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DE RUEHTH #0685/01 0941401
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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8648
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STAFF STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017 
TAGS: NATO MARR MOPS PREL PGOV GR
SUBJECT: MY WAY: GREECE AND NATO TRANSFORMATION 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 216 
     ¶B. ATHENS 550 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Greece's fulfillment of its commitment to the 
NATO Alliance in terms of defense transformation has been, at 
best, mixed.  Greece has taken some steps to reform its 
military doctrine and strategic and tactical thinking.  It 
also has introduced some new institutions and procured new 
systems.  But, overall, Greece's focus remains on traditional 
regional threats and, hence, traditional strategy and 
tactics.  A number of factors account for Greece's 
transformation tardiness: budget constraints, the Greek 
public's reflexive anti-Americanism -- and by extension, 
anti-NATO feeling -- and the traditional obsession with the 
Turkish "threat."  Our challenge remains getting the Greeks 
to look beyond their immediate neighborhood and to recognize 
their own interests in NATO's broader strategic agenda.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
WHAT GREECE HAS DONE ... 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) NATO has identified transformation of forces, 
capabilities, and doctrine as critical for the Alliance in 
the 21st Century.  According to the Riga Summit Declaration 
of November 29, 2006, defense transformation "is essential to 
ensure that the Alliance remains able to perform its full 
range of missions."  The Greek foreign policy establishment 
and military officially support transformation -- though it 
is usually referred to in Greece as "evolution," emphasizing 
a more gradual and somewhat less comprehensive concept of the 
adaptation of forces.  Greek military planning and strategy 
documents emphasize the fundamentally new character of 
warfare in the 21st Century, the significance of new 
"asymmetrical threats," and the importance of adapting forces 
and strategy to meet these new challenges.  Hellenic General 
Staff Defense Policy Director Brigadier General Aleksandros 
Tsigaras told us the Greek military supports transformation 
 
SIPDIS 
and insisted that it was doing all it could, given Greece's 
unique defense requirements and political and budgetary 
capacities. 
 
¶3. (C) Tsigaras pointed to a number of specific examples 
where Greece was making contributions to NATO transformation. 
 One was the new deployable headquarters for a NATO division 
or corps that Greece had set up and positioned in 
Thessaloniki, to which many other allies had contributed. 
Another was the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations 
Training Center (NMIOTC) Greece had established at Souda Bay 
on Crete to train NATO personnel for exercises such as 
Operation Active Endeavor.  Greece had donated patrol boats 
to Georgia to help that country meet its Intensified Dialogue 
goals of border security.  At home, the Hellenic General 
Staff had established an "Evolution Center" to plan and 
oversee the Greek military's increased interoperability and 
NATO transformation. 
 
¶4. (C) In addition to the contributions Tsigaras noted, 
Greece has consolidated its rapid reaction forces under its 
2nd corps in Veria in northern Greece, established a 
broadband communications satellite link with cartographic 
work stations to permit mapping of remote locations, and 
acquired a well-drilling and reverse-osmosis water 
purification system for use in distant locations without 
regular water supplies.  Greece has also made modest 
contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan (ref a) and 
the Balkans. 
 
...AND HASN'T DONE 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) These efforts notwithstanding, Greece remains far from 
achieving the transformational goals outlined by NATO.  Its 
military doctrine -- a new version of which was recently 
announced -- continues to emphasize conventional warfare and 
deterrence of the Turkish "threat."  Greece's military 
procurement system remains focused, at best, on traditional 
weapons systems, such as F-16 fighters and heavy armor.  At 
worst, it focuses on buying incompatible and/or un-needed 
weapons systems to score political points with European 
governments.  And while Greece has made modest contributions 
to NATO's new missions -- the most critical being Afghanistan 
-- its forces are hamstrung by caveats. 
 
BUDGET WOES 
----------- 
 
¶6. (C) There are a number of reasons why Greece has trouble 
with transformation.  One is budget constraints.  Greece 
traditionally has maintained relatively high levels of 
defense spending, higher as a proportion of GDP than the EU 
or NATO averages.  But more recently such outlays have become 
unsustainable, and the New Democracy government has made 
reductions a priority, with spending as a percentage of GDP 
going from about 4.4 in 2005 to 3.5 in 2006 and targeted to 
be under three percent in 2007.  In such a fiscal 
environment, the GoG has had to focus not on procurement of 
new, more modern -- and potentially transformational -- 
systems but on meeting obligations for systems incurred in 
the past.  As editor of the defense monthly "Amyntika 
Themata" Spyros Papageorgacopoulos told us, "despite all the 
talk about procuring new systems, they are now only paying 
their bills." 
 
