VZCZCXRO1074
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #1055/01 0911141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011141Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7188
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3903

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 001055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: SEMI-ANNUAL HELMAND REVIEW 
 
Classified By: DCM Richard Norland for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Helmand faces serious problems within all PRT pillars 
)- security, governance and development.  Security is the 
most pressing and immediate concern for the province.  Apart 
from intense civilian and military focus on major projects 
such as Kajaki, little progress can be expected on governance 
and development (and counter narcotics) until the security 
situation improves.  Security is worst in northern and 
southern Helmand, where ISAF and the Afghan Government (GOA) 
currently are prosecuting operations.  While the central 
region is relatively safer, there are risks of intimidation 
and violence to those with links to the GOA or ISAF, and 
there is evidence of increased risk to NGO staff and 
contractors involved in reconstruction projects.  In terms of 
governance, Helmand is saddled with a corrupt and mismanaged 
bureaucracy that has little ability to provide services to 
the populace and few qualified people to tap as replacements. 
 Elected Provincial Council members have little influence and 
few links to their constituents.  The new Governor, whose 
interest in reaching out to tribal leaders has flagged as he 
focuses more on the need for military operations, has a 
domineering style that eventually might bring tribal elders 
into the GOA's sphere, but also could result in little 
attention paid to improving provincial and district 
governance. 
 
¶2.  (C) Economically, a province rich in resources has seen 
decades of conflict and neglect seriously degrade its 
irrigation system and infrastructure.  The deteriorated 
security environment has hampered reconstruction and chased 
away many NGOs.  Though Helmand appears poised to see 
progress in reconstruction and development, given donor plans 
and projects, the security environment and the lack of human 
capital could limit anticipated gains.  In the social sphere, 
women face resistance to any change in traditional roles, 
e.g., opportunities to learn new job skills.  Those perceived 
as challenging those traditional roles face threats.  The 
education sector has been hit hard, with school closures and 
burnings, and attacks on teachers.  Finally, combating the 
opium trade and reducing and eventually eliminating poppy 
cultivation, cuts across - and directly impacts - security, 
governance and development efforts.  Helmand's population 
seems ambivalent about the exploding poppy trade.  More might 
turn against the poppy culture if they appreciated the 
growing indigenous addiction problem, if they saw greater 
risk introduced at the cultivation, production and 
trafficking points in the trade, and if they perceived 
themselves to have viable alternative sources of livelihood. 
Intensifying progress on these key pillars of our CN strategy 
remains essential.  END SUMMARY 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Local Afghans are becoming increasingly dissatisfied 
with conditions in Helmand, with many pointing to the 
deteriorating security environment as the primary reason. 
The deterioration accelerated in 2006.  Over the summer, 
fighting in the north and south of the province intensified 
greatly.  Autumn saw a lull in the fighting, a decrease that 
coincided with the Afghan government's controversial 
agreement (supported by UK-led ISAF) with the shura of the 
northern district of Musa Qala that turned over to local 
elders responsibility for the district's security.  Fighting 
increased at the onset of winter, with the fraying and 
breakdown of multiple ceasefires in Naw Zad and the one in 
Sangin, and with the UK-led Helmand Task Force prosecuting 
operations in Kajaki, Nahri Sarraj and Garmser districts. 
Early in 2007 the uneasy quiet in Musa Qala ended with the 
Taliban attacking and occupying the district center.  In 
March, ISAF and the GOA launched Operation Achilles to 
 
KABUL 00001055  002 OF 005 
 
 
stabilize the northern districts. 
 
¶4.  (C) Until recently, the central districts had not 
experienced the fighting seen elsewhere, until the Government 
of Afghanistan (GOA) launched an operation in the area of 
Babaji, north and west of the provincial center of Lashkar 
Gah, on March 22 which displaced anti-government forces from 
the area.  This operation aside, in the generally more secure 
center individuals with links to the GOA have been at risk of 
intimidation or violence.  Examples include two Afghan 
National Police (ANP) personnel beheaded in January 2007; a 
line ministry employee reportedly forced under threat to move 
his family from Nawa-I-Barakzayi district; and staff members 
of the Ministry of Women's Affairs receiving threatening 
phone calls and "night letters".  In 2006, all but one of the 
suicide bombing attacks in Lashkar Gah appeared directed at 
GOA or PRT/ISAF targets.  Dozens of Afghan civilians died in 
the incidents, including a group waiting outside the 
Governor's compound, seeking permission to attend the Hajj. 
There have been three suicide bombings in Lashkar Gah this 
year. 
 
