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Viewing cable 07GUANGZHOU487, Fuzhou - Fraud Capital of China (2 of 2): 3 Days in Fuzhou

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07GUANGZHOU487 2007-04-24 01:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Guangzhou
VZCZCXRO4367
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC
DE RUEHGZ #0487/01 1140139
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240139Z APR 07
FM AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5994
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5319
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 6267
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USUN NEW YORK 0022
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GUANGZHOU 000487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/VO, CA/FPP, CA/EX, DS/IP/EAP, DC/CR, DS/CR/VF, DS/CR/PF, 
AND INL/HSTC 
BEIJING FOR RSO, DHS, CG AND FPU 
NVC FOR FPU 
USICE/HQ FOR HQINT, HQOAI, CAO AND FDL 
US UN FOR RSO-PASS TO DS/FLD/NYFO 
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT ASEC CVIS KFRD CH KCRM INL HSTC
SUBJECT: Fuzhou - Fraud Capital of China (2 of 2): 3 Days in Fuzhou 
 
THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
REF: A. Guangzhou 00485 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: A Conoff from Guangzhou's Fraud Prevention Unit 
and a LES Investigator visited Fuzhou from January 29-31, performing 
14 immigrant-visa field investigations. Of the 14, 12 were confirmed 
to involve fraud and one applicant could not be located.  In many 
cases, neighbors and village residents are the best resource for 
uncovering fraud but in some villages, the entire population is 
active in the deception and consulate investigators are unwelcome 
guests.  This is the second in a three cable series detailing the 
level of visa fraud activity in the Fuzhou area of Fujian province. 
End Summary. 
 
Three Days in Fuzhou 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Conoff and LES Fraud Prevention Unit Investigator (FPUI), 
both from Guangzhou's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) visited Fuzhou in 
Fujian province from January 29-31 to perform field investigations 
relating to pending immigrant and non-immigrant visa cases.  In what 
is representative of many Fuzhou cases, Conoff and FPUI investigated 
14 suspected cases involving a sham marriage and one non-immigrant 
visa case involving a Fuzhou travel agency partnership. 
 
3.  (SBU) Of the fourteen immigrant visa cases that were 
investigated, all involved suspected sham marriages and twelve 
involved suspected sham divorces.  Conoff and FPUI went to each 
applicant's most likely addresses, using self-reported home 
addresses from the application for an immigrant visa as well as 
addresses on submitted divorce decrees, household registries, and 
employment certifications to try and confirm the likelihood of 
cohabitation between the applicant and the supposed ex-spouse.  In 
eleven of the cases, the applicant's residence was located and 
confirmed by the applicant, applicant's family member, or residence 
neighbors. 
 
Be a Good Neighbor 
------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) Among these eleven cases, all showed strong signs of fraud 
and in ten cases cohabitation between the applicant and the supposed 
ex-spouse was confirmed.  In two of the cases, the ex-spouse was 
seen leaving the applicant's home as Conoff and FPUI arrived.  In 
these two cases neighbors and village residents quickly confirmed 
the identity of the ex and confirmed the cohabitation with the 
applicant.  In three other cases, neither the applicant nor the 
ex-spouse was found at the residence but neighbors, asked 
independently, once again confirmed the on-going cohabitation of the 
applicant with the original spouse.  In an additional three cases it 
was other family members, children, siblings, or parents, of the 
applicants and original spouse who were found at home at the 
residences and confirmed the cohabitation of the couple. 
 
Revealing Residences 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) In four of the cases, a family member or the applicant was 
at home and maintained the divorce was still legitimate in 
questioning by Conoff and FPUI.  After identifying themselves as 
fraud prevention staff from the Consulate, Conoff and FPUI asked for 
permission to enter the home and look around.  In all cases, 
permission was granted.  During the viewing of the home, residents 
were asked to voluntarily show all bedrooms and closets.  Conoff and 
FPUI also noted displayed photographs and items about the residence 
such as house shoes, coats, toiletries.  When clothing or other 
items appeared to be those of the supposed ex-spouse, residents were 
asked to explain.  In all cases, residents' stories quickly fell 
apart as physical evidence in the residence overwhelmed the ability 
to create stories at a moment's notice. 
 
