VZCZCXRO7656
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0589/01 1060907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160907Z APR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6858
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0100
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0029
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0135

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000589 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S 
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU, CH 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
ADVISOR NAFIE 
 
KHARTOUM 00000589  001.5 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 15 Deputy Secretary Negroponte met 
with Nafie Ali Nafie, a trusted advisor to President Bashir 
and a key hard-liner in the National Congress Party (NCP). 
The Deputy Secretary told Nafie that the most pressing issue 
of his trip was the situation in Darfur in all its aspects: 
humanitarian, security, and political.  According to Nafie, 
solving the Darfur crisis would be simple: "If we neutralize 
Chad, create peace and security on the ground, and show 
agreement between the US and Sudan," the Darfur rebels would 
melt away.  Nafie repeatedly warned against "reopening" the 
details of the Heavy Support Package, which he argued had 
been negotiated in the December 2006 Presidential Statement, 
in the November 30 Abuja meetings, and most recently in the 
UN-AU-Sudan meeting in Addis on April 9. End summary. 
 
------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that mortality and 
nutrition indicators had stabilized in Darfur, but that 
situation was unstable and could worsen quickly given the 
security situation.  The Government could make important 
improvements in facilitating the work of international NGOs 
and guaranteeing access to camps.  Humanitarian access, 
stated Nafie, was an area where there are no disagreements: 
the Government of Sudan and the international community 
agreed on making this &easy and smooth.8  If there were any 
problem, it was that the international community was slow in 
delivering on its promises of aid. 
 
------------------------- 
SECURITY AND PEACEKEEPERS 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that, particularly after 
observing the situation on the ground, he shared the general 
agreement that Darfur needed more peacekeepers, as quickly as 
possible, as part of a hybrid AU-UN force under a single 
chain of command conforming to UN standards and practices. It 
was also urgent, said the Deputy Secretary, that the 
government cut off support for, and restrain, the Janjaweed. 
Nafie said the charges about the Janjaweed were largely 
political propaganda.  There were some Arab units that should 
be incorporated into the Army, but they were under control. 
Those who were committing crimes were just bandits, with no 
links to the government. 
 
¶4. (C) The November 16 meeting in Addis had resolved the 
question of AU-UN forces in Darfur "once and for all," Nafie 
said.  "This should be the final resolution of this debate." 
The UN, the African Union, and Sudan are in agreement, and he 
hoped that the US would support this.  Nafie stated he 
thought that the remaining issue of the helicopters would be 
resolved soon. If the U.S. were claiming that Sudan is not 
honoring the Addis agreement in order to press again for UN 
Resolution 1706, Nafie warned, this would be a step very far 
backwards.  The agreement reached at the Addis meeting on 
November 16 had been carefully negotiated and clarified at 
Abuja, in the Presidential Statement of December 19, and most 
recently in the agreements made in the tripartite mechanism. 
 
 
¶5. (C) The Deputy Secretary clarified that the final details 
of a hybrid AU-UN force could be resolved later.  We have 
agreed on the Heavy Support Package, but even the Light 
Support Package is not yet in place, Nafie replied. The UN 
needs to authorize funding and recruit the necessary forces 
for the Heavy Support Package.  What is most important is 
that the international community deliver on the help the AU 
needs, through personnel and logistics. 
 
-------------------- 
POLITICS AND THE DPA 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The non-signatories are an important obstacle to full 
implementation of the DPA, said the Deputy Secretary.  The 
international community wants to see the non-signatories 
participate in some kind of political discussion, whether 
 
KHARTOUM 00000589  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
through the work of the UN and AU envoys Eliasson and Salim, 
or through the efforts of Sudan,s First Vice-President Salva 
Kiir.  Nafie agreed, saying that the problem was that the 
non-signatory groups are very fragmented; this was also true 
of the forces of DPA signatory Minni Minawi. 
 
¶7. (C) The Deputy Secretary suggested that implementing the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and the USD 300 
million Darfur Reconstruction and Devlopment Fund could help 
end the conflict, by empowering Darfurians and showing the 
benefits of peace.  Nafie demurred, noting that the 
government had met &100 per cent8 of its commitments under 
the DPA: Darfurians were governing Darfur. The only 
appropriate point of reference was the DPA.  The government 
would not do "additional" things that were not in the 
agreement. Some people always want more than they have, Nafie 
noted. And since the international community is slow to 
deliver funds for projects such as the DRDF, people become 
skeptical. 
 
¶8. (C) Throughout, Nafie developed his theme that the Darfur 
rebels are now only fragments of the former groups. There is 
no fighting in Darfur between the government and the rebels, 
asserted Nafie.  Tribes are fighting tribes, and there are 
bandits too of course.  Some rebel factions have become 
bandits; for others, their leaders have become creatures of 
the international community.  If a unified international 
community really pressed for a political agreement, all would 
see that the former rebels are now only bandits. 
 
--------------------- 
CHAD,S ROLE IN DARFUR 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Sudan has an interest in good relations with Chad, 
said Nafie, despite the recent attack on Sudanese soldiers at 
the border.  Sudan has so many potential problems, it would 
like to cross some off its list.  The Chadian Ambassador,s 
formal apology for the border incident is a good step and 
Sudan has agreed to host Chadian President Deby soon.  Sudan 
is looking to the US to encourage Chad to find a solution to 
the conflicts. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
IT TAKES TWO TO CLAP: BILATERAL RELATIONS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that trust between their 
two governments would have to be built "brick by brick."  "We 
have put all our bricks on the table," rejoined Nafie.  "It 
takes two to clap. I personally see no will on the US side to 
improve relations. Darfur has been blown out of its size 
because of your own issues" and US political dynamics.  The 
Deputy Secretary noted that he had rebutted this same 
argument in his conversation with intelligence chief Salah 
Gosh, and that he had seen the U.S. and other countries work 
together to mend poor relationships. There would be some 
other excuse after Darfur, Nafie complained. &If the U.S. 
and Sudan become good friends, or at least not enemies, that 
will be news.8 
 
 
¶11. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Deputy Secretary 
Jendayi Frazer, A/S for African Affairs 
Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affairs 
Bobby Pittamn, Senior Director for Africa, National Security 
Council 
Col Dennis Giddens, DoD advisor 
Kathryn Hoffman, Embassy notetaker 
 
Sudan 
Nafie Ali Nafie 
 
HUME