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R 220910Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
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INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 7887
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1610
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 9048
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9850
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000663 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREF KDEM PMIL BG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENTS WITH COAS MOEEN 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 657 
     ¶B. DHAKA 646 
     ¶C. DHAKA 560 
     ¶D. DHAKA 505 
     ¶E. DHAKA 484 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia A. Butenis; reason 1.4(d) 
 
¶1.    (C) Summary: In an April 16 meeting with Ambassador 
Butenis and DATT (note taker), Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. 
Moeen Uddin Ahmed described the military's successes in 
support of the civilian government, cited the need for 
political party reform, provided assurances the military 
would remain subordinate to civilian government, defended his 
recent speeches, saying criticisms cited passages out of 
context, and promised to review allegations of human rights 
abuses by the military.  The Ambassador reiterated core USG 
themes.  She acknowledged the end 2008 elections timeline and 
noted the need for further details on interim steps, said the 
ban on political activity should be lifted now to allow 
important political party reform to move forward, stressed 
the necessity of civilian rule and the negative impact if the 
military overstepped its role, and emphasized the need to 
observe international standards of due process and human 
rights.  Moeen's personal secretary, Lt. Col. Feroze, also 
attended the one hour meeting. End Summary. 
 
¶2.    (C) Political Reform and The Two Ladies: Internal 
political party reform is essential, Moeen said, but is 
difficult to achieve if Sheikh Hasina or Khaleda Zia remain 
in Bangladesh.  Party leaders, however, were unwilling to 
tell Hasina and Zia to go.  Moeen said senior Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party leaders met recently with government 
officials and decided that Zia must go. (Note: The government 
has indefinitely barred Hasina from returning to Bangladesh 
(Ref A) and Zia is expected to depart for Saudi Arabia 
shortly (Ref B)). 
 
¶3.    (C) Governance:  Moeen noted progress under the 
Caretaker Government, especially at Chittagong Port, which he 
claimed was fully functional now as a result of the 
military's involvement.  He gave the civilian leadership 
mixed reviews, suggesting they had been slow to address 
problems and had made some questionable decisions, citing as 
an example the demolition of slums on public lands.  The 
constitutional limit of 10 advisers plus the Chief Adviser 
was not enough to manage the government.  One option under 
consideration is for the President and the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court to increase this number.  If that cannot be 
done constitutionally, another option is to appoint "special 
consultants" with the rank of state minister. 
 
¶4.    (C) And the Army's Role:  Ambassador, reflecting 
concern in Washington and Embassy's previously expressed 
views, stressed that any political role for the army or Moeen 
himself would be a mistake for Bangladesh, and something we 
could not support.  Moeen denied, as he has in the past, that 
the military had or would assume a political role.  He ruled 
out martial law, denied plans for a military endorsed 
national unity government, said the army would not form a 
political party, and denied personal political ambitions "so 
far."  He defended his recent remarks (Refs. C and D) but 
said he would speak publicly less in the future.  The 
government will form a National Security Council, he said, 
but the civilian government, not the army, would determine 
its structure and composition.  Military ranks will be 
increased to include the rank of full general (as first 
proposed under the Zia government, he said) to bring 
Bangladeshi military structure more in line with that of its 
South Asian neighbors.  Moeen noted that even the military's 
limited role created opportunities for corruption; the army 
is under intense pressure to take bribes and Moeen has 
already removed several officers for abusing authority.  He 
agreed to provide the details to the DATT. 
 
¶5.    (C) Human Rights:  Asked about reports of military 
involvement in the torture of a minority leader (Ref E), 
Moeen noted on-going civilian and military investigations but 
downplayed reports of torture, suggesting the leader's 
injuries resulted from running into a tree while intoxicated. 
 Challenged by the Ambassador to explain credible contrary 
accounts, Moeen promised to investigate. 
 
¶6.    (C) Comment:  Moeen has consistently denied to the 
diplomatic community any possibility of martial law, a 
national unity government, or a military "king's party" but 
 
DHAKA 00000663  002 OF 002 
 
 
he was coy about a political role for himself.  We have made 
it clear to him and others in the military that General Moeen 
in uniform must have no political role.  He was no doubt 
burned by the negative reaction to his public political 
speeches, though he claimed that "70%" of the responses he 
received from the public were favorable.  We will continue to 
reinforce our message on the need to focus on elections and a 
restoration of an elected civilian government as soon as 
possible. End Comment. 
BUTENIS