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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUJUMBURA 000241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/S; PRETORIA FOR T. TRENKEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PINR BY SF
SUBJECT: BURUNDI CEASE FIRE AT CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
 
REF: PRETORIA 1077 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Ann Breiter for Reasons 1.4 (B) and ( 
D.) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Burundi's cease fire agreement with the 
rebel PALIPEHUTU-FNL has stalled.  Visiting South African 
analyst Jan van Eck (protect) warned that the accord could 
collapse because the South African facilitators had assured 
the FNL that certain outstanding issues could be discussed in 
Bujumbura following the September signing.  Van Eck claimed, 
however, that the facilitators never obtained the Government 
of Burundi's (GOB's) assent to this plan.  Van Eck feared 
that this revelation might prompt the FNL to leave the 
negotiating table.  South Africa's Ambassador to Burundi 
(protect) disputed thisQim, but he acknowledged that on 
March 26, the FNL categorically refused to continue 
discussions until the GOB met its concerns.  Clearly annoyed, 
the Ambassador implied that Van Eck's discussions with the 
FNL may have prompted the party to take a harder line.  For 
his part, Van Eck plans to travel to Dar es Salaam on March 
31 to meet with FNL leaders there and return to Burundi early 
in the week.  Van Eck also expressed concern that FNL chief 
Agathon Rwasa's personal credibility within his party could 
be at stake.  End Summary. 
 
Two Conflicting Stories 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Burundi's fragile cease fire agreement with the rebel 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL may be on the verge of failure, warned South 
African analyst Jan van Eck (protect) on March 29.  The FNL 
signed the September cease fire agreement after intense 
pressure from the facilitators, said Van Eck, because the 
facilitators assured the FNL that they would be able to 
negotiate certain key points, including terms of political 
participation,  after the signing.  However, newly-elected 
CNDD-FDD party President Jeremie Ngendakumana, who 
participated in the peace talks in Dar es Salaam for a time, 
told Van Eck on March 29 that the Government of Burundi (GOB) 
never agreed to continue talks, and that the facilitators 
never broached the possibility of such an arrangement with 
the GOB.  Burundi's government has steadfastly maintained 
that it will not reconsider the terms of the September 8, 
2006, agreement. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Van Eck, Ngendakumana expressed shock at 
Van Eck's report that the FNL had agreed to sign only on 
condition that the two sides would continue to negotiate 
certain key points.  In Van Eck's presence, Ngendakumana 
immediately telephoned South African Ambassador to Burundi 
Mdu Lembede to seek confirmation of the report.  Ambassador 
Lembede apparently tacitly confirmed Van Eck's version of 
events, according to Van Eck.  Van Eck surmised that, in the 
runup to the agreement, the facilitators may have "forgotten" 
to advise the Government of Burundi of the proposal.  He 
feared that, once FNL leaders learned of the apparent 
disconnect, they could question the good faith not only of 
the GOB, but also of the facilitators themselves. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador Lembede hotly contested this version of 
events, telling Charge on March 30 that when the FNL signed 
the cease fire agreement in Dar in September, they continued 
to insist upon additional discussions on four outstanding 
issues: the rewriting of  Burundi's history; the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission; the identification and location of 
assembly areas for former combatants; and FNL participation 
in the government.  The parties discussed these concerns in 
Dar for over six hours before agreeing that they would be 
more appropriately discussed in Bujumbura.  Lembede reminded 
Charge that he had personally participated in the talks in 
Dar and thus knew what was said. 
 
¶5.  (C) Ambassador Lembede continued that when President 
Nkurunziza met with FNL leader Agathon Rwasa in Dar es Salaam 
in September, Nkurunziza plainly stated that given the 
provisions of Burundi's Constitution, he could not guarantee 
that FNL members could obtain specific positions in the 
government.  Once FNL leaders are demobilized, the goQment 
could advise the party of those government positions which 
were available, and FNL members could compete for those jobs 
based on their skills and merit. 
 
¶6.  (C) Lembede acknowledged, however, that the 
implementation process has come to a standstill.  Certain of 
the FNL's most recent demands, he said, would be very 
difficult to meet.  For example, continued the Ambassador, 
the FNL has asked the government to release all political 
prisoners before they continue discussions; however, the 
government could not simply open the doors of all Burundi's 
prisons.  Instead, the release would require a defined 
process. 
 
