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RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 7973
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RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000847 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR PINS ZJ ZK AJ GG TI RS TU
SUBJECT: LOOKING EAST: TURKEY'S MILITARY INVESTS IN THE 
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 0489 
     ¶B. ANKARA 0779 
 
ANKARA 00000847  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Carl Siebentritt for 
reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Turkey has invested heavily in its security 
relationships in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with the bulk 
of its military assistance going to Azerbaijan.  Turkey 
provides security assistance funds and training to all the 
countries in the region except Armenia and Uzbekistan. 
Historical and cultural ties, expanding commercial interests, 
strategic competition with Russia and Iran, and 
disenchantment with Euro-Atlantic relations are the 
traditional drivers of Turkey's interest in the east. 
Increasingly, however, military officials justify intensified 
security ties by citing threats to energy security from 
perceived Russian conniving with Armenia and Iran to "breach" 
U.S.-supported east-west routes for Caspian energy.  Turkish 
officials tell us they would welcome closer collaboration 
with the U.S. in this region, but intend to move slowly to 
avoid irritating Russia.   End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Turkey-Azerbaijan: "One Nation but Two States" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) Turkey's military relations with Azerbaijan, which 
Turkey perceives as its strategic bridge to Central Asia, are 
the strongest in the region and the most extensive with any 
country except the U.S.  With close ethnic and cultural ties, 
Turkey and Azerbaijan are "one nation, but two states," 
according to one Turkish general.  The Turkish General Staff 
tells us Turkey has provided approximately USD 600 million in 
military assistance to Azerbaijan since 1998, focused on 
training, improving force readiness, and adapting Azeri 
equipment and doctrine to NATO standards.  Azerbaijan 
benefits particularly from the Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
program, according to Turkish observers, who claim that 
military training has boosted the confidence of Azeri 
military forces.  The Turkish military mission in Azerbaijan 
currently includes 46 instructors and staff at the Turkish 
designed and built military academy.  Meanwhile, over 200 
Azeri officers and cadets have been trained in Turkey, 
including at Turkey's PFP Center. 
 
¶3. (C) Turkey and Azerbaijan announced a joint high level 
commission to coordinate military cooperation and mutual 
security assistance in February 2007 during a visit to Baku 
by Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff (DCHOD) GEN 
Ergin Saygun.  TGS officials say the commission, chaired by 
Saygun and Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Aliyev, will 
have logistics, political-military, and defense industry 
components.  Prior to Saygun's visit to Baku, Aliyev met with 
Chief of the Turkish General Staff (CHOD) GEN Yasar Buyukanit 
on February 5 in Ankara to discuss military cooperation.  We 
understand that a three-star billet has been created for a 
Turkish general to become a senior advisor to Aliyev. 
 
¶4. (C) The TGS has flagged the strategic importance to Turkey 
of the east-west energy corridor from Azerbaijan, comprised 
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which became 
operational in May 2006, and a parallel new line that is 
expected to pump Azeri gas to the Turkish grid at the eastern 
Turkish city of Erzurum later this year.  A new rail line has 
 
ANKARA 00000847  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
also been undertaken which will -- when complete -- link Baku 
to the Turkish rail network at Kars (and completely bypass 
Armenia).  The TGS is very concerned that Russia is conniving 
with Armenia and Iran to breach this east-west energy 
corridor by pushing north-south alternatives (ref a), 
including a Russia-Armenia-Iran pipeline and construction of 
a refinery in Armenia near the Iranian border. 
 
----------------- 
Isolating Armenia 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Accelerated Turkish military ties with Azerbaijan are 
also intended to isolate Armenia.  The Turkish-Armenian 
border has been closed since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
and the countries have no bilateral security cooperation. 
Military officials note that Armenian officers have been 
invited to training at Turkey's Partnership for Peace Center 
and a senior Armenian officer attended the Silk Road flag 
officer seminar hosted by Turkey.  However, Armenia has never 
reciprocated, they complain, and has used NATO and PFP fora 
to push the for recognition of an Armenian genocide.  Turkish 
officers cite Armenia's close relations with Russia as a 
major impediment to Turkish plans for greater engagement with 
Central Asia (ref b). 
 
