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DE RUEHBS #1307/01 1081725
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P 181725Z APR 07 ZDK
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (TAGS ORDER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 
TAGS: PREL EUN GG GR RS
SUBJECT: GREEK CONCERNS ABOUT SEMNEBY'S METHODS SHOULD NOT 
PRECLUDE MOVING FORWARD ON SOME OF SEMNEBY'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
REF: (A) BRUSSELS 822 (B) BRYZA-FRIED E-MAIL APRIL 17 
 
BRUSSELS 00001307  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Enlargement Unit Chief Vincent Carver for reasons 1.5 (B 
/D). 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - - 
 
¶1.  (C) Greek Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
Ambassador Lozos told DAS Bryza April 17 that Greece largely 
shares U.S. views on Georgia and that Athens wants to 
reinforce Tbilisi's territorial integrity and Euro-Atlantic 
ties while remaining sensitive to Russian concerns.  In this 
context, Lozos supported a "step-by-step joint U.S.-EU 
approach."  He expressed consternation at EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) Semneby's "missionary zeal," said his 
stewardship had not met Greek expectations, and characterized 
Semneby's recent trip to Washington and complaints about 
Greek opposition to some of Semneby's proposals as "disloyal 
behavior to the Union."  Despite these misgivings, Greece 
would support most of Semneby's recommendations if Tbilisi, 
the UN, and the OSCE are fully on board.  END SUMMARY 
 
GREEK - SYSTEMATIZED SUPPORT FOR GEORGIA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) DAS Matt Bryza and Greek PSC Ambassador Lozos met 
April 17 to discuss Georgia and reports that Greece has been 
obstructing two key proposals of EUSR Peter Semneby on 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, e.g.: 
 
- Providing one EU policeman to complement UN police efforts 
in Abkhazia and one EU policeman to complement OSCE 
security/observer efforts in South Ossetia; and 
 
- Extending the mandate of the EU's Border Security Team to 
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
Both Bryza and Lozos agreed on the utility of expanding the 
EU's footprint in Georgia's conflict zones to help "unfreeze" 
discussions on conflict resolution and on the need to help 
Georgia move toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Lozos, noting that Greece "and a number of other member 
states" believe Russian concerns should be better taken into 
account, observed the historic and cultural ties between 
Greece and Georgia.  Athens, he said, wants to help promote a 
stable and democratic Georgia.  The Georgians, however, often 
have too high expectations and remain impatient and 
emotional.  A step-by-step joint EU-U.S. approach might help 
calm down the Georgians and increase stability. 
 
¶3.  (C) Bryza stressed that Georgia will feel secure only 
once it knows its path to membership in NATO and the EU will 
be determined by Georgia's own behavior rather than by 
political considerations within Europe (e.g., avoiding 
tension with Russia).  Georgia sees the Baltic States as an 
example of what membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions can 
do for a country's relations with Russia, as Moscow decreased 
its pressure when it became clear there was no way to 
obstruct the Baltic states' movement toward NATO.  The U.S. 
objective is to help Georgia enter the MAP process at the 
next NATO Summit if Georgia sustains its military and 
judicial reforms and its constructive approach toward 
conflict resolution. 
 
COPIOUS CRITICISM OF SEMNEBY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) Lozos explained Greece's opposition to the recent 
proposals of EUSR Peter Semneby as resulting largely from 
procedural matters, Semneby's "missionary zeal," and 
aggressive style aimed at obtaining immediate EU approval of 
his proposals.  Such attributes and actions have not won him 
Greek admiration.  Rather, Semneby's record "is not up to our 
expectations."  Lozos explained that, while the PSC approved 
the overwhelming majority of Semneby's proposals, Athens 
still had concerns about some of his ideas.  Greece is not 
convinced of the value added of the two proposed police 
positions.  According to Lozos, neither the UN nor the OSCE 
had approached the EU about this proposal and the collocation 
of EU police representatives in UN buildings.  In fact, 
Greece does not even know the Georgian Government's position 
on the proposal.  While others (apparently incoming EU 
President Portugal and possibly other member states) have 
similar and additional concerns, Greece would have no 
objections to sending the two police officers if both the UN 
and the OSCE accept the proposal. 
 
¶5.  (C) Lozos outlined Greek concerns about Semneby's 
proposal to use the nine-person EU border monitoring team for 
customs and rule-of-law missions.  Lozos questioned the added 
value of having the border monitoring team perform such 
 
BRUSSELS 00001307  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
functions that are outside its official mandate, and in the 
difficult separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
He also cautioned that doing so could send the wrong signal 
to both the Russian and Georgian authorities.  Greece, 
however, would support creating two EU communications centers 
for border security cooperation in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, if these were acceptable to the Georgian Government. 
 Rather than supporting Semneby's "academic and NGO-like" 
approach of making Georgia a test case for innovative ideas, 
Greece favors moving forward with those of Semneby's 
proposals that Athens has already supported. 
 
¶6.  (C) Not missing an opportunity to further criticize 
Semneby, Lozos pointed to Semneby's draft report that 
referred to trade promotion with northern Cyprus as a 
maladroit effort that only alienated several member states, 
especially Cyprus, but also including Greece, Spain, Hungary, 
and Slovakia.  Lozos also complained about both the U.S. and 
Lithuanian demarches in Athens regarding Greece's opposition 
to Semneby's latest proposals as unfairly characterizing the 
Greek position as obstructionist.  To top this off, Semneby 
traveled to Washington rather than discussing how to resolve 
the problems with either Lozos personally or with the MFA in 
Athens.  Such "whining to a third country," even a country 
with which Greece wants to work closely on Georgia, could be 
seen as "disloyal to the Union."  Lozos added that he may 
raise this within the EU.  Getting back on a constructive 
path, Lozos concluded that he may propose an informal trip 
with three or four other PSC ambassadors to Georgia to see 
how the EU can better help Tbilisi. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) Despite Lozos' stream of criticism against Semneby, 
including Semneby's trip to Washington (and the fact that 
Semneby had not yet submitted a report on his trip), Lozos 
agreed with Bryza's main points -- the need to strengthen 
Georgia's confidence through greater Euro-Atlantic 
integration and clear support for Georgia's territorial 
integrity.  He also stressed the need to move forward on the 
Semneby recommendations that Athens has already supported. 
Lozos did not object when Bryza emphasized the U.S. goal of 
getting Georgia into MAP at the next NATO summit, despite his 
professed sympathies for Russian sensitivities.  Bryza 
offered to ask informally the UN, the OSCE, and the Georgian 
Government about Semneby's proposals with an eye to 
addressing Athens' procedural concerns.  It will be important 
to press these issues forward to ensure they do not become 
pretexts for what may be Amb. Lozos' localized efforts to 
oppose Semneby's efforts on Georgia.  Lozos claims he has 
tried to discuss these matters with Georgia's ambassador in 
Brussels.  When Bryza conveyed this claim to the Georgian 
ambassador, she howled in disbelief, lamenting that she has 
tried for months to secure a meeting with Lozos, but with no 
success. 
 
¶8.  (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. 
 
GRAY 
.