ANTI-AMERICAN DIALECTICS 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Another reason Greece drags its transformational feet 
is the sometimes vague, sometimes pointed anti-Americanism -- 
and by extension, anti-NATO feeling -- that permeates much of 
the Greek polity.  A lengthy and lively discussion with 
several defense analysts revealed various facets of this 
phenomenon.  Zacharias Michas, chief editor of "Geostrategy," 
said much of the Greek public has a knee-jerk reaction 
against NATO expressed in slogans such as "NATO has never 
helped Greece," "NATO is not good for peace," and "NATO can 
hurt stability in the region."  (NOTE: Cancellation of NATO's 
participation in the February 27 military exercise at Agios 
Efstratios following Turkish assertions of the island's 
"de-militarized" status (ref b) was taken by many Greeks as 
confirmation of their preconceptions about the Alliance.  END 
NOTE.)  At the same time, Michas noted, Greeks got very upset 
when Bulgaria and Romania entered the Alliance because that 
ended the Greek monopoly on Balkan NATO membership.  Pericles 
Zorzovilis, correspondent for "Defense News," agreed on the 
contradictory views many Greeks have about the Alliance. 
While many disliked NATO's policies, they recognized its 
value for meeting the pressing military needs of the country. 
 Maintaining a standing army of 140,000, Zorzovilis argued, 
imposed an enormous financial cost, which the Greek budget 
could not sustain without outside help. 
 
¶8. (C) In such a paradoxical environment, the GoG has found 
it difficult to commit itself fully to NATO.  Greek 
governments, Michas argued, had developed a defensive tactic 
vis-a-vis evolving NATO initiatives that he described as 
"katenatsio," an Italian term for a tight zone defense in 
soccer.  Defense analyst Konstantinos Grivas said Greek 
governments always "play against the clock," trying to 
postpone major decisions on Alliance matters or on assuming 
greater responsibilities within the context of collective 
action.  It was this reluctance to get involved, the analysts 
agreed, that kept Greece from deploying more troops to 
Afghanistan or allowing the Greek troops already there to 
leave their protected bases.  As for transformation, Greece 
embraced the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the concept of 
reorganizing rapid deployment forces to add greater 
flexibility to existing mission profiles.  But beyond these 
concepts, Zorzovilis noted, Greek politicians just could not 
bring themselves to commit.  Ever fearful of the impact of 
new initiatives, Michas argued, Greek politicians worried 
that transformation would spell changes that would hurt Greek 
interests and negatively influence hard-fought domestic 
political and military balances. 
 
THE OBSESSION WITH TURKEY 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The third and perhaps most important factor shaping 
Greek policy on NATO transformation is the 900-pound gorilla 
of Greek politics -- the obsession with Turkey.  It permeates 
practically all aspects of Greek politics and, especially, 
military policy.  Former DefMin Spilios Spiliotopoulos, whose 
views undoubtedly reflect the attitude of much of the Greek 
military, said that at the heart of the current problems with 
Turkey was Ankara's consistent refusal to act according to 
the letter and spirit of international law and treaties.  For 
Spiliotopoulos, the Turks were constantly pushing the 
envelope in the region.  They "see talks of any kind as 
opportunities to push new demands on the table so they can 
demand more in the future and force a compromise on something 
that was not identified as an issue in the first place." 
 
¶10. (C) Such animosity had a direct impact on NATO policy. 
NATO obligations notwithstanding, Greece's "primary need," in 
Spiliotopoulos' view, was for troops ready to face "a 
tactical army like the Turk."  With 1,400 men serving abroad 
in various missions, Greece had reached the "absolute limit" 
of what it was able to do without risking its own defense. 
NATO transformation, he said, was an important goal, but it 
could only be pursued within the context of Greece's 
overarching defensive policy against Turkey.  Deputy director 
of the MFA D2 Directorate for NATO Theodoros Daskarolis 
succinctly summed up this position.  "If you could guarantee 
us protection against the Turks," Daskarolis said, "we could 
do a lot more in Afghanistan and on NATO transformation." 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) When it comes to cooperation in the Aegean and 
eastern Mediterranean, Greece has been forthcoming, meeting 
specific requests for military assistance.  Examples include 
Greek support for the USN facility at Souda Bay and Greece's 
generous offer on CFE entitlement transfers.  Our challenge, 
however, remains getting the Greeks to look beyond their 
immediate neighborhood and to recognize their own interests 
in NATO's broader strategic agenda.  Our goal is to get 
Greece to embrace genuine Alliance internationalism that sees 
issues such as NATO transformation not as burdens imposed 
from without but as self-generated imperatives. 
RIES