VZCZCXRO3735
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1095/01 0940301
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040301Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7273
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3912

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAIDAF ECON MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT SHARANA: PAKTIKA ASSESSMENT 2006 
 
------ 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) In the past twelve months, measurable progress in 
Paktika has been limited, although 2006 witnessed greater 
Afghan involvment in the province's security.  The most 
positive changes were driven by the U.S. military and the PRT 
in Sharana.  Paktika is a province that has never experienced 
effective central government control.  Since the fall of the 
Taliban, the U.S. military has been the single largest force 
for change in Paktika.  The Afghan government and security 
forces in the province remain weak and for the most part 
ineffective.  END SUMMARY 
 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) 2006 witnessed greater Afghan involvement in the 
province's security.  With U.S. military assistance, Afghans 
now operate a Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) 
which coordinates the activities of all Afghan security 
forces in the province.  There are 839 Afghan Uniformed 
Police (AUP) authorized in Paktika.  However, only 455 
professional (trained) police were actually on hand in 2005 
and 2006.  In 2006, Paktika hired an additional 294 
non-professional temporary contract police.  Paid by the 
Governor's operational funds, the contract police wear the 
national police uniform, provide a national presence in 
remote districts, and perform the normal police functions of 
the AUP, although none have been trained at the Regional 
Training Center.  The AUP recently began joint patrols with 
the PRT's MP platoon and have, in the last few months, 
successfully defended themselves when attacked in the 
districts.  However, the AUP was not an effective security 
force in 2005 and they remained ineffective at the end of 
¶2006.  Afghan Border Police (ABP) numbers remained generally 
static with 992 authorized and approximately 479 on hand in 
both 2005 and 2006.  The ABP in Paktika lack sufficient 
personnel, NCOs, equipment and infrastructure, but mostly 
they lack professional and honest leaders.  They will not 
significantly improve as an effective force in Paktika until 
their leadership sets a more professional example. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In the JPCC, the Afghans maintain a presence, but 
they are not as effective as they could be due to failure to 
fully staff it.  The leadership tends to be ineffective and 
does not provide enough support for the JPPC which is not 
staffed with the best personnel in the security forces. 
Moreover, they are not fully manned.  However, they do 
understand reporting requirements and there is good cross 
talk among staff of different security elements.  To become 
more effective, Afghan security forces need to commit to 
fully staff all personnel requirements, be willing to 
organize under the command of the AUP Chief of Operations in 
the JPCC, and work for the Officer in Charge regardless of 
service affiliation.  This will only be accomplished through 
continued engagement, coaching, and training. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Afghan National Army (ANA) numbers increased in 
Paktika in 2006 from two Kandaks (battalions) with 
approximately 1200 soldiers to four Kandaks with roughly 2200 
soldiers. Unfortunately, many ANA will only leave their 
secure bases if paid an additional two U.S. dollars a day to 
go outside the wire.  Despite these problems, the ANA is by 
far the best Afghan security force in the province and is 
continuing to improve under U.S. and Romanian Embedded 
Training Team (ETT) guidance. 
 
INSURGENT ACTIVITY 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Insurgent activity in Paktika increased in 2006. 
In the period May through December, indirect fire attacks 
increased from 95 in 2005 to 148 in 2006.  Direct fire 
attacks, tracked over the same time period, increased from 54 
to 118, with improvised explosive device strikes increasing 
 
KABUL 00001095  002 OF 003 
 
 
from 26 to 67.  The first suicide bombing in Paktika occurred 
on April 9 (there were none in 2005) with a vehicle born 
suicide attack in Bermel district.  They continued through 
December, with a total of four vehicle and five body-borne 
suicide bombings.  Many of these security incidents occurred 
in the border districts and are tied more to cross border 
activity.  With the exception of the border districts, 
insurgent attacks in Paktika saw no significant increase in 
2006 over 2005.  Attacks did, however, impact the provincial 
government.  Paktika's Directors of Health and Refugees and 
the District Commissioner of Shakalabad as well as the Chief 
of Police of Gayan district were all assassinated in 2006. 
 
GOVERNANCE 
---------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) During 2006, Paktika's Governor Khpalwak attempted 
to reach out to the tribes and religious leaders and made a 
conscious effort to travel to each district.  However, he 
does not have a strong staff or a good relationship with 
other members of the provincial government and is to a great 
extent a one-man government.  Paktika's Provincial Council 
continued to struggle in 2006.  Meeting haphazardly, and 
regularly ignored by the Governor, the Provincial Council at 
present is not an effective representative body.  The three 
Meshrano Jirga members and four Wolsei Jirga members who 
represent Paktika in the national Parliament are rarely seen 
in the province.  Parliamentarians and Provincial Council 
members are simply not a factor in day to day life and have 
made little effort to connect with their constituents. 
Little progress was made in developing Paktika's Directors of 
Ministries during 2006.  UNAMA rarely visits the province and 
there is no NGO or Afghan government-sponsored governance 
training.  Only 16 of the 25 ministries are represented in 
Paktika. 
 
REAL POLITICAL POWER IN PAKTIKA ) THE TRIBES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In Paktika's districts, tribal and religious 
structures provide the only functioning government and 
judicial systems.  Afghan government representatives in the 
districts are more symbolic faces than ruling entities. 
(Comment: Effective authority can only come about when local 
tribal and religious leaders work together with trained, well 
resourced local district and provincial administrators who 
are able to convince the traditional leaders that they bring 
something of value to complement or replace the tribal and 
religious systems. End Comment)  Corruption and the pervading 
suspicion of corruption in the national and provincial 
governments are the single largest factor separating the 
people from the government in Paktika. 
 
ECONOMIC SITUATION 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Paktika's economy is pre-industrial farming and 
pastoral.  Its predominately subsistence economy saw little 
economic growth or change in 2006.  Over 90 percent of the 
people of Paktika are subsistence farmers or nomadic herders. 
 There was little or no change in their economic situation in 
2006, with the exception of a 50 percent reduction in 
cereal/grain crops due to a severe drought.  There is no 
industry or manufacturing in Paktika.  The largest employers 
in Paktika are the Afghan government and the U.S. military. 
However, there has been some limited economic growth in 
service industries along the roads  built with U.S. 
assistance. 
 
SOCIETAL 
-------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Paktika has limited exposure to the world outside. 
Traditional religious and tribal (Pashtun Wali) customs hold 
sway.  No noticeable change in the social order was seen in 
Paktika for some time.  Women are rarely seen, and when 
outside the family compound, are nearly always covered head 
 
KABUL 00001095  003 OF 003 
 
 
to toe in burkas.  Few schools for girls currently exist but 
increased threats to both schools and parents caused at least 
one school to close in western Paktika.  However, in 2006, 
nearly all Paktika's District Tribal Shuras went on record 
requesting the government build schools for both boys and 
girls in their districts. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) In Paktika, government inaction, inefficiency, and 
corruption are the biggest threats to the Karzai Government. 
The failure of the government to reach out to tribal and 
religious leaders and the people in the districts is a 
weakness that needs to be addressed before effective 
governance can take place.  Until Afghan government leaders 
take responsibility and reach out to the people in the 
districts, the Afghan government will remain ineffective in 
Paktika. 
NEUMANN