VZCZCXRO8490
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0021/01 0991212
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 091212Z APR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0090
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0049
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0085
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0083

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; PARIS FOR WALLER; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU 
FOR HAUGEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/9/2027 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR MOPS UK IZ
SUBJECT: IRANIAN REACTIONS TO BRITISH DETENTIONS 
 
REF: DUBAI IRPO 0018 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000021  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary:  Several Iranians discussed their views of 
what prompted the March 23 detention of British sailors and 
marines by the Iranian military.  All three thought the action 
was preplanned, although it was less clear whether it had 
pre-approval by the Supreme Leader.  All felt the detention of 
the five Iranian Quds Force personnel by US forces in Irbil 
contributed to Iran's motivation for taking such an action, with 
Iran wanting to demonstrate its strength.  One contact claimed, 
however, that the detention of the five Iranians was not a major 
issue in Iranian public opinion.  Another contact thought the 
Iranian action may have also been an attempt by radicals to 
seize power away from the so-called pragmatists who purportedly 
gained strength with the outcome of the December elections.  The 
recommendations of these contacts for dealing with Iran vary 
greatly between those living in Iran and those outside.  End 
comment. 
 
Former IRGC General believes Supreme Leader approved action 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
2.(S/NF) A purported former Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) general maintained that the motivation for the March 23 
detention of British soldiers was the US detention in Irbil of 
five IRGC personnel, as well as UK-Iranian clashes (NFI) in 
Basra predating the detention.  According to the general, the 
IRGC was likely concerned that the British were planning an 
Irbil-type raid in Basra against it and wanted to preempt them 
with a show of strength.  He added that the incident appeared 
very well planned and was convinced the Supreme Leader gave his 
pre-approval.  He believes that President Ahmadi-Nejad is not a 
political decision-maker in Iran. 
 
3.(S/NF) When asked why target the British if IRGC anger was 
mostly focused on the Irbil detentions, the former general 
reasoned that unlike the Americans, the British are already on 
their way out in Iraq so Iran would reason they would be less 
inclined than the Americans to escalate the situation.  Also, he 
said, Iran would like to be able to claim that they helped push 
the British out of Iraq, similar to Hizballah claims that it 
ended the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.  He doubted that the 
Iranians used the detention to test Western reaction to such an 
incident but said it served this purpose regardless.  Asked if 
he thought the intent of the Iranians was to change the subject 
of international discourse from the nuclear issue, he said he 
did not know, but that if that had been their intent, they were 
wrong to think it would work. 
 
4.(S/NF) When asked if the Iranian government likely understood 
the highly negative international reaction that the video 
"confessions" of the detainees would provoke, the general said 
he doubted it, saying that those involved in the operation are 
largely ignorant of the West.  The general asserted that the 
peaceful resolution of the incident would likely have a positive 
impact on overall Iranian-Western relations, setting a precedent 
that diplomatic solutions work.  In contrast to some of our 
interlocutors (reftel), the former general asserted that Iran 
does not want direct conflict with the US. 
 
5.(S/NF) The general went on to reason that releasing the five 
Iranians detained by the US in Irbil would provide a "golden 
opportunity" for further improving the political atmosphere.  He 
said it would send a message to Iran that when it takes a 
"positive" step, i.e. releasing the detainees, the US is 
prepared to reciprocate.  He claimed this strategy would weaken 
the extremists in Iran more than passing UN Security Council 
resolutions against the country.  He believes the Iranian people 
as a whole supported the detention of the British soldiers, as a 
warning to the West not to detain Iranians.  On the other hand, 
he acknowledged that the Iranian people do not seem too well 
informed or irate about the five Iranian detainees in Irbil. 
Nonetheless, he argued, their release without conditions would 
have a positive impact.  He said Iranians had taken note of an 
evolution in US rhetoric on Iran, based on a calmer, less 
aggressive tone.  Therefore, he reasoned, if the US made a 
positive gesture, public opinion in Iran would put pressure on 
the Iranian government to respond in kind. 
 
6.(S/NF) When asked about public opinion in Iran regarding the 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000021  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
IRGC-Quds Force, he said the general public knew little about 
the various divisions within the IRGC and saw it as one 
organization.  He deflected the question about general attitudes 
towards the IRGC and talked instead about the history of the 
Quds Force.  He said it was created about 20 years ago, towards 
the end of the Iran-Iraq war, initially to help Palestinians 
combat Israeli aggression.  Since then, its mandate had been 
expanded to unconnected issues, such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq.  He added that its members are more competent and more 
committed to the revolution than the rest of the IRGC, and 
membership is very selective. 
 
Professor assumes pre-approval 
------------------------------ 
 
7.(S/NF) An Iranian professor said that the detention of the 
five Iranians in Irbil had a "huge effect" on the Iranian 
government, and that the government's response was the detention 
of the British sailors and marines.  He obviously believed 
Iranian press reports that the US would release the detainees by 
Nowruz and wondered why this had not occurred.  He added that 
the local IRGC commander (no name given) in the region where the 
Brits were picked up is not the type to take unauthorized 
actions, so he assumed there had been some kind of pre-approval. 
 
Oppositionist says 50-50 chance leader approved 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8.(S/NF) In a phone conversation prior to their release about 
the British detentions with US-based Mohsen Sazegara (please 
protect), a founder of the IRGC who has since become a reformer, 
Sazegara said there was a 50-50 chance that the incident had 
preapproval from the Supreme Leader.  Not everything in Iran is 
preplanned, he said.  He reasoned that such an event could have 
been orchestrated by a group of radicals to assert its political 
hand over pragmatists, who were bolstered by their general 
success in the December 2006 elections.  Whether or not the 
Supreme Leader had advanced warning of the incident mattered 
little, he said, since Supreme National Security Council 
Secretary Larijani's subsequent statements about the possibility 
 
SIPDIS 
of trying the detainees indicated that the Supreme Leader was in 
control of the situation.  Larijani would not have gotten 
involved without the explicit instructions from the Supreme 
Leader, Sazegara reasoned. 
 
9.(S/NF) Sazegara's explanations for why the detention occurred 
included several tacks: 
 
-- whenever Iran has internal problems, it creates an external 
crisis -- for instance, the 1979 hostage situation (to distract 
from the chaos of the revolution) and the Salman Rushdie affair 
(to distract from the Iran-Iraq war ceasefire).  In this way, 
Iran can divert attention from internal issues and have an 
excuse to stir up nationalism and crack down on internal 
dissent.  (Note:  The British detentions occurring just prior to 
the passage of UNSCR 1747 certainly served to preempt news of 
the resolution's passage in Iran.  Endnote) 
 
-- to demonstrate Iran's strength after three "humiliations": 
1) detentions in Irbil of top Quds Force personnel; 2) two 
UNSCRs passed unanimously, including by "friends" of Iran; and 
3) demonstrations by Russia of its ability to start and stop the 
Bushehr project. 
 
10.(S/NF) Sazegara said that Iran likely had little fear it 
would pay a serious prices for  the detentions.  He claimed that 
the Supreme Leader's New Year message demonstrated his 
confidence that the US and West will not attack Iran. 
Furthermore, according to Sazegara, the Supreme Leader has tried 
for the last 10 years to create a situation where people think 
they have no power to do or change anything in Iran.  Therefore, 
reasoned Sazegara, the Supreme Leader currently believes he 
faces no real threat from internal groups or external forces. 
In Sazegara's view, Iran feels it can tolerate any sanction, 
short of an oil boycott, and it does not think the international 
community would impose an oil boycott because of oil demands. 
 
11.(S/NF) Sazegara said he heard Khatami had met with the 
Supreme Leader (no timeframe given) and told him the situation 
was dangerous, and Iran was risking war, but the Supreme Leader 
told him not to worry, that Iran has the upper hand.  Many 
technocrats in the regime don't like the current situation, but 
they have no say, claimed Sazegara.  He added that if Rafsanjani 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000021  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
tries to exert influence, his sons are threatened with 
corruption investigations, leaving the Supreme Leader and the 
security and intelligence forces the upper hand. 
 
12.(S/NF) Comment:  The policy recommendations regarding dealing 
with Iran from those still connected to Iran and those outside 
often vary widely.  In this case, the former general (now a 
Dubai-based businessman) and the professor both claim not to 
like Ahmadi-Nejad, and the professor in particular was critical 
of what he saw as a fundamental flaw of the regime trying to mix 
Islamic rule and democracy, but neither could be categorized as 
oppositionists.  (Note: both were introduced to IRPO by the same 
longstanding Iranian-American contact.  Endnote)  Sazegara has 
apparently completely broken with the regime and faces charges 
in Iran.  The general and the professor both advocated changing 
Iran's behavior through engagement, which they said would 
increase public pressure on the Iranian government to move 
toward rebuilding relations, although their recommendations seem 
unlikely to succeed.  The general proposed starting by releasing 
the Irbil detainees, and the professor claimed that opening up 
US trade would have greater impact on Iran than military action, 
while at the same time sparing the region greater instability. 
The professor, in particular,  did not seem to realize how 
unlikely it was that the US would open trade relations with Iran 
prior to resolving differences.  Sazegara, on the other hand, 
advocated threatening to deny Iran the ability to repatriate its 
profits from oil sales until it agrees to a Helsinki-type 
process and frees political prisons, reopens its shuttered 
reformist press, and holds free elections.  It would seem that 
this threat would only be effective if other countries would 
sign on, and that appears unlikely for the time being. 
BURNS