VZCZCXRO1024
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1209/01 1010917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 110917Z APR 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017 
TAGS: BE CR CY EUN PREL TK TU
SUBJECT: EU AND US DISCUSS TURKEY, CROATIA AT COELA TROIKA 
AND OTHER MEETINGS 
 
REF: USEU BRUSSELS 1130 
 
Classified By: Institutional Affairs Unit Chief Courtney Nemroff for re 
asons 1.4  @ap SUM 
 
¶2. (SBU) The German My 
on a variety of economic iQsues.  Silliman told his European 
counterparts to feel free to call on the USG for assistance 
on any of these issues, drawing on our relationship with 
Ankara. 
 
¶3. (C) Turning to the PKK, Haber expressed concern over the 
possibility of a Turkish incursion into Iraq to counter the 
PKK threat.  She asked whether Europe could have an impact 
with the PKK.  Silliman cautioned against EU member states' 
tendency to connect PKK to Kurdish rights, which he said gave 
the PKK a base for operating in Europe.  He noted it may be 
useful to increase cooperation between EU member states' 
police and military services to counter PKK criminal 
activity, financing, recruting and propoganda activities in 
Europe.  He also suggested that European leaders (perhaps 
bilaterally) stress in conversations with governing Iraqi 
Kurds that there will be implications if they do not push 
back against the PKK. 
 
¶4. (C) Portuguese Head of Enlargement and Western Balkans 
Pedro Antunes said the EU would be extremely interested in 
seeing how GOT authorities reacted to PKK actions.  (Note: a 
number of EU contacts raised in separate meetings with 
Silliman their concerns that a GOT intervention in Iraq could 
have a "devastating" effect on member state perceptions of 
Turkey, as it would reinforce their argument that the 
accession of state that bordered on Iraq would be dangerous 
for European security.  Senior Commission officials stressed 
that Turkish intervention in Iraq could have grave 
repercussions for the entire Turkish accession process.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) In addition to the troika meeting, Silliman briefed 
27 members of the COELA working group, the forum in which all 
27 member states, the Council, and the Commission discuss 
enlargement issues.  During his briefing, an official from 
the Dutch permanent representation noted his "shock" at 
statements by Turkish academics and others at a recent Wilton 
Park conference where they referred to the EU's December 
Council decision on Turkey as the EU's "humiliation" of 
 
BRUSSELS 00001209  002 OF 003 
 
 
Turks.  In response, Silliman noted the importance of 
reaching out to Turkish civil society and described USG 
efforts in this area, including our large student exchange 
program. 
 
¶6. (C) Silliman met separately with Commission and friendly 
Permanent Representation officials, as well as with the 
German presidency and incoming Portuguese presidency. 
Commission contacts noted steady progress in screening and 
opening Turkey's acquis chapters, with four chapters possibly 
opening by the end of the German presidency (note: one of the 
four, the chapter on enterprise and industrial policy, was 
opened March 28.)  They added that progress should continue 
during the upcoming Portuguese presidency. 
 
¶7. (C) However, the Commission officials acknowledged the 
current sense of calm in negotiations would not last, 
especially when it came time to discuss more controversial 
political reforms in October or November 2007. They also 
noted they would need to take stock of progress on the Cyprus 
issue later this year.  An official in Enlargement 
Commissioner Olli Rehn's cabinet noted Ali Babacan had been 
an active, regular visitor to Brussels and that his efforts 
were playing well in Brussels.  She added that politically 
the EU wanted to renew cooperation with Turkey in the energy 
sector. The Commission was planning a high level conference 
in Istanbul on energy cooperation which Energy Commissioner 
Piebalgs and Rehn would likely attend, along with Turkish 
Foreign Minister Gul.  German presidency officials noted they 
remained hopeful they could achieve "something" on direct 
trade with the Turkish Cypriots during their presidency, 
although not likely as much as they had hoped. 
 
8.. (C) A UK Permanent Representation official stressed that 
the French election could play heavily into the dynamics of 
negotiations, noting the danger that Sarkozy, if elected, 
could be tempted to make a clear statement about Turkey at 
the June European Council meeting within the context of 
discussions over EU Constitutional reform and the future of 
the Constitutional treaty.  Our UK contact noted it would be 
helpful for France to be able to show some "commercial wins" 
from the negotiation process, for example on issues such as 
the beef ban or IPR, to help get French buy in.  Overall, our 
source said "we probably have 18 months" before the EU 
re-focuses its attention on Turkey's lack of implementation 
of the Ankara Additional Protocol, around the beginning of 
the French presidency, at which point Cyprus will start to 
make noises again.  That, he said, would be a good time for 
Turkey to make more dramatic moves.  He noted it might be 
useful for GOT officials to go to France, meet the new French 
President, and possibly announce some "France-friendly" 
concessions, possibly in the form of some sort of trade-off 
for Ankara given that the French will be assuming the 
presidency. 
 
¶9. (C) Our UK contact assessed that the more difficult acquis 
chapters to open would be those that got into issues of 
normalization and international organizations.  He indicated 
that Turkey would likely at a minimum need to cease blocking 
Cyprus in Waasenaar in order to gain more member state 
sympathy on some of these points.  Regarding direct trade for 
the Turkish Cypriots, the UK expert was pessimistic about the 
presidency's chances for finding a successful formula, but 
pointed to the fact of having direct trade "on the table" 
could be useful for ensuring "good behavior" by the Greek 
Cypriots. 
 
Croatia 
------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) European Commission Deputy Head of Unit for Croatia 
Hendrik Bendixen briefed the troika on the status of 
Croatia's accession negotiations and noted that the screening 
process will be finished by mid-April. Commission 
interlocutors reported that that Zagreb's institutional 
capacity for negotiations is good, but not deep, and the 
government has difficulty making some political decisions. 
Despite relatively good progress, Bendixen said that 
Croatia's 2009 accession target date is unrealistic, and 
while the government's plans for reform appear promising, the 
EU is waiting to see tangible results. The Commission has 
 
BRUSSELS 00001209  003 OF 003 
 
 
closed two chapters (Education and Culture and Science and 
Research) and plans to open more by the end of the year. 
Other chapters will likely remain unopened until 2008, 
pending Croatian ability to meet key benchmarks. At the top 
of the Commission's agenda are issues of judicial reform, 
anti-corruption, and human rights. EU negotiators are 
concerned about the backlog of court cases and the lack of 
transparency in financial crimes and corruption cases. 
Bendixen also noted Croatia's slow progress on refugee 
returns. He said that shortcomings in all of these areas were 
indicative of broader questions about the functioning of rule 
of law in Croatia. He added that Zagreb had put forward a 
promising plan for 2007, however, the EU side cautioned that 
reform may slow later this year with the approach of the 
November elections. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Hoh noted that the U.S. viewed the accession process 
in a positive way and said that the U.S. shared EU concerns 
about the judicial system and refugee returns. Hoh observed 
that much of the corruption is a result of the Communist 
legacy; attention to economic reform will enhance prospects 
for growth. Washington is optimistic that the EU accession 
process will aid in this regard and the U.S. will be 
supportive. He said that while the U.S. and EU held differing 
views on closing the OSCE mission in Croatia, the potential 
closure will mean that the two sides will need to redouble 
cooperative efforts to ensure progress on refugee returns and 
minority rights. (Note: In a separate meeting, Commission 
Head of Unit for Croatia David Daly told Hoh that the EU 
highly valued the OSCE mission, and believed that replacing 
its countrywide monitoring function would be difficult, and 
that closure would be premature.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) Hoh also underscored the broader, regional 
circumstances of Croatia's role as EU candidate, observing 
that Croatia wanted to be a model for its neighbors by 
offering help them to prepare, but the effect of its actions 
was sometimes to leave them behind. In this context, he 
inquired about general accession standards for the rest of 
the region, and whether political considerations will come 
into play as other countries negotiate their accession. 
Bendixen argued that EU standards have probably become more 
stringent now than during previous enlargements. The EU is 
taking their lessons learned and applying them to current 
candidates. 
 
¶11. (U) EUR/SEA Doug Silliman and EUR/SCE Chris Hoh have 
cleared this cable. 
 
MCKINLEY 
 
.