VZCZCXRO6421
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0959/01 1151246
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251246Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1832
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000959 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: STILL COMMITTED TO JULY 8 PROCESS, BUT TO 
WHAT DEGREE? 
 
REF: ANKARA 711 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Turkish MFA Deputy Under Secretary 
responsible for Cyprus Haydar Berk claims that Turkey remains 
committed to the July 8 process.  He said Turkey wants to 
ensure, though, that the Turkish Cypriots do not shoulder the 
blame for the process breaking down by agreeing to discuss 
comprehensive settlement issues such as disposition of 
property in the technical committees.  Both Berk and, in a 
separate conversation, MFA Under Secretary Apakan argued that 
UNSRSG Moller has "misled" P-5 representatives and 
secretariat staff in perpetuating the perception that the 
 
SIPDIS 
Turkish Cypriots are blocking progress.  They said that 
proposals forwarded by the "TRNC President" Talat to UNSYG 
Ban Ki-moon in an April 3 letter are evidence of Turks' 
continued commitment to the process, and Apakan was specific 
that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots regard the negotiations 
as continuing.  The Turkish officials also lamented the lack 
of progress on direct trade with Northern Cyprus.  Although 
GOT officials assure it won't be the Turks who walk away from 
the table, there appears to be little creative thinking going 
on in Ankara on how to recapture the initiative on the Cyprus 
problem.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C) MFA Deputy Under Secretary for Americas and the 
Northeast Mediterranean (Greece/Cyprus) Haydar Berk briefed 
Ambassador on the GOT's current view on moving the July 8 
process forward.  As he did previously (reftel), Berk placed 
blame for the current impasse squarely on Cypriot President 
Papadopoulos.  Berk characterized Greek Cypriot (GC) moves in 
recent months as merely an attempt to display a bit more 
flexibility so its EU partners would not view the Cypriots as 
purely obstructionist.  He said the GC side had made clear 
its unwillingness to engage in confidence-building 
discussions by raising comprehensive settlement issues like 
property that will scuttle any chance of success for the 
technical talks. 
 
TURKS WON'T TALK PROPERTY 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Berk emphasized Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (TC) 
continue to support the July 8 process and hope to get it 
moving quickly.  He claimed that the TC side had, in fact, 
"saved the process" after the latest impasse, insisting that 
talks should continue despite continued lack of agreement on 
terms of reference for the technical committees and working 
groups.  He underscored TC opposition to GC attempts to 
insert the property issue in the technical committees.  Berk 
noted the TCs had perceived GC flexibility on this issue when 
GC negotiator Tzionis signaled "agreement to disagree" on 
whether property issues could be raised in the technical 
committees.  With that understanding, the TCs believed talks 
could proceed even if the TCs refused to discuss property 
issues in the technical committees.  Per Berk, the GCs later 
backtracked and indicated the TCs would "pay a price" for 
refusal to engage on property in the committees.  As a 
result, the TCs had sought a written guarantee that their 
refusal to engage on property would not block the entire 
process and cause them to take the blame. 
 
MOLLER MISLEADING? 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Berk renewed the Turks' earlier misgivings about 
UNSRSG Moller, whom he claimed "is misleading P-5 
representatives as well as the Secretariat" in perpetuating 
the perception that the TCs are blocking progress of the July 
8 process.  Ambassador countered that in the aftermath of 
Papadopoulos' positive step in taking down the Ledra Street 
wall and his seeming willingness to push ahead with meetings 
of both the technical committees and working groups, there 
had been a perception that "TRNC President" Talat had agreed 
to press forward on talks, then pulled back.  While 
Papadopoulos' motivation likely was to reduce pressure within 
the EU to proceed with the direct trade regulation, the net 
effect had been an effective ambush of Talat, the TCs, and 
Turkey. 
 
¶5. (C) Berk said the Turkish side needs agreement that the 
July 8 process will not be open-ended.  Only a limited 
timeframe can ensure the GCs do not use the process to delay 
indefinitely engaging on comprehensive settlement issues. 
Berk also reiterated that, while GCs voted down the Annan 
Plan, it still should serve as a "basic parameter" on the 
basis of which discussions should move forward.  Issues 
regarded as final settlement issues in Annan and decades of 
earlier Cyprus negotiations cannot now be regarded as 
"day-to-day community" matters for discussion in the 
technical committees, which Berk and Apakan accused the GCs 
 
ANKARA 00000959  002 OF 002 
 
 
and Moller of trying to do.  However prospects for true 
engagement appear to be dimming.  Berk noted that even Greek 
Cypriots from parties that have been relatively open to 
discussions with the TCs, such as AKEL, have ratcheted up 
attempts to further isolate the TCs.  He referenced a letter 
sent by the AKEL party mayor of Nicosia to her Turkish 
counterpart, refusing to attend municipality meetings where 
the TC mayor is present and pointed to continued GC 
objections to allowing TC universities to participate in the 
Bologna process. 
 
PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS? 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Berk called Ambassador's attention to Talat's April 3 
letter to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon as well as a TC non-paper which 
lay out TC views on how to move the process forward. 
However, progress over the next several months was unlikely. 
Ambassador acknowledged the difficulty of moving forward 
during the Turkish election cycle.  Berk saw as more of an 
impediment the changeover at the UN with a new Secretary 
General and senior staff.  Ambassador noted that we saw the 
July 8 process as a way to demonstrate that there was 
sufficient common ground between GCs and TCs to make it 
worthwhile for the UNSYG to spend time working toward a 
comprehensive settlement.  Lack of progress in the July 8 
process risked removing the issue from his agenda altogether. 
 He emphasized our hope that the GOT will urge Talat and the 
TCs to keep the onus on Papadopoulos to keep moving July 8 
talks ahead. 
 
¶7. (C) Berk lamented the EU's continued inability to 
follow-through with its commitments to ease the isolation of 
the TCs.  He pointed to GC attempts to maintain control over 
the flow of EU aid project funding targeted for the North and 
the German EU Presidency's lack of progress on a trade 
regulation.  This makes it all the more difficult to sell 
continued Turkish concessions to a skeptical public. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  The current Turkish political constellation 
is boxing Talat in as much as the GCs.  The Turkish military 
has signaled clearly that any political steps the TCs take 
should be reciprocal and simultaneous, and that TGS will 
remain the final protector of Turkish national interests, 
including on Cyprus.  The ruling AKP will risk neither 
nationalist nor military backlash in the run-up to this 
year's parliamentary elections.  For now, it may be up to 
Talat to decide how much room to maneuver he has. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON