VZCZCXRO3921
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0026/01 1131601
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 231601Z APR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0101
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0058
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0094
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IRAN, INL, INR, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/23/2027 
TAGS: IR KCRM PGOV PREL PINR SNAR
SUBJECT: UNODC OFFICIAL VIEWS IRAN DRUG CHIEF REPLACEMENT A SIGN OF 
HARDLINER RESURGENCE 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000026  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary:  The head of Tehran's UNODC office sees the 
recent dismissal of Fada Hossein Maleki as head of the Drug 
Control Headquarter as a sign that President Ahmadi-Nejad got 
the upper hand over Expediency Council head Rafsanjani. 
Although appointed by Ahmadi-Nejad, Maleki reportedly moved into 
Rafsanjani's camp as he came to see value in international 
engagement on the drug issue.  When he reportedly confronted 
Ahmadi-Nejad over the president's decision not to let him attend 
a ministerial level meeting in Vienna, Ahmadi-Nejad fired him 
but was unable to actually get rid of him until the crisis over 
the British sailors strengthened his position over pragmatists, 
in Arbitrio's view.  The UN official noted that while he 
believed hardliners currently had the upper hand in Iran, the 
internal political dynamics could shift again. He also said 
Iranians increasingly recognize that their own government is the 
source of Iran's tense international relations.  End summary. 
 
2.(S/NF) UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Tehran-based Field 
rep Roberto Arbitrio (Italian citizen, please protect) opined in 
an April 21 meeting with IRPOffs that the recent dismissal of 
Fada Hossein Maleki as secretary-general of the Drug Control 
Headquarters demonstrates that currently hardliners have the 
upper hand in Iran.  Arbitrio's account fills in holes from 
recent conflicting reports in the Iranian press whether or not 
Maleki was on his way out, prior to the definitive news of 
Brigadier General Esmaeel Ahmadi-Moqaddam's swearing-in April 
¶11.  Arbitrio's assessment is based on a conversation between 
his staff and Maleki and therefore only tells Maleki's side of 
the story.  Arbitrio's updates on the drug situation in Iran and 
Iran's regional cooperation to be provided septel. 
 
Maleki unemployed or not? 
------------------------- 
 
3.(S/NF) As background, Arbitrio said that when UNODC Director 
General Costa visited Iran in November 2006, Maleki appealed to 
him for assistance in helping Iran approach the international 
community on the drug issue via Afghanistan and specifically 
NATO.  Maleki's interest in international engagement, Arbitrio 
said, was the result of UNODC's efforts over a year and a half 
to convince him of the benefits of such activities.  He noted 
that in Costa's subsequent meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad, the 
president did not specifically reiterate the point about 
reaching out to NATO, calling only for regional engagement. 
Nonetheless, UNODC assumed his endorsement, given that Maleki 
was seen as close to Ahmadi-Nejad, who had appointed him. 
 
4.(S/NF) According to Arbitrio, Costa took this request on board 
and worked on organizing a ministerial level delegation from 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to address major donors in 
Vienna.  When he heard the meeting was moving ahead, Maleki was 
reportedly very happy and grateful, and said he would attend. 
However, when the Iranian authorities sent passports to the 
Tehran UNODC office for the trip, Maleki's was missing.  Late 
February, UNODC in Tehran heard that perhaps Maleki would not go 
and perhaps no one else would go either.  However, in Vienna, 
the Iranian mission told UNODC that all was on track.  By 
February 27, Arbitrio, already in Vienna, heard no one was 
traveling from Iran.  Reportedly, the Pakistanis were very upset 
when they heard the Iranians were pulling out, and Afghanistan 
and Pakistan eventually sent a lower level delegation. 
 
5.(S/NF) On March 2, Iranian Ambassador Soltaniyeh requested a 
meeting with Costa, attended by Arbitrio.  Soltaniyeh reportedly 
made no apologies for Iran's no-show, simply saying that Maleki 
had a "personal commitment," and reiterated Iran's interest in 
increasing international cooperation.  Costa was reportedly very 
upset by Iran's handling of the matter but said he would 
continue to try to facilitate international contacts. 
 
6.(S/NF) Arbitrio said his staff later (no date given) talked 
directly to Maleki about what had happened.  Maleki reportedly 
said that when he learned about the ministerial meeting, he 
requested a meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad.  After the president 
"reluctantly" gave him an appointment, he told Maleki he would 
not approve the meeting.  When Maleki pressed for a reason, 
saying that Costa had organized the meeting as a response to the 
president's request, Ahmadi-Nejad gave no explanation. 
 
7.(S/NF) According to Arbitrio's readout of the conversation 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000026  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
with Maleki, others lobbied the president to change his mind 
about Iranian attendance at the Vienna meeting, including 
Judiciary chief Shahroudi and Foreign Minister Mottaki, without 
success.  Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi could not even 
get a meeting with the president, according to Maleki.  Maleki 
claimed he managed to get a second meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad in 
which he pleaded to be allowed to go.  When Ahmadi-Nejad did not 
change his mind, Maleki claimed he told the president he was 
making a mistake, and Ahmadi-Nejad reportedly responded by 
firing him. 
 
8.(S/NF) Maleki reportedly then contacted Expediency Council 
Chair Rafsanjani, who got angry that he had not been consulted. 
According to Iran's drug policy, the president is the chair of 
the Drug Control Headquarters, but the Expediency Council plays 
a supervisory role.  After some kind of intervention by 
Rafsanjani, Maleki's dismissal was reportedly rescinded, and 
Maleki traveled mid-March to Vienna for a different 
anti-narcotics meeting.  In Vienna, Maleki reportedly reassured 
Costa that he was still in charge.  Arbitrio said it was a 
strange delegation that traveled with Maleki, less than half of 
whom seemed pro-Maleki, most pro-IRGC.  When Maleki met with 
Costa, the delegation insisted on providing its own interpreter, 
which Arbitrio said was not standard. 
 
9.(S/NF) Per Arbitrio's Foreign Ministry sources, the source of 
the tension between Maleki and Ahmadi-Nejad was Maleki's growing 
closeness with Rafsanjani.  As Maleki reportedly came to see the 
value of engagement on the drug issue to Iran's overall foreign 
policy, he gradually moved towards Rafsanjani, who was more 
sympathetic to this view than Ahmadi-Nejad.  Ahmadi-Nejad was 
reportedly unhappy about the situation but only saw his chance 
to act upon it in the aftermath of the British sailors crisis. 
According to Arbitrio, Ahmadi-Nejad had orchestrated the 
incident to get the upper hand over the pragmatists.  Arbitrio 
believes that one consequence of the situation was that 
Ahmadi-Nejad succeeded in dismissing Maleki.  Two days after the 
sailors' release, Maleki received his dismissal letter.  What 
was particularly unusual, the letter did not include an onward 
assignment. 
 
10.(S/NF) Arbitrio also commented he was surprised how 
out-of-the-loop the Foreign Ministry had been on the issue, 
saying that UNODC heard before the ministry did that Maleki was 
not being allowed to attend the ministerial meetings in Vienna. 
 
Starting over with a new head 
----------------------------- 
 
11.(S/NF) Maleki's replacement, Ahmadi-Moqaddam, also retains 
his role as Chief of Police and supposedly has the protection of 
the president.  He is reportedly married to the president's 
sister.  He comes out of the IRGC and reportedly met 
Ahmadi-Nejad working on security issues in Kurdistan.  He was 
also deputy commander of the Basij.  Rafsanjani reportedly 
criticized Moqaddam for helping Ahmadi-Nejad in the presidential 
elections.  Arbitrio said that Maleki had earlier told him 
before that Ahmadi-Nejad wanted to replace him with Moqaddam, in 
order to get the police inside the Drug Control Headquarters. 
 
12.(S/NF) Arbitrio, who was in Dubai en route to Pakistan, said 
he would meet Moqaddam for the first time after his return to 
Iran.  He expressed frustration at having to rebuild a 
relationship with the new head and - he hoped - convince him of 
the benefits of international engagement on the drug issue. 
Arbitrio could not say he understood what Ahmadi-Nejad's policy 
on the issue was.  Maleki's dismissal could have been the result 
of policy differences on this issue of international engagement, 
or it could have been simply intended to punish Maleki for 
switching alliances.  He also noted that other issues could have 
been at play.  Maleki had come from mid-level ranks of the 
Ministry of Interior and as such was not widely accepted by the 
police.  This supposedly caused problems in implementing Drug 
Control Headquarters policy.  Now, the drug office and the 
anti-narcotics police are unified, but Arbitrio said it was too 
soon to judge whether this would have positive or negative 
effects on drug policy.  He also repeated a rumor that Moqaddam 
may have been appointed to the new position in essence to 
sideline him because of unhappiness with his performance 
regarding the deteriorating security situation in Sistan-va 
Baluchistan. 
 
Hardliners on the upsurge 
------------------------- 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000026  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
13.(S/NF) Arbitrio, who very clearly caveats between what he 
knows and what he surmises, said he believes that as a result of 
the seizure of the British sailors, the hardliners generally 
have the upper hand in Iran.  He noted, however, that this could 
change at any time, making Iranian decision-making hard to 
predict.  He believes that Ahmadi-Nejad knows he faces a 
legitimacy gap, demonstrated in every democratic exercise in 
Iran, including the December 2006 elections and the push-back he 
has gotten from the Majles.  Arbitrio said the Iranians he knows 
believe the hardliners know they will lose in any future 
election absent any change, so the hardliners are either 
plotting to forego elections or to make sure elections are held 
in a crisis situation.  Therefore, in Arbitrio's view, 
Ahmadi-Nejad uses crises like the nuclear issue and the British 
sailors to artificially create consensus and to confront 
pragmatists.  Arbitrio also believes that Ahmadi-Nejad, who he 
has met in two short meetings as well as the long meeting with 
Costa, suffers from a Napoleonic complex (Arbitrio estimated his 
height at 168 cm).  He had heard that the president has fired 
people for being taller than him. 
 
14.(S/NF) The religious-military alliance sees itself above 
democracy, and isolation and tension simply empowers them. 
Arbitrio also claimed that Iran is increasingly militarized, 
citing visible anti-aircraft weapons both around Tehran and en 
route to Esfahan.  He is also increasingly doubtful of the 
Supreme Leader's control over the situation.  He thinks the 
Supreme Leader feels more threatened by Rafsanjani than by 
Ahmadi-Nejad, particularly given Rafsanjani's calls to reassess 
the role of the Supreme Leader.  Arbitrio also said that he is 
hearing for the first time in a long time that there are limits 
to Rafsanjani's scope of action, and he doubted reformers could 
have much impact on the political scene. 
 
15.(S/NF) Arbitrio said there is a real fear in Iran that war is 
on the horizon.  UNODC and embassies are doing contingency 
planning, he has stocked up on food and water at home, and 
embassies are counting their nationals.  One ambassador told him 
that until three months ago, he thought conflict was unlikely 
but that he was now discouraged and saw no sign that Iran would 
pursue a sensible solution.  One change Arbitrio noted among 
Iranian people with whom he has contact, however, was that in 
the past they blamed US policy for the tense bilateral 
relations, but now they've realized that their president is to 
blame.  They are more worried what the "Iranian Hizballah" will 
do and say next than what the US will do.  They also see that it 
is no longer a US-Iran issue, but that the international 
community is unified in their objections to Iranian behavior. 
BURNS