----------------------------- 
Keeping the Georgians in Line 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) While Turkey has sought closer relations with Georgia, 
including military ties, it views Tbilisi's recent stance 
toward Russia as unnecessarily and dangerously provocative, 
and has urged Georgia to be more cautious.  Turkish officials 
have told us they support Georgia's NATO ambitions but are 
not quite as optimistic as the U.S. that a Membership Action 
Plan will temper Tbilisi's rhetoric towards Russia.  An MFA 
official told us that Turkey's security assistance to Georgia 
is calibrated by Ankara's concerns for what it considers 
"inexperienced and reckless leadership" vis-a-vis Russia. 
 
¶7. (C) Turkish observers view Georgia's political environment 
as the most fragile in the Caucasus.  Nevertheless, the TGS 
reports that Turkey has provided Georgia with over USD 70 
million in bilateral military aid in recent years and has 
trained 65 Georgian military personnel in Turkey, including 
border guards, making Tbilisi the second largest recipient of 
Turkish security assistance in the region after Azerbaijan. 
Most of Turkey's aid to Georgia has focused on training, 
including the establishment of a modern military academy with 
some Turkish faculty and staff. 
 
-------------------------- 
Assistance to Central Asia 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) As in the Caucasus, Turkey's military aid to Central 
Asia has focused on training from the outset.  The five 
post-Soviet Central Asian republics had a pressing need for 
military training, ASAM Central Asia analyst Gokcen Ogan told 
us, because the large number of mid-level military officers 
and NCOs in those countries who chose to remain in the 
Russian armed services created a void of trained middle 
managers and action officers.  And as with Azerbaijan, 
Turkish ethnic affinity with the Central Asians has provided 
an important psychological and strategic rationale for 
Turkey's security relations in the region. 
 
 
ANKARA 00000847  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶9. (C) Of the five Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan has 
received the most military assistance from Turkey, valued at 
USD 30 million in recent years for logistics support and 
training, according to the TGS.  Turkey has trained 170 
Turkmen officers.  Officials tell us Turkey hopes to expand 
its overall relationship with Turkmenistan and is seeking to 
exploit the political opening created by the succession of 
President Berdimuhammedov (reftel).  As with Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon resources are a critical factor 
driving Turkey's interest. 
 
¶10. (C) Other Central Asian countries receiving Turkish 
military assistance according to the TGS are: Kazakhstan (USD 
20 million), Kyrgyzstan (USD 16 million), and Tajikistan (USD 
11 million). 
 
¶11. (C) Uzbekistan is perhaps the most strategically 
important Central Asian country for Turkey, according to 
ASAM's Ogan, but has been the most problematic for the last 
ten years.  Although Turkey had provided over USD 6 million 
in military assistance in the early 1990s, according to the 
TGS, President Karimov cut off Turkish military and other 
assistance after Turkey was charged with supporting his 
political opposition beginning in 1996.  Turkish training, 
educational exchanges, and much investment have been halted. 
According to Ogan, the bilateral discord continues, with 
further suspicion in Tashkent about illicit Turkish aid to 
the opposition in Uzbekistan's 2007 elections.  Uzbekistan 
remains Turkey's weakest military link in Central Asia. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) While Turkey's earlier and less than successful 
forays into Central Asia in the 1990's were based on hopes of 
a post-Cold War re-birth of Turkish culture and Turkic 
consciousness in the region, today's push for security ties 
focuses more on gas and oil, and Turkey's ambition to be the 
region's energy hub.  The Turkish military in particular 
shares our concern over Russian attempts to monopolize 
Caspian energy sources and transport, seeing Armenia and Iran 
as Russia's allies in this effort.  In that regard, the TGS 
regards the millions Turkey spends on security assistance in 
the region to be well worth the influence it buys.  Turkish 
officials tell us they would welcome closer consultation with 
us on security issues in the region, but add that Turkey will 
proceed cautiously to avoid provoking Russia. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON