VZCZCXYZ0017
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #1271/01 1140837
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240837Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5812
INFO RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 001271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR G/AIAG, AF/EX, AND DS/IP/AF 
USAID/W FOR AFR/SD, BGH/AI, AFR/ESA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ET KFLU TBIO AMED EAID EAGR SENV XW
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISING AVIAN AND PANDEMIC RESPONSE 
PLANS IN ETHIOPIA 
 
REF:  a) STATE 50514; b) Addis 1042 
 
¶1. SUMMARY:  Post's inter-agency Avian Influenza Committee met March 
29 to review the situation in Ethiopia with respect to a possible 
outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in the country 
(reftel b).  The GOE's recent revamping of its National Task Force 
for the Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza highlight that 
addressing other emerging zoonotic/epizootic diseases, such as Rift 
Valley Fever (which has occurred in neighboring Kenya and Somalia), 
may be a greater immediate concern for Ethiopian authorities. The 
government does not have plans to test their National AI 
Preparedness Plan but continues to support active surveillance in 
high risk areas throughout the country.  Although HPAI has been 
confirmed in several states bordering Ethiopia (Sudan and Djibouti), 
there is no evidence of HPAI in Ethiopia.  Ethiopia remains at risk 
for HPAI, but risk of transmission may not be as high as originally 
stated, largely because Ethiopia has few large-scale poultry farms, 
and there is no cross-border movement of poultry into Ethiopia. 
USAID, CDC, FAO, WHO, and DFID continue to work with the Ethiopian 
government to prepare for and respond to potential future AI 
outbreaks, through supporting surveillance, prevention, and training 
activities. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. Emboffs, CDC, and USAID representatives reviewed the HPAI 
situation in Ethiopia and the region at Post's March 29 AI Committee 
meeting chaired by DCM (reftel b).  USAID highlighted that HPAI has 
been confirmed in Sudan, Djibouti, Egypt and Nigeria.  While 
Ethiopia remains at risk for HPAI, risk of transmission may not be 
as high as originally stated, largely because Ethiopia has few 
large-scale poultry farms, and most families have only 6-12 chickens 
on their compounds.  Compounds in rural areas also tend to be widely 
dispersed with little inter-mixing of poultry from household to 
household.  Additionally, and perhaps most important, there is no 
cross-border movement of poultry into Ethiopia. 
 
---------------------------------- 
GOE CONDUCTING ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. The Ethiopian government, through assistance from FAO, is 
conducting active surveillance of farms (both household and poultry 
production) around the country, with a particular focus on border 
areas with Sudan and Djibouti.  In mid-March 2007, samples collected 
from a poultry disease outbreak in Ethiopia's western 
Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State were submitted to the National 
Animal Health Research Center (NAHRC).  Preliminary results indicate 
negative findings for HPAI, although replicate samples were sent to 
Weibridge, UK, for further analysis. 
 
¶4. Surveillance teams from the FAO and the GOE's Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD) are deployed throughout 
the country.  In March, a team from Dire Dawa Veterinary Laboratory 
conducted active AI disease surveillance by administrating 
structured questionnaires in Dire Dawa Provisional Administrative 
Council, Harari Region; and in Shinile and Erer districts, of the 
Somali Region.  The team visited 3 small-scale poultry farms and 
interviewed 84 farmers, none of whom reported observing any unusual 
mass die-offs or illnesses in either domestic or wild birds in the 
past 60 days.  The team also collected information about livestock 
populations, veterinary infrastructure, and manpower.  Surveillance 
teams are also briefing communities on AI risks and the need to 
report any bird diseases immediately to nearby agriculture offices 
or other designated authorities. 
 
------------------------------------- 
PREPAREDNESS 
------------------------------------- 
 
 ¶5. A National AI Prevention and Containment Plan has been developed 
and disseminated by the original national AI Task Force with input 
from relevant groups such as government agencies, private sector, 
civil society, USAID, CDC, FAO, and WHO.  The plan includes 
containment measures including vaccination of domestic poultry and 
culling. The plan has been costed and an implementation plan has 
been developed. 
 
¶6. At this time the Government does not have plans to test the 
preparedness plan. However, as stated above, the government 
maintains active animal surveillance in key high risk areas. 
Through active surveillance, teams collected samples from poultry at 
least once in the past six months in 75-100% of target areas. 
Currently, on average it takes 7-12 days from the onset of 
"significant" deaths in poultry or wild birds associated with 
clinical symptoms consistent with H5N1 to the collection of clinical 
samples for H5 or H5N1 diagnosis by rapid diagnostic or laboratory 
testing.    Average number of days from receipt of clinical samples 
from an outbreak with "significant" bird deaths associated with 
clinical symptoms consistent with highly-pathogenic H5N1, it takes 5 
 
- 9 days to either confirm or rule out H5 or H5N1 avian influenza as 
the causative agent using a rapid diagnostic or laboratory testing. 
 
 
¶7. Mission points of contact are:  Judith Robb-McCord, 
USAID/Ethiopia Health Officer (251-11-551-88) and Carolyn Greene, 
CDC/Ethiopia Deputy Director for Programs (251-11-4669566). 
 
YAMAMOTO