6.  (SBU) In one case, the applicant's child, himself a derivative 
to the visa petition, claimed the woman's closet full of woman's 
clothes found in the applicant's bedroom were an aunt's.  When asked 
for the relation he claimed the woman was his mother's sister and he 
gave a name.  When leaving the residence Conoff and FPUI found the 
 
GUANGZHOU 00000487  002 OF 003 
 
 
applicant waiting at the ground floor of the apartment building. 
The applicant tried to hide but when noticed, agreed to talk to 
Conoff and FPUI.  When asked whose clothes were in his closet, he 
replied they belonged to his brother's daughter and gave a second 
name.  These wildly inconsistent stories show how far applicants in 
sham marriage schemes will continue to lie to consular officers, 
even when caught in the act of perpetrating the fraud. 
 
7.  (SBU) In a separate case, Conoff and FPUI went to the 
application address to find it was actually the applicant's father's 
residence but the applicant happened to be there helping to clean. 
Upon questioning, she admitted she did not live at the address given 
but rather with her mother.  In fully six of these twelve site visit 
cases, the applicant provided a false or out-of-date address for 
their current residence.  The applicant then accompanied Conoff and 
FPUI to her mother's home which was a short walk away.  In that 
residence, while no sign of the ex-spouse was found, there was also 
little sign of the applicant's continued residence at the home 
either and the bedroom she claimed as her own was currently occupied 
by her still sleeping brother. 
 
First Marriage, Still a Sham 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Two applicant's cases were first marriages but due to 
information sent to Post were thought to be suspect.  In both cases, 
without the information submitted by anonymous sources, it would 
have been difficult to detect and confirm fraud.  Both cases 
involved young, single women marrying Chinese-American males where 
it was a first marriage for both.  In one case, post was sent photos 
of the applicant with a different man.  Upon visiting the 
applicant's address she recognized the man in the photos as a work 
colleague and even had photos with him on her computer.  She readily 
gave Conoff and FPUI the phone number of the colleague in the photos 
but denied any relationship between the two.  Upon leaving the 
applicant's residence, FPUI called the work colleague who quickly 
admitted he and the applicant actually had a long-time romantic 
relationship and he was actively assisting her in perpetrating the 
sham marriage so she could later divorce and petition himself to the 
United States. 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
9.  (SBU) While in some cases local residents, neighbors, and 
sometimes even family are happy to discuss applicants engaged in 
visa fraud, once leaving the confines of Fuzhou's central business 
district for the surrounding areas of Changle, Fuqing, Lianjiang, 
and Mawei, it becomes a different story.  In each village or 
community the site of an unfamiliar car quickly starts a verbal 
early-warning system to alert residents.  As the destination becomes 
clearer, villagers approach to run interference and start collecting 
intelligence as to whether a foreigner is in the car and if the 
occupants can speak the local dialect.  In the ensuing 
conversations, questions and answers are repeated back, in louder 
than needed voices and sometimes a listener or two will suddenly 
wonder off and disappear.  The element of surprise is usually lost 
in most field investigations. 
 
10. (SBU) In many field investigations, despite confirmation from 
other sources and evidence abounding within the home pointing to 
cohabitation, the applicant and the supposed ex-spouse are not 
caught together.  With such complicit community involvement it is 
simply too easy for the ex-spouse to disappear out a back door and 
wait for investigators to leave.  Remittances and overseas links 
benefit the entire village, not just the family of concern, and in 
many cases help with a sham marriage has been or will be repaid.  It 
is more difficult to gauge the level of influence of snakeheads, 
loan sharks, and other criminal influences and the fear factor they 
contribute to these villages once a few residents are committed to 
$40,000 to $80,000 USD per person to get to the United States.  As 
one Fuzhou resident explained to Conoff, if you want borrow money to 
start your own business, no one will loan you any but if you say you 
want to get to America then it is easy to borrow large sums.  For to 
many residents in Fuzhou and its surrounding areas, leaving still 
seems the best return on investment available. 
 
 
 
GUANGZHOU 00000487  003 OF 003 
 
 
GOLDBERG