¶7.  (C) The mandate of the Joint Verification Monitoring 
Mechanism is to implement the cease fire, continued Lembede, 
but the process could not succeed without the cooperation of 
the FNL.  Ambassador Lembede lamented that the FNL 
representatives still remain outside the negotiating process 
and are obliged to consult with their senior leaders by 
telephone in order to make decisions.  Lembede added that he 
could not understand the FNL's continued absence; as long as 
the FNL remains outside the process, there will be no 
movement.  Unfortunately, opined the Ambassador, Burundi's 
government is no longer focusing on the cease fire agreement 
because it is consumed with other, more pressing problems. 
He concluded that both parties must exhibit political will in 
order for the agreement to succeed.  The South African 
facilitators planned to meet with a technical team in Cape 
Town on March 30 to review ways in which to reinvigorate the 
discussions.  However, Ambassador Lembede warned that 
ultimately, if the two sides could not resolve their 
differences sufficiently to implement the agreement, the 
entire process would collapse. 
 
¶8.  (C) Turning again to Van Eck's statements, Lembede stated 
with visible frustration that he did not know where Van Eck 
received his information, nor what he was trying to achieve. 
Lembede somewhat angrily commented thaQ Friday, March 23, 
the FNL had not yet responded to the government's position. 
He noted that Van Eck arrived in Burundi on Sunday evening, 
and on Monday, the FNL flatly refused to continue 
negotiations.  "I don't think that's a coincidence," alleged 
Ambassador Lembede. 
 
Rwasa's Credibility Threatened? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Van Eck, in turn, has expressed grave concern that 
the revelation that Burundi never agreed to the subsequent 
political talks, a stipulation which the FNL required in 
order to sign the September agreement, could destroy the 
South African facilitators' credibility.  In the worst case, 
the FNL could decide to break off talks completely and return 
to the bush.  In an effort to break the impasse, Van Eck 
proposed to Ngendakumana that President Nkurunziza meet 
personally with FNL chief Agathon Rwasa.   Ngendakumana was 
receptive to the proposal.  Van Eck planned to meet with 
African Union representatives later on March 29 to discuss 
options.  He also planned to travel briefly to Dar es Salaam 
over the weekend of March 31 to meet with FNL spokesperson 
Pasteur Habonimana and then to return to Burundi early in the 
week. 
 
¶10.  (C) Rwasa's personal credibility and leadership within 
the FNL is at stake, opined Van Eck.  He characterized the 
FNL as a very dogmatic, tightly run operation whose 
discipline results largely from Rwasa's leadership and the 
force of his personality.  Were Rwasa to be discredited, the 
potential for violence from rogue elements of the party would 
increase dramatically. 
 
¶11.  (C) Van Eck also expressed fears that a continuing power 
struggle within the ruling CNDD-FDD could weaken the 
government.  Despite Radjabu's dismissal as party head, 
President Nkurunziza is still widely perceived as a weak 
figure who spends little time in the office, thus leaving a 
"power vacuum."  According to Van Eck, party members 
increasingly hope to put pressure on the President to serve a 
portion of his term and then to resign in favor of another, 
stronger leader who would be able to make tough decisions. 
 
¶12.  (C) During his meeting with Van Eck, African Union (AU) 
Ambassador Mamadou Bah decried the JVMM's inability to make 
substantive progress on implementation, according to another 
western diplomatic source who spoke with Van Eck on the 
evening of March 29.  Ambassador Bah suggested that if the 
two sides could at least agree on the location of assembly 
areas, the underutilized AU forces could perhaps begin to 
prepare assembly areas for the FNL troops.  The AU's forces 
include one battalion of former UN peacekeepers who remained 
in Burundi following the UN's drawdown in December and were 
immediately rehatted.  However, both Bah and Van Eck worried 
that the FNL leadership would oppose such a move, believing 
that it would serve to confirm that the government never 
intended to negotiate further any of the FNL's concerns. 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  This is Jan Van Eck's first trip to Burundi in over 
a year; he reportedly was denied a visa to return to the 
country after certain government officials, notably former 
CNDD-FDD head Hussein Radjabu, became concerned about his 
close relations with the FNL.  Following Radjabu's dismissal 
as party head, Van Eck sought successfully to return to 
Burundi.  While clearly sympathetic to the FNL, he 
nevertheless enjoys access to the highest levels of Burundian 
society, in which he is a known and respected commodity.  As 
one of the most long-serving diplomats in Bujumbura, African 
Union Ambassador Bah has an extensive knowledge of Burundi's 
peace process and commands widespread admiration. 
 
¶14.  (C) While it is unclear what influence Van Eck may have 
had, if any, on the FNL's decision to halt discussions, it is 
certain that the talks have reached a critical, and possibly 
perilous, juncture.  The facilitators have long worried that 
if the FNL walks away from the table, it would be very 
difficult to draw them - and also possibly the government 
itself - back into the discussions.  It is also possible that 
the infighting in the ruling CNDD-FDD party over the past 
months has distracted the government from the process itself. 
 Nonetheless, with a major donor conference scheduled in 
Bujumbura in late May, the government has a powerful 
incentive to keep the FNL engaged. 
BREITER