VZCZCXRO1723
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0977/01 0921227
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021227Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5390
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000977 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS ET SO
SUBJECT: MANAGING A TOUGH MIL TO MIL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
ETHIOPIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
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Summary: 
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¶1. (S/NF) In a difficult meeting, Ethiopian Chief of Staff 
General Samora outlined for visiting Combined Joint Task 
Force ) Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Commander Admiral James 
Hart on March 28 of Ethiopia's new military priorities: 
 
--  General Samora said air mobility was critical as a result 
of the conflict in Somalia.  Repair of two C-130 and purchase 
of additional cargo planes are on the top of the list.  The 
approaching rainy season makes this urgent. 
 
--  General Samora asked for U.S. assistance in assuring 
professional standards for the newly established command and 
staff college in Addis. He also talked about sending 
Ethiopian officers to U.S. war colleges. 
 
--  General Samora asked the U.S. to close the CJTF-HOA 
operating bases in Bilate and Hurso.  He offered that the 
U.S. might re-establish itself in nearby Dira Dawa or Jijiga, 
but not in defended camps.  (While Samora claimed that U.S. 
training was of limited utility and no longer needed, troops 
and sub commanders have all praised the U.S. training.) 
 
¶2. (S/NF) It is not clear why Samora is so adamant that the 
long standing camps at Hurso and Bilate must be closed.  It 
may be that recent U.S. and British press arguing that the 
U.S. was using camps in Ethiopia to launch attacks into 
Somalia may have forced the Ethiopians to close the camps, 
just as the AC-130 operations closed as a result of articles 
in the U.S. press.  It is also possible that Samora is 
annoyed at what he sees as lack of respect and support for 
Ethiopia.  It is very clear that we will need to engage the 
often prickly General Samora in an in-depth discussion. End 
Summary. 
 
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New Priorities 
-------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) General Samora outlined for Admiral Hart, his 
POLAD and Ambassador (notetaker) Ethiopia's new changing 
priorities.  He said that air mobility was critical.  As a 
result of the ENDF's experience in Somalia, it was clear that 
cargo planes and helicopters were key to Ethiopia's lift 
capability of troops to the battlefield and pursuit of 
targets.  Samora cited the importance of repairing the two 
C-130 aircraft provided by the U.S. in 1997.  One was 
somewhat functional while the second was being cannibalized 
for spare parts.  Admiral Hart told a skeptical Samora that 
the U.S. is trying to repair the 2 C-130 aircraft.  General 
Samora said he was waiting for the maintenance project for 
over seven years and replied that he is willing to buy some 
spare parts to try to repair the C-130 aircraft. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) General Samora said Ethiopia established a command 
and staff college but wanted the U.S. to help with books and 
materials as well as a curriculum to train senior officers. 
He also asked for increased number of war college slots for 
Ethiopian officers. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) He added that the British were helping with 
accounting and administrative training for his financial 
officers.  The U.S. could help with providing training on the 
code of operations for the military.  General Samora noted 
that they were still developing a list and would present it 
to the U.S. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Past Problems Affect Current Operations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) General Samora raised briefly past bilateral 
problems.  He said the U.S. cancellation of two C-130 in 1998 
due to Ethiopia's border war with Eritrea and suspension of 
some two dozen HUMVEES in 2005 due to use of the HUMVEES to 
transport soldiers to quell riots after the 2005 elections 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000977  002 OF 002 
 
 
severely strained bilateral relations.  He did not see why 
the punishment still exists.  He said he still needs C-130s 
and as for the HUMVEES, he is seeking alternate equipment. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Samora emphasized to the Admiral that the U.S. 
must leave Bilate and Hurso, not immediately, but eventually. 
 Part of the problem may be the force protection measures; 
towers and fences.  Just as Ethiopians cannot occupy a camp 
within a U.S. base, the U.S. should not expect to have a camp 
within an Ethiopian base. He said that the U.S. could 
relocate to Dira Dawa or Jijiga, but cannot establish 
defended installations.  Samora went on to say that he no 
longer wants commando training because the Ethiopians can 
conduct the training themselves.  He was quite dismissive of 
the training, saying that he only sent troops for their 
&entertainment8 and as a way of obtaining further US 
support.  It should be noted that these statements contradict 
some of his previous comments as well as the opinions 
expressed by many Ethiopian commanders. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) At the end of the conversation, the General had a 
further, private meeting with the Admiral.  During this 
meeting Samora reinforced his determination to close the 
camps, even if it meant canceling civil affairs projects. 
Samora dismissed the projects, noting that &no one asked you 
to do them.8  Samora did agree to visit Camp Lemonier, but 
only after conditions in Somalia improve. Samora displayed 
signs of fatigue and discomfort from his multiple war wounds. 
 
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Comment: 
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¶9.  (S/NF) It is not clear what has lead Samora to this 
hostile position.  Clearly, he is offended by past US efforts 
to criticize Ethiopia for the war with Eritrea and the 
violence against demonstrators following the elections.  He 
clearly believes that the US has dealt with Ethiopia in bad 
faith.  The focus on Bilate and Hurso may be due to the 
recent U.S. and British press reports of U.S. forces 
launching attacks into Somalia from U.S. camps inside 
Ethiopia.  U.S. press reports led to the closure of the 
AC-130 operations at the end of January.   It is clear that 
the U.S. Embassy must make greater efforts to develop and 
work with General Samora directly.  After the recent firings 
of top Ethiopian generals and potential rivals, General 
Samora may be primus interparis among the generals, but he 
still has a long way to go before he earns the adoration of 
his staff.  For the moment, General Samora wants to have 
complete control of the military and has demanded that all 
requests for training and offers of programs by the U.S. be 
given to him directly and not to the liaison office. 
Further, it is clear the U.S. Mission must continue contacts 
with Samora's generals and mid ranking officers, but must now 
focus on General Samora for all programs, events and 
activities.  This will increase delays in response to U.S. 
and other types of training and could impact negatively on 
bilateral relations.  The Embassy will work closely with 
Samora and determine how best to handle essential bilateral 
programs, without damaging or detracting from the more 
important strategic bilateral relationship.  End Comment. 
 
¶10. (U) This message has been cleared by CJTF-HOA Commander 
Rear Admiral James Hart. 
YAMAMOTO