VZCZCXRO1012
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0515/01 0910443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010443Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6686
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000515 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WEEK OF MARCH 26:  DYSFUNCTION 
TO BREAKDOWN - SLA/MINAWI ON STRIKE 
 
REFS:(A) KHARTOUM 459 
 
      (B) KHARTOUM 445 
      (C) KHARTOUM 396 
 
SUBJECT:  AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WEEK OF MARCH 26:  DYSFUNCTION 
TO BREAKDOWN - SLA/MINAWI ON STRIKE 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) With no specific cases to examine, Ceasefire Commission 
(CFC) discussions continued to revolve around AMIS' proposed 
restructuring of the body.  SLA/Minawi, this week joined by the 
Sudanese government and other DPA signatories, railed against the 
proposed reduction in salary payments and number of representatives 
per sector.  SLA/Minawi later issued a statement proclaiming that 
they would go on "strike" for one week beginning March 30.  This 
issue, if not quickly resolved, stands to further alienate DPA 
signatories and lead to another crisis similar to the ejection of 
non-signatories in August 2006.  The Government denied 
responsibility for an alleged March 22 aerial bombing near the 
Chad-Sudan border.  With both AMIS language assistants and 
SLA/Minawi representatives striking, AMIS is effectively closed for 
business. End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
CFC RESTRUCTURING TURMOIL 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Despite its obvious absence from the CFC agendas during the 
week of March 26, SLA-Minawi representatives continued to deride 
AMIS' proposals to restructure the ceasefire mechanism (reftels). 
These concerns were echoed by other CFC representatives, including 
the Government, which argued that AMIS was deliberately attempting 
to undermine the ceasefire body to justify more urgent UN 
intervention.  Deputy Force Commander Rurangwa, chairing the CFC in 
the Force Commander's absence, repeatedly attempted to steer the 
conversation away from the CFC restructuring, holding that it was a 
political matter decided at the Khartoum level in conjunction with 
the international community.  Complaints, he asserted, should be 
channeled through the appropriate political leaders in the capital. 
(Comment: While the March 11 meeting convened by the AU in Khartoum 
for the international community previewed the proposed changes in 
the CFC, donors only agreed that representatives' monthly payments 
should be reduced.  No consensus was achieved in determining the 
final salaries or the precise number of representatives per sector. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) SLA/Minawi CFC representatives expressed frustration at 
AMIS' lack of investigations and "failure to neutrally implement the 
DPA."  (Note: Despite a recent surge in potential ceasefire 
violations, AMIS has noted only one active investigation in its 
situation reports for several weeks.  End Note.)  The movement's 
exasperation culminated March 29 when it declared that it would not 
participate for one week in any AMIS activities, including 
patrolling, investigations or CFC deliberations.  In its nine-page 
statement, SLA/Minawi accused the National Congress Party (NCP) of 
undermining the DPA and asserted that the African Union (AU) was 
complicit in these activities.  The document specifically cites the 
AU's failure to "play its role in the disarmament of the 
Janjaweed...carry out early verification of the positions controlled 
by the parties...(and) provide logistic non-military support as 
provided for by the DPA." 
 
¶4. (SBU) The SLA-Minawi statement blamed AMIS Force Commander Aprezi 
for "the harm to our movement" and concludes that he "can hardly be 
described as impartial or objective."  Citing several cases, it 
alleged that the Force Commander unjustly accused the Movement of 
various misdeeds, denigrated the integrity of SLA/Minawi and worked 
"at driving a wedge between the people and the Movement."  The 
SLA/Minawi statement further explained its opposition to AMIS' 
reconfiguration of the CFC.  It lays down an ultimatum that all 
SLA/Minawi personnel will strike for one week, beginning March 30, 
pending positive resolution of six demands: 
 
-- AMIS reverses its suspension of activities in 
SLA/Minawi-controlled areas (prompted after the killing of two 
Nigerian AMIS soldiers on March 5 in Graida, South Darfur, an area 
controlled by SLA/Minawi forces). 
-- Retraction of "unilateral" decisions by the Force Commander, 
including refusal to allow Movement representatives to attend AMIS 
morning briefings or receive the daily situation report. 
-- Reconsideration of AMIS' decision to reduce CFC representatives' 
Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA). 
-- Assurance that AMIS will not reduce the number of SLA/Minawi 
representatives serving as CFC participants and military observers. 
-- Greater AMIS cooperation with SLA-Minawi in providing 
 
KHARTOUM 00000515  002 OF 002 
 
 
communications and transportation. 
-- AMIS must give "due respect for all our reps." 
 
