VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJA #1150/01 1140848
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240848Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4469
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0022
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0543
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0003
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0010
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0011
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0047
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0013

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK SR ZL ID
SUBJECT: AHTISAARI MEETINGS IN INDONESIA ON KOSOVO 
 
REF: JAKARTA 1098 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Michael Anderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari told 
A/DCM April 24 that President Yudhoyono (SBY) said that 
Indonesia would try to decide on the future of Kosovo 
rationally.  Citing domestic concerns and the need to consult 
the legislature, SBY did not state a position.  The 
Indonesians seemed to be looking for reasons to support 
Ahtisaari's plan.  Ahtisaari met with Vice-President Kalla 
and several ministers over dinner.  Kalla reportedly phoned 
Yudhoyono in support of the plan.  Ahtisaari gave a personal 
tone to all of his discussions to emphasize to the 
Indonesians that they owed him one, given his previous role 
in the Aceh peace negotiations.  Ahtisaari was more 
optimistic about his Indonesia stop than the ones in Ghana 
and South Africa.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) The morning of April 24, UN Special Envoy for Kosovo 
Marti Ahtisaari briefed A/DCM on his talks with President 
Yudhoyono and other senior leaders about the future status of 
Kosovo.  Ahtisaari had dinner at Vice-President Kalla's home 
the evening of April 22, met with President Yudhoyono April 
23 and was scheduled to meet Foreign Minister Wirajuda the 
afternoon of April 24.  He was scheduled to meet EU 
representatives before departing that evening for Vienna. 
Three of Ahtisaari's aides attended our meeting as did 
PolCouns. 
 
SBY Wants to Make a "Rational" Decision 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ahtisaari spoke positively about the April 23 meeting 
with SBY, whose comments were reassuring.  SBY told Ahtisaari 
that the Indonesians were trying to be rational in their 
decision-making.  SBY acknowledged the differences between 
Kosovo and other territories.  SBY said he would have to 
consult within the government and with the legislature, but 
left Ahtisaari with the impression that he could control the 
process.  SBY said that Islamists would be supportive but 
that others would be critical.  Although SBY was unwilling to 
say what exactly he would do about a UN Security Council 
resolution, Ahtisaari told us that he would be very 
disappointed if the Indonesians did not support.  Ahtisaari 
felt much more positive about his Indonesia visit than he had 
after his recent Ghana and South Africa visits:  in those 
countries he did not know what to make of their positions, he 
said. 
 
¶4.  (C) During the conversation, SBY discussed possible EU 
incentives to Serbia and Kosovo at length.  Ahtisaari said 
that the Indonesians clearly did not understand the mechanics 
of EU membership nor had they internalized that Kosovo would 
have to be independent in order to join the EU.  The 
hand-over of wanted war criminals by Serbia had to be 
resolved as well.  Hopefully, he added, the Indonesians 
understood better EU membership procedures.  Ahtisaari said 
that SBY had promised to call after the visit of a Serb 
envoy, who was scheduled to arrive in Jakarta April 24, to 
provide a readout of that conversation.  SBY was accompanied 
in the meeting by Cabinet Secretary Sudi Silalahi and foreign 
affairs adviser Dino Djalal. 
 
Dinner with VP Kalla and Cabinet Members 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ahtisaari was received the previous evening by VP 
Kalla for dinner.  In attendance were several Cabinet members 
including Coordinating Minister for Security, Political, and 
Legal Affairs Widodo, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, and Minister 
of Justice and Human Rights Awaluddin.  Also in attendance 
was the former rector of Jakarta's Islamic Univerity, 
Azaruddin Azra, who is a well-known religious moderate. 
Ahtisaari said he made his "sales pitch" and that there were 
extensive questions and answers.  Uncharacteristically, 
Vice-President Kalla was silent during most of the discussion 
while the Foreign Minister probed with many questions.  Azra 
asked questions about the kind of state that would emerge in 
Kosovo.  Ahtisaari expected his formal call on Minister 
Wirajuda would not cover any new ground.  Minister Awaluddin 
told Ahtisaari at an April 24 dinner that Kalla had 
telephoned SBY with a recommendation to support the Kosovo 
plan. 
 
No Press 
-------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Before the Presidential meeting, Ahtisaari agreed not 
to make a statement to the press at the request of Dino 
Djalal.  Apparently, the Indonesians wanted to avoid any 
appearance that SBY was being lobbied, as opposed to 
receiving an explanation of the recommendations.  Ahtisaari 
said that he was comfortable with that approach and suggested 
that any further interactions by the Kosovo plan's supporters 
with the Indonesians be low-key.  He did not plan to hold any 
press event before his departure.  With respect to his own 
tactics, Ahtisaari said that he made sure that all his 
interlocutors understood that he would be personally 
disappointed if they did not support his plan, leaving unsaid 
that the Indonesians owed him for his assistance with the 
Aceh peace talks.  He noted that the Indonesians seemed most 
interested in the position of Qatar, presumably due to the 
religious factor surrounding Kosovo's future. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  We are happy that Ahtisaari had a good 
round of meetings in Jakarta, and have no doubt that his 
visit will be an important contribution to Indonesian 
thinking.  The references by SBY to his domestic audience 
probably reflect a real concern, given the parliamentary 
outcry over the Iran vote.  We believe that he will want to 
make sure his bases are covered before the GOI makes a final 
decision on the Kosovo resolution.  Based on Ahtisaari's 
relative optimism, that decision could bode well for his 
plan.  End Comment 
 
 
 
HEFFERN