VZCZCXRO6280
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0583/01 1060642
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160642Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6840
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0097
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0026
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0132

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000583 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S 
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN EAID KPKO MOPS PGOV PHUM
PINR, PREF, PREL, SU, AU-1, UN 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
ADVISOR SALAHEDDIN 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000583  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Presidential Adviser Salaheddin appealed for 
a qualitative change in the bilateral relationship. He 
presented an upbeat assessment of the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), saying that momentum is 
building, with progress being made even on the contentious 
issue of Abyei. On Darfur, Salaheddin acknowledged the need 
for a political settlement and a process to bring in UN 
peacekeepers. He is confident that an understanding is 
emerging on deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP). He 
sees further incremental changes as the way forward, 
suggesting that a first step could be appointments to key 
positions. The Deputy Secretary outlined some of the key 
elements needed for the hybrid force to attract troop 
contributions and succeed in the long run. He stressed the 
need to have a single chain of command in the hybrid force, 
and he reiterated the urgent need for action. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with Presidential 
Advisor Ghazi Salaheddin on April 15. The Deputy Secretary 
opened by providing a brief summary of his earlier meetings 
in Juba, Darfur and Khartoum, noting that the humanitarian 
situation seems to have stabilized, but because of political 
and security uncertainty, the situation is balanced on a 
knife's edge and could revert to crisis.  The recent 
agreement on humanitarian access was a positive step, and the 
U.S. will be watching it carefully as it is implemented. As 
the largest donor, the U.S. has a legitimate interest in this 
topic. We want to see the hybrid force deployed as soon as 
possible. The meeting with the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) force commander confirmed that Darfur is beyond the 
capabilities of the 5,000-strong AU force. 
 
--------------------------- 
I Want to Help You Help Us 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Salaheddin said that his aim in meeting with the 
Deputy Secretary was to "help you help us." In his opinion, a 
resolution of the problem of Darfur will allow for an 
improvement in bilateral relations.  Focusing on the CPA, 
Salaheddin said progress is being made and momentum is 
picking up.  The CPA is a huge document, very detailed, and 
difficulties in implementation are to be expected. It is 
encouraging that while both sides have complaints, the 
differences are not over principles. In all other areas 
beyond Abyei, things have improved over the past six months. 
He cited revenue sharing and legislation as areas where 
progress has been made, noting that legislation to implement 
the CPA has been passed by a process of consensus and the NCP 
has not had to use its mechanical majority to force 
legislation through the Assembly. In reply, the Deputy 
Secretary urged Salaheddin not to be too difficult to help, 
 
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and noted that it does not derogate from sovereignty to 
accept help from the international community. 
 
------------------------- 
Abyei Receiving Attention 
------------------------- 
 
4.(C) Salaheddin went into great detail on the issue of 
Abyei, which he described as the most difficult piece of CPA 
implementation. The two sides are working on the issue, and 
at the latest National Congress Party (NCP)/Sudanese Peoples' 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) meeting, they agreed to establish 
a provisional administration for the area. The Deputy 
Secretary asked whether the CPA required that the decision of 
 
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the Abyei Commission be accepted by the two sides. Salaheddin 
said that was true, but that the CPA also required that the 
Commission use the 1905 administrative order as the basis for 
its decision. The NCP believes this was not the case. 
Nevertheless, there are efforts underway to move beyond the 
Commission decision. Salaheddin said options under 
consideration include; new arbitration, an appeal to the 
constitutional court, or, an effort at international 
arbitration. 
 
------ 
Darfur 
------ 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000583  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (C) It is imperative to focus on Darfur and find a way to 
move forward, said Salaheddin. Noting that the recent 
humanitarian access agreement is a positive step, he said 
that there is now a need for a political settlement and a 
process to allow peacekeepers to deploy. Saying the 
government has been willing to go down this road, he 
complained that the rebels are "uncontrolled" and that 
insecurity now is due to infighting among the various groups. 
On peacekeeping, he is confident that the government is close 
to a common understanding on the agreement for the HSP. But 
he stressed that Chad had to be brought on board. Salaheddin 
said that his personal view is that peacekeepers are needed 
to patrol Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African 
Republic. This is a huge job, but it is crucial. In recent 
conversations with him, the French have expressed concerns 
that the situation in Darfur may become a regional problem, 
involving not only Chad, but countries further to the west. 
 
¶6. (C) The fragmentation of the rebel groups in Darfur 
further complicates matters. The government is willing to 
work for the enhancement of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
and remains flexible in this regard, said Salaheddin. The 
Deputy Secretary asked how credible partners can be 
identified in Darfur. Salaheddin replied that the population 
groups that must be brought in are well known; he cited the 
Fur, the Zaghawa and the Massalit. He dismissed Abdul Wahid 
as "useless" and said he could have had Minawi's place in the 
government if he had been willing to sign the DPA. The Deputy 
Secretary asked if other credible Fur leaders are active, and 
 
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Salahaddin replied that there are, but each commands only a 
small following. 
 
¶7. (C) Salaheddin noted that the resolutions of the AU Peace 
and Security Council and the Presidential Statements on 
Darfur helped to build a framework. He sees further 
incremental changes as the way forward, suggesting that a 
first step could be appointments to key positions. The Deputy 
Secretary agreed that appointments to these positions are 
 
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long overdue. Salaheddin then raised the possibility of a UN 
Chapter VIII mandate, which he argued could be tailor-made to 
Darfur. 
 
¶8. (C) The Deputy Secretary commented that practicalities 
have to be addressed in order for the peacekeeping force to 
do its job. The force requires the support of the government 
of Sudan. It must protect the civilian population and IDPs, 
and it must assist with the implementation of the DPA. 
Command and control must be defined and there can only be a 
single chain of command.  If the force is not structured 
properly, countries will not contribute forces. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Perception that U.S. Promises Not Always Fulfilled 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (C) Salaheddin said there is a need for a qualitative 
change in the bilateral relationship in order to realize 
benefits for both parties.  New sanctions are "hobbling" us 
from achieving potential gains, he argued.  The belief is 
becoming entrenched among Sudanese that the U.S. will never 
change its policy.  Some in the government feel let down and 
disappointed that despite signing the CPA and the DPA, Sudan 
remains on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and 
comprehensive economic sanctions remain in place. Salaheddin 
recounted some of his past involvement in US-Sudanese 
relations, saying that he remembered Senator Danforth 
promising sanctions relief. However, when the CPA was signed, 
such relief did not materialize. Later, Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick had said that everything would fall into place once 
the DPA was signed, but again the Sudanese were disappointed. 
 Assistant Secretary Frazer replied that she too was involved 
when the U.S. was facilitating the CPA negotiations.  At the 
time it was felt that the CPA addressed an overall type of 
response, that of using military power to crush civilians. 
The Sudanese Government's actions in Darfur were reminiscent 
of this approach. Therefore the sanctions remained in place. 
 
 
¶10. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Deputy Secretary 
 
KHARTOUM 00000583  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
Jendayi E. Frazer, A/S for African Affairs 
Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affairs 
Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security 
Council 
Bill Garvelink, USAID 
Gustavo Delgado, D staff 
Curtis Stewart, Embassy notetaker 
 
Government of Sudan 
Ghazi Salaheddin, Presidential Advisor 
Ambassador Abdel Basit Badawi al Sanousi, Director, Americas 
Division 
HUME