-------------------- 
CFC AND AMIS INERTIA 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) No cases were considered during the week of March 26, 
despite a number of potential ceasefire violations that occurred 
over the previous weeks.  The U.S. observer enumerated a number of 
specific recent cases - alleged Sudanese government aerial 
bombardment March 22 on the Chad-Sudan border, an alleged Arab 
militia attack March 24 on Sirba in West Darfur, the March 24 
killing of SLA/Minawi South Darfur Security Arrangements Committee 
Head Abdel Shafee Juma Arabi, among other incidents - and urged the 
acting CFC Chairman to issue orders to all relevant sectors to carry 
out immediate investigations.  Deputy Force Commander Rurangwa 
acknowledged the importance of swift AMIS action but, in the same 
breath, pointed out that the ongoing language assistants strike and 
absence of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and SLA-Non-signatory 
Factions (SLA-NSF) representatives at AMIS effectively precluded 
carrying out any investigations, particularly in areas held by the 
non-signatories. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Responding to a direct query from the U.S. observer, 
Government representatives denied that Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) 
carried out any aerial bombing along the Chad-Sudan border.  (Note: 
AMIS has been unable to verify the March 22 attack as some of the 
bombings occurred on the Chad side of the border and because the 
affected zones on the Sudanese side are controlled by DPA 
non-signatories.  The CFC EU Second Vice Chairman, French Brigadier 
General Sintes, confided to the U.S. Observer that French forces 
based in Chad verified the bombardment, as had locals and NGOs 
operating in the area.  End Note.)  CFC participants noted a number 
of on-going, unresolved matters, including joint AMIS-Sudanese 
government review of the Janjaweed disarmament plan (due for 
presentation to the CFC on April 4), completion of the 
areas-of-control verification exercise (due by April 2), and next 
steps in resurrecting the failed CFC Second Chamber. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶7. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Luke Aprezi has sought to shift 
responsibility for the CFC restructuring decisions to the AU and 
donor nations, when he devised and presented the options as a fait 
accompli at the March 11 meeting in Khartoum.  The DPA signatories 
have little legal ground to protest the reduction of MSA, though 
they have ample justification under Article 25, paragraph 233 to 
argue against any reduction in the number of representatives, which 
the DPA holds should be increased.  From a practical standpoint, it 
is logical to have at least two Movement representatives per Sector 
(vice only one, as proposed by AMIS) in the event that there are 
multiple patrols or one representative is indisposed.  This issue, 
if not quickly resolved, stands to further alienate DPA signatories 
and lead to another crisis similar to the ejection of 
non-signatories in August 2006 - from which AMIS and the 
peace-process has yet to recover. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment continued: In the days preceding the March 29 
SLA/Minawi statement, the movement's representatives were only 
sporadically participating in AMIS activities.  Patrols have 
dwindled to negligible levels.  Tensions between AMIS and SLA/Minawi 
are at an all-time high, exacerbated by AMIS' perceived lack of 
neutrality, its inability to facilitate the delivery of non-military 
logistical support and its accusations (many of them probably 
justified) of SLA-Minawi involvement in several recent carjackings 
and hostile confrontations.  The implications of this state of 
affairs - compounded by the March 24 attack on SLA/Minawi facilities 
in Khartoum - may lead to further defections by field commanders 
from SLA-Minawi.  Without rapid, concerted and coordinated 
international attention to address both AMIS and SLA-Minawi's 
legitimate grievances, the peace process will stall.  End comment. 
 
HUME