VZCZCXRO3054
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHBP #0374/01 0931413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031413Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7175
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0323
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0286
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC 0054
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON ML
SUBJECT: KIDAL FORUM BRINGS CLOSURE TO TUAREG REBELLION 
 
REF: A. 06 BAMAKO 00591 
 
     ¶B. 06 BAMAKO 01032 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Glenn Fedzer 
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The Kidal forum, organized to bring 
closure to a Tuareg uprising in May, 2006, brought together 
senior Malian government officials, including the President 
and Prime Minister, Tuareg leaders, and representatives from 
a broad range of donor countries to address the persistent 
poverty and isolation that are believed to be the root causes 
of the region's instability.  The March 22-24 meeting also 
provided Malian President Toure (ATT) an opportunity prior to 
the upcoming Presidential election to demonstrate that the 
Tuareg "problem" was resolved.  Air lift support provided to 
the Malian Government and the diplomatic community for the 
Forum by the Special Operations Command proved to be a highly 
visible, and deeply appreciated, testament to USG support for 
peace in Northern Mali.  Real outcomes may be elusive, but 
when challenged with "why are these promises different," the 
Prime Minister cited the presence of senior officials and 
diplomats (many only able to attend due to the USG-provided 
airlift) as the clearest demonstration that this time, the 
Malian and international commitment is sincere. End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Kidal Forum, with invitations extended to 
Ambassadors, heads of development agencies, and senior Malian 
officials, was held March 22-24 in Mali's most remote, and 
inaccessible, regional capital.  Kidal is the home of several 
thousands of Mali's Tuareg minority, and has been the focal 
point of two major rebellions and some minor uprisings 
against the central government since independence, the last 
in May of 2006 (reftel A). Travel from Bamako to Kidal 
normally requires three days by 4x4; routine commercial air 
service is unavailable, and the gravel air field lacks even 
the most basic ground support facilities. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The ostensible objective of the Forum was to promote 
a Malian ten year development plan for the north (centered on 
Kidal but extending to Tessalit, Gao, and Timbuktu), put 
together in a few weeks before the forum by officials in the 
Ministry of Planning and Territorial Development.  The plan 
incisively analyzed the obstacles blocking development in 
northern Mali, but lacked clear oversight mechanisms or 
funding commitments from the central government.  The Forum 
was also intended--and for the moment may have succeeded--in 
putting to rest the May 2006 Tuareg uprising.  The President 
deftly used the Kidal Forum as a highly public, and well 
publicized, platform to assert that he had peacefully 
resolved the conflict, an important bit of "theater" just 
prior to the first round of Mali's presidential election, 
scheduled for April 29th. 
 
¶4.  (C)  USG Airlift support was the critical difference in 
making the Forum effective.  Tuaregs in the past have 
indicated a lack of confidence in the Malian government's 
capacity--and will--to implement assistance programs in the 
north.  Without the significant USG-facilitated outside 
participation to lend credence to Malian Government 
intentions, the forum may have failed as an instrument of 
reconciliation.  Members of the Diplomatic and International 
community were unequivocal in their appreciation of the USG, 
noting it was the only way they would have been able to 
participate.  "All the world," as one Malian official put it, 
could see US commitment to the region with the arrival in 
Kidal of the C-130 carrying the Prime Minister and other 
Malian ministers and members of the diplomatic corps. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Donors remained lukewarm to the 10 year development 
plan as presented, and elected neither to endorse it directly 
nor pledge any financial backing, but they did use the forum 
as an opportunity to publicly highlight their current efforts 
in the region--and make clear that peace was necessary for 
these programs to continue. The European Union, in 
conjunction with Canada, the United States, and Switzerland, 
also opted to make a joint statement emphasizing general 
support for the development of the north, and the need for 
peace to sustain that development. 
 
¶6.  (U)  The major complaint articulated by Malian 
participants in the forum was the need for improved 
transportation links--road, air, and river--(reftel B), but 
Tuaregs also noted the lack of education, health care, water 
and economic opportunities.  For many Malian officials, 
diplomats and representatives of international organizations, 
the trip was their first to Kidal.  A southern Malian, 
admittedly dismissive of complaints from the north in the 
past, said the trip opened his eyes to the deep isolation and 
 
BAMAKO 00000374  002 OF 002 
 
 
poverty confronting residents of the region.  The town of 
Kidal does have electricity and water for part of each day, 
but lacks even a single paved road.  Underlining the need for 
greater institutional support to promote development in the 
region, the US Ambassador and the Malian Minister of 
Investment took the opportunity to inaugurate a micro-credit 
operation receiving capital and training from USAID. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Comment:  A senior Malian military officer present 
at the Kidal Forum claimed that President Toure was briefed 
three courses of action after the May uprisings: 
counterattack, negotiate, or negotiate and then counterattack 
after the election.  The officer claimed President Toure 
committed himself to peaceful negotiations, and remained 
sincere in efforts to keep the Tuaregs in the Malian orbit 
without resorting to military options.  The Kidal Forum as an 
element of that approach appears to have reduced tensions in 
Northern Mali for the moment, with the USG C-130 
indispensably contributing to that outcome.  Should 
development efforts lag, violent outbreaks may reoccur, but 
donors at least can better appreciate the obstacles to such 
efforts-and the Malians' need of foreign assistance to 
overcome them. 
McCulley