary,s question, that al Qaeda 
was trying to reestablish a base of operations in Sudan. 
Indeed, there were several active terrorist cells/groups 
resident in Sudan.  Ghosh stressed that his service was 
actively and aggressively monitoring these targets and would 
continue to do so regardless of the state of the bilateral 
relationship. 
 
----------------- 
DARFUR IS THE KEY 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that he had come to Sudan 
at the request of the U.S. Secretary of State.  He intended 
to talk to the Government and to see for himself the 
situation on the ground.  The Deputy Secretary stressed that 
it was imperative that the Government of Sudan work with the 
international community to improve the situation in Darfur. 
A positive climate must be created to ensure stability, not 
only for the delivery of humanitarian aid, but also to allow 
the stalled political process to move forward.  The Deputy 
Secretary noted that the African Union Mission in Sudan 
 
SIPDIS 
(AMIS) lacks the capacity to carry out its mandate as 
currently constituted.  As a result, the AU and UN must reach 
some form of compromise with the Sudanese on UN command and 
control of the hybrid force if progress was to be made. 
 
¶4. (C) With respect to Darfur, the Deputy Secretary cited the 
main challenges as facilitation of humanitarian aid and the 
creation of a stable environment to allow the political 
process to move forward.  Without stability and a working 
political process, there was a real danger of the situation 
on the ground regressing.  The Deputy Secretary said that the 
Government-supported Janjaweed must be brought under control 
and urged the Sudanese to take decisive action. 
 
¶5. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed U.S. support for the 
work undertaken by UN envoy Jan Eliasson and AU envoy Salim 
Ahmed Selim. The Deputy Secretary suggested that one 
immediate course of action the Sudanese could take was the 
immediate provision of USD 300 million as called for under 
the terms of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  He also 
suggested that the GOS move to empower the local regional 
authority, returning power to the local leaders as soon as 
possible.  Finally, the Deputy Secretary stressed that the 
United States wanted a better relationship with Sudan. 
However, the situation in Darfur stands in the way of such 
improvement.  The Deputy Secretary suggested that if Sudan 
moved decisively on DPA implementation, such action could 
create a positive atmosphere in which the U.S. and Sudan 
could move forward in improving the bilateral relationship. 
 
¶6. (C) Ghosh said the Government of Sudan well understood 
that Darfur was an issue that needed to be resolved.  The 
Sudanese were committed to finding that solution as outlined 
in the Abuja and Addis Ababa agreements.  Ghosh said that the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000596  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
role of the U.S. was very important in solving the crisis. 
He appealed for continued U.S. engagement, noting that the 
U.S. should also put pressure on third country actors such as 
Chad, Libya and those rebel groups that would not come to the 
table, and not solely on Khartoum. 
 
¶7. (C) Ghosh did not disagree with the Deputy Secretary,s 
assessment that a stable climate needed to be created in 
Darfur. He encouraged the U.S. and the international 
community to see the issue of Darfur as only one part of the 
larger overall bilateral relationship, not the sole issue. 
Ghosh reiterated that Sudan understood that improving 
security on the ground for everyone was important. He 
underscored that he understood that the administration was 
under pressure from Congress and the American public to do 
something about Darfur, and, as a result, that Sudan was 
facing additional pressure to act. However, Ghosh repeatedly 
pressed for understanding, engagement and dialogue vice more 
pressure, which he felt would be negative and make the 
situation worse. 
 
------------------ 
CPA IMPLEMENTATION 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Ghosh said there were three areas that needed to be 
addressed in order to improve the security situation in 
Sudan, the first being the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  Ghosh stated that it 
was important to move forward and implement the CPA as soon 
as possible.  The CPA offered the best chance to create a 
climate of stability throughout the country.  The second area 
was resolution of the Abyei boundary dispute.  While he 
agreed with the Deputy Secretary that this was an important 
issue, Ghosh explained that tribal disputes were playing a 
role in delaying implementation.  Ghosh noted that his 
service was working with those Sudanese People,s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) officers who had been integrated into NISS to 
come up with a serious bipartisan recommendation to be 
presented to President Bashir. 
 
¶9. (C) The Deputy Secretary also noted that he had traveled 
to Juba for meetings with the Government of South Sudan 
(GOSS) President and Government of National Unity (GNU) First 
Vice President Kiir.  In his opinion, there were several 
matters that needed to be urgently addressed there as well: 
the resolution of the Abyei border dispute, progress on the 
integration of the Joint Military Units (JMU) and withdrawal 
of the remaining Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) units from the 
South.  The Deputy Secretary also discussed Kiir,s offer to 
reach out to rebel leaders in Darfur, calling it a positive 
development. 
 
¶10. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Deputy Secretary 
Jendayi Frazer, A/S for African Affairs 
Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affaires 
Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security 
Council 
Gustavo Delgado, D staff 
Ted Wittenstein, D staff 
 
Government of Sudan 
Salah Ghosh, Director General, National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) 
HUME