¶5.  (C) Civilian members of the PRT move primarily within 
Lashkar Gah and to a lesser extent neighboring Nad Ali. 
Afghans can generally move freely in the central districts, 
though (ironically) perhaps one of the greatest problems 
encountered is harassment at police checkpoints.  The ANP is 
almost universally seen as a deeply corrupt organization that 
preys upon rather than supports the populace.  The Afghan 
National Army (ANA) enjoys a better reputation, and in some 
districts it is improving.  The PRT has funded the 
construction of police checkpoints, manned by ANP and the 
Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP).  (NOTE:  In the 
north, ANAP have been deployed to man checkpoints.  There 
have been reports of Taliban checkpoints in the north, where 
"tolls" are assessed. END NOTE.) 
 
¶6.  (C) The end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 saw an 
increase in threats to NGOs and contractors undertaking 
reconstruction projects.  Examples include an NGO that 
reported the kidnapping (and eventual release) of two local 
staff, supposedly by the Taliban; a contractor in Nad Ali who 
was threatened into abandoning work on a school, and another 
in Nahri Sarraj who was beheaded; the kidnapping and 
execution of a doctor who worked at a medical clinic operated 
by an NGO for the GOA; and the first suicide bombing of 2007, 
which was directed at the compound of the USAID Alternative 
Livelihoods implementer. 
 
Political 
--------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Helmand's ineffectual and corrupt bureaucracy ) at 
the provincial and district levels - has long been a source 
of dissatisfaction and has offered few prospects for 
improvement.  Line ministries have small staffs and, aside 
from Rural Rehabilitation and Development, little in the way 
of funds for development.  The Provincial Council (PC) is not 
yet ready to play a constructive role.  The PC members appear 
to have settled in Lashkar Gah and are reluctant to reach out 
to their districts, citing lack of budget and security 
concerns. 
 
¶8.  (C) Upon arriving in Helmand in January 2007, Governor 
Assadullah Wafa energetically reached out to tribal leaders, 
trying to bring them into the GOA's sphere by issuing an 
ultimatum that, for tribal councils to enjoy his recognition 
and cooperation, they must accept a slate of conditions 
requiring cooperation with the GOA, ISAF, and development 
organizations.  Two district shuras signed Wafa's demanding 
"protocols", though afterwards both were briefly occupied by 
the Taliban.  Over time, Wafa has pursued his protocols less 
aggressively; increasingly, he has pointed to robust military 
operations across the province as a prerequisite to political 
outreach, and he has backed away from efforts to eradicate 
 
KABUL 00001055  003 OF 005 
 
 
poppy. 
 
¶9.  (C) Wafa's domineering style ) some would call it 
abrasive and dismissive ) is another source of concern.  His 
imperious approach leaves little room for improving local 
governance.  He has made clear his disdain for the line 
ministries, declaring them to be ineffective and corrupt.  He 
has demanded close oversight over all development projects in 
Helmand and only reluctantly agreed to call a PDC meeting. 
Wafa also risks falling into the trap he often rails about: 
promising but not delivering, e.g., touting the establishment 
of a university in Helmand and promising that poppy 
eradication would cover the province. 
 
¶10.  (C) Local distrust of the GOA flows largely from the 
extravagant misrule and rampant corruption over much of the 
past several years, which have so ingrained the perception of 
an unresponsive, ineffective and unrepresentative government 
that few now look to the GOA for assistance.  For example, 
where courts are functioning (reportedly only in the four 
central districts), there is little evidence that locals use 
them.  People are more likely to turn to traditional 
mechanisms of justice, like local shuras, or to run afoul of 
Taliban justice in ad hoc "courts". 
 
Economy, Reconstruction and Development 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Helmand has considerable potential for livestock, 
fisheries, poultry, floriculture, and horticulture, and is 
rich in natural resources, primarily the Helmand and 
Arghandab rivers.  Decades ago, construction of an irrigation 
system created an extensive farming zone, but ensuing 
conflict and neglect nearly destroyed the irrigation and road 
infrastructure.  As a result, Helmand,s economy remains 
feudalistic and underdeveloped.  The majority of the province 
has no access to electricity.  There is no manufacturing 
industry of any significance, with the exception of a small 
marble factory and dilapidated cotton gin.  Vocational 
training schools are in complete disrepair.  Poppy 
cultivation has overshadowed all licit agricultural 
activities.  Without dramatic changes, sustainable growth 
remains a distant prospect, due to the insecure environment, 
the lack of infrastructure, agriculture production techniques 
and crop values. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Reconstruction and development have been inhibited 
in Helmand, in large part due to the deteriorated security 
environment that has caused many NGOs to leave the province. 
This has limited development, income and employment 
opportunities.  USAID plans and projects (Kajaki energy and 
infrastructure project, Alternative Livelihoods, ARIES 
micro-finance), the UK (short-term quick impact and 
longer-term agriculture projects), as well as Danish and 
Estonian projects targeting the education and health sectors 
give some basis for optimism.  Helmand might experience only 
very limited gains this year, not simply due to the insecure 
environment, but also because of the lack of local capacity, 
in government and the private sectors, that hampers delivery 
of services and reconstruction. 
 
