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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL NATO QA
SUBJECT: NATO WEIGHING NATURE OF POSSIBLE TIES TO QATAR 
 
REF: A. USNATO 146 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. SHINAGEL/REID MARCH 15 AND EARLIER 2006 
     ¶C. BROTZEN/REID MARCH 9 2006 
 
Classified By: A/DCM IAN KELLY;REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.(U)  This is a request for guidance; see para. 11-13. 
 
2.(C)  Summary:  NATO is debating whether, and how strong, a 
security assurance it is prepared to offer Qatar in the 
ongoing negotiation of a possible NATO-Qatar agreement which 
would allow NATO liaison personnel to stay at the al Udeid 
Combined Air operations Center (CAOC) (ref. A).  Drawing on a 
letter then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sent to 
(then partner) Bulgaria in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict, 
in which NATO offered time-limited security assurances 
against Serbian retaliation in exchange for use of Bulgarian 
airspace, NATO is proposing Allies Monday discuss a narrow 
form of possible security assurance for Qatar linked to any 
threat which Qatar might receive because of hosting NATO 
personnel (ref. B) Ideally we would have guidance by March 
19, but could seek a postponement until March 21. Simmons has 
said that NATO was not yet at the endgame of these talks, 
but, out of respect, should be timely about starting the 
exchange of draft language.  NATO Allies debated other 
aspects of this agreement on Monday, March 12, deciding to 
eliminate discussion of a transit agreement.  NATO staff did 
not raise jurisdiction issues on March 12, but privately 
assured the U.S. that it would use U.S.-provided text in 
their proposal to Qatar (ref.C). NATO Deputy Assistant 
Secretary General (DASG) Robert Simmons plans to go to Doha 
 
SIPDIS 
from March 31 to April 3 to discuss a bracketed text, which 
he wants Qatar to have adequate time to review ahead of his 
visit. End Summary. 
 
3.(C)  NATO is developing a bracketed text for a possible 
NATO-Qatar agreement and hopes to send it to Qatar next week. 
 Previous exchanges with Doha have identified three 
substantive areas for further Allied consideration: transit 
provisions, jurisdiction and security assurances.  On Friday, 
March 9, NATO staff agreed with representatives of the five 
nations who currently have or had posted personnel to the 
liaison group (U.S./UK/NO/CA/FR) that NATO would use 
U.S.-proposed text to seek a strong carve-out for bilateral 
defense cooperation agreements (DCA) despite several Qatari 
rejections of this approach.  In Monday, March 12, Political 
Committee discussion, Allies decided to drop mention of 
transit provisions in the bracketed text since Qatar had not 
sought them in its earlier submissions, no Allies had 
encountered transit problems, and there was interest in 
simplifying a possible agreement. 
 
4.(C)  In the absence of sufficient time to receive 
authoritative instructions from capital, discussion of 
security assurances still yielded Allied hesitation to offer 
Doha a general security assurance, or indeed formula, on 
cooperation linkages which went much beyond agreed language 
in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).  Some Allies 
also reflected that Qatari interest in hosting a possible 
future Security Cooperation Center was off the table since 
the Alliance had yet to decide whether to pursue such a step. 
 Simmons, as chairman, said that Qatar considered itself to 
be offering a basing contribution through hosting ISAF 
personnel on its territory - a step which Doha saw as beyond 
the ICI - and wanted "something from NATO" beyond the ICI 
format in return.  He also drew Allied attention to past 
Allied extension of temporary security assurances to Bulgaria 
during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999.  Text follows: 
 
BULGARIAN ASSURANCE LETTER, APRIL 20, 1999 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5.(SBU) In the context of the North Atlantic Council's 
request to grant unrestricted access to the airspace of 
Bulgaria for the execution of air operations over the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I would like 
to reiterate the assurances provided in my letter dated 24 
March 1999 which states that it would be unacceptable if the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were to threaten the 
territorial integrity, political independence and security of 
your country. 
 
USNATO 00000172  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.(SBU)  The Alliance would view with the utmost seriousness 
any attacks by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on your 
country, in particular stemming from NATO's use of the 
airspace of Bulgaria. 
 
7.(SBU)  The Alliance has repeatedly made clear that the 
security of all NATO Member States is inseparably linked to 
that of all Partner countries.  Your security is of a direct 
and material concern to the Alliance. 
 
8.(SBU)  I should like to add my appreciation of the stalwart 
support Bulgaria has given to NATO throughout the crisis in 
Kosovo.  Your country's valuable assistance will strengthen 
and deepen the already close cooperation between NATO and 
Bulgaria.   Your sincerely, (Javier Solana) 
 
END TEXT 
 
9.(C)  While observing that the case with Qatar might be more 
complex because it possibly would be threatened by a 
non-state actor perhaps even using domestic-linked 
terrorists, Allies generally indicated an openness to refer 
to capitals a more narrowly-worded formulation of the 
Bulgarian security assurance.  Allies also discussed 
inconclusively whether Allies should consider Qatar's 
approaches to NATO as fundamentally a partner cooperation 
issue or a basing arrangement proposal from an operational 
contributor.  France said that the question of whether Qatar 
should be addressed as a partner or as an operational 
contributor was an open one, but that Paris likely would be 
more comfortable if Doha's contribution to ISAF exceeded 
allowing the ISAF liaison group to operate at al-Udeid. 
 
10.(C)  Several Allies and the chairman also reviewed their 
impression that Qatar attached considerable importance to the 
personal relationship which NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap 
de Hoop Scheffer was developing with the Amir and Heir 
Apparent.  We supported this observation, noting there had 
emerged a two-track process in which Simmons negotiated a 
substantive text and the SYG pursued development of a 
personal relationship with the Qatari leadership. 
 
11.(C)  Request for guidance:  NATO proposed on March 16 that 
Allies consider the following text as a starting point on 
negotiation of limited security assurance language for Qatar 
linked to their hosting of the ISAF liaison group: 
 
TEXT BEGINS 
 
NATO will consult with the State of Qatar if that country 
perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, 
political independence or security in the context of the ISAF 
functions currently being undertaken within the Combined Air 
Operations Center at al Udeid Airbase and NATO's request to 
the State of Qatar to allow NATO personnel to function in 
support of the ISAF mission.  The security of the State of 
Qatar is of concern to the Alliance. 
 
END TEXT 
 
12.(C) RFG continued:  USNATO recommends that Washington 
instruct it to propose an alternate formula as follows: 
 
NATO will consult with the State of Qatar on security 
concerns which are mutually perceived as credible threