VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2923/01 1202254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 302254Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4444
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8932
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY LIMA 4994
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0237
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5617

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002923 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CO
SUBJECT: PDAS SHAPIRO MEETS WITH MOD SANTOS 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C)  Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos told WHA PDAS 
Charles Shapiro that Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa was 
seeking to provoke a confrontation with Colombia to 
strengthen his domestic political position.  Colombia was 
working with Peru, Mexico and Chile to deepen economic 
integration and to provide a contrast to Venezuelan President 
Chavez' Bolivarian economic model.  The Charge stressed that 
alleged ties between COLMIL units and paramilitaries required 
investigation and prosecution, not just dismissal.  Santos 
said Vice Minister Pinzon would soon present the GOC's 
thinking on nationalization to INL A/S Anne Patterson.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) On April 18, WHA PDAS Shapiro met with Defense 
Minister Santos.  Shapiro was accompanied by WHA Senior PD 
Advisor Maria Pia Tamburri, CDA Drucker, Polcouns, 
D/Polcouns, and pol/mil officer (notetaker).  Santos was 
accompanied by Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo. 
 
------------------------------- 
Ecuador: Combative vs. Colombia 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  Santos said, "Ecuador wants to pick a fight, for 
internal reasons," but the GOC would be patient and would 
continue to seek dialogue with Quito.  The GOC's approach was 
to ignore the GOE's "aggressive language," such as President 
Correa's recent threat to shoot down spray planes intruding 
into Ecuadorian airspace.  Santos said he countered such 
provocation with notes to his Ecuadorian counterpart that 
were so cordial as to be "almost love letters."  In ongoing 
bilateral meetings on the environmental impact of spraying, 
the Ecuadorians were more interested in blaming the 
Colombians than in finding solutions.  Just as Venezuela's 
Chavez used the U.S. as an all-purpose enemy, Correa had 
chosen Colombia -- a "very intelligent strategy" that 
resonated with Ecuadorian voters tired of being Colombia's 
"little brother." 
 
------------------------ 
A Potential Pacific Bloc 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C)  Santos said the GOC is working closely with Peru, 
Mexico and Chile to form a group of like-minded countries 
committed to deeper economic integration.  This bloc would 
espouse "free trade, free markets, and democracy, 
highlighting the contrast with Venezuela."  Santos said 
ratification of the bilateral free trade agreement (CTPA) was 
vital in this regard.  Failure would weaken President Uribe 
and boost Chavez' Bolivarian model.  Shapiro assured Santos 
that the administration would make every effort to secure 
U.S. congressional passage of the three pending Latin 
American CTPAs.  Santos said the GOC had evidence and 
arguments to persuade even skeptical U.S. members of Congress 
on Colombia's progress.  He stressed that across the board 
--labor, environment, displacement--the GOC had met 
Congressional wishes. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Prosecuting COLMIL Ties to Paras 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  The Charge conveyed U.S. concern over alleged ties 
between some COLMIL units and new criminal groups, stressing 
that offenders must be investigated and, if warranted, 
prosecuted.  Mere dismissal would not deter future offenders. 
 Moreover, the Leahy Amendment governing U.S. military aid 
required that accused members of the COLMIL be investigated 
and tried, not just removed from duty.  Santos agreed human 
rights violators must be punished, and said he was 
aggressively using his discretional authority to dismiss such 
individuals from the military.  He understood the importance 
of also investigating and prosecuting personnel implicated in 
human rights abuses, but said building criminal cases 
required more time.  Santos asked the U.S. to share evidence 
of human rights allegations to enable the COLMIL to take more 
cases to trial. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Narino: FARC Strategies to Thwart Colmil Operations 
 
¶6. (C) Shapiro said the deteriorating situation in Narino 
department was a central concern.  The Charge warned that El 
Charco municipality, where more than 9000 residents were 
recently displaced by fighting between the COLMIL and the 
FARC, risked becoming Colombia's next human rights and 
humanitarian crisis.  It was essential that the COLMIL 
incorporate contingency plans to deal with displaced persons 
into its military operational planning.  Santos agreed the 
situation in Charco was deplorable, but said the displacement 
was deliberately orchestrated by the FARC before the COLMIL 
operation had even begun. This was a common FARC tactic to 
hinder COLMIL operations and harm its public image.  He said 
the COLMIL could not refrain from conducting military 
operations due to FARC-organized displacements, but 
recognized the COLMIL needed to be better prepared to deal 
with humanitarian developments.. 
 
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Nationalization 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  PDAS Shapiro raised the issue of USG financial 
support for Plan Colombia and the GOC's gradual assumption of 
a greater share of the costs. Shapiro said the U.S. hoped to 
keep its contribution steady over the next two years, but 
stressed that funding would begin to gradually fall at that 
point.  Santos said he understood this. His proposal was "to 
start now, to save money, to nationalize programs that you do 
now very expensively and we could do more cheaply."  Santos 
said Vice Minister Pinzon would meet soon with INL A/S 
Patterson to explain GOC thinking on nationalization. 
 
¶8. (U)  PDAS Shapiro did not have an opportunity to clear 
this message. 
 
 
Drucker