Cultural/Social 
--------------- 
¶13.  (SBU) There are few opportunities for women in this very 
traditional province.  Thus, while a project to train 
midwives has local support, there is resistance to employment 
outside the home, training, or even elementary education for 
girls.  Some local elders have expressed displeasure at the 
prospect of a widows' association running a dairy, 
especially, as they said, in a province with significant male 
unemployment.  Those seen to advocate a greater role for 
women in Afghan society, e.g., staff of the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs, have received threatening calls and "night 
letters".  Nevertheless, there are a number of women's 
associations active in the province, whose members point to 
 
KABUL 00001055  004 OF 005 
 
 
the great need for employment in the villages and have 
expressed interest in a variety of training opportunities. 
¶14.  (SBU) Widespread insecurity has hit the education sector 
particularly hard.  The number of people reporting their 
children not attending school increased as the security 
situation worsened, and has remained steady.  Of the 224 
schools in the province, 113 are operating, 45 are 
"semi-active" (ceasing operations during periods of 
conflict), 30 are closed, and 36 have been burned.  Schools 
in the provincial center are generally open and operating, 
though a fear of suicide bombings has kept some parents from 
sending their children to classes and some teachers have 
reported receiving night letters.  The director for the 
Education Ministry reported that three teachers were murdered 
in 2006, and one was murdered in January, 2007.  (Note: 
According to Education Ministry contacts in Kabul, eight 
staff including teachers were killed in 2006.) 
 
Counter Narcotics 
----------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Security and corruption are closely intertwined with 
the drug trade, so closely that it is often difficult to 
separate trafficking, politics and the ongoing insurgency. 
As Afghanistan's top producer of opium - representing nearly 
half of its poppy cultivation ) Helmand has seen poppy 
become the key economic factor.  Despite its centrality in 
the province's economy, only a limited number of influential 
people (including some government officials) drive poppy 
cultivation and derive the greatest profits from it; for 
most, there are relatively small though still tangible 
benefits. 
 
¶16.  (C) Introducing risk into the poppy trade is the goal 
and greatest challenge here.  The local population is well 
aware of the evils of the opium trade, which have been the 
subject of numerous shuras and radios messages.  Yet people 
seem evenly divided as to whether poppy cultivation is good 
for the province or not.  Locals may not appreciate the 
growing addiction problem in Helmand, where the head of a 
local drug rehabilitation clinic estimates that one in five 
families contains a drug addict (likely an overstatement, but 
the problem for Helmand is considerable and growing).  Some 
of those who accept the fact of counter narcotics efforts in 
Helmand insist that they be "fair", by which they appear to 
mean the risks should fall more on drug lords rather than 
small farmers and should not target areas where the people 
(at least nominally) accept the GOA's rule.  More Helmand 
residents might turn against the poppy culture if they 
appreciated the growing indigenous addition problem, if they 
saw greater risk introduced at the cultivation, production 
and trafficking points in the trade, and if they perceived 
themselves to have viable alternative sources of livelihood. 
Intensifying progress on these key pillars of our CN strategy 
is essential. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Reducing and eventually eliminating poppy 
cultivation is not the only pressing need in Helmand.  There 
is a critical need to strengthen GOA institutions related to 
counter-narcotics )- Counter Narcotics Police of 
Afghanistan, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and, more 
broadly, the courts and the jails )- which are largely not 
functioning. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶18.  (C) While the opium trade is generally identified as 
Helmand's paramount problem, for most residents the 
deteriorated security environment represents the most 
immediate and pressing concern.  One need not embrace the 
Governor's often repeated statement that all but three 
districts are "controlled" by the Taliban to appreciate the 
problem -- a population that has never had strong ties to the 
central government has seen that government's influence 
 
KABUL 00001055  005 OF 005 
 
 
undermined over the last year.  Even should Governor Wafa 
pursue and secure additional signatures on his protocols, 
that would be no more than paper recognition of GOA authority 
unless the government can credibly and sustainably project 
itself beyond the central districts.  This will not be 
possible without a stronger ISAF role.  Any assessment of 
progress on governance, development and counter narcotics in 
Helmand must be seen and measured in light of the current 
security environment. 
 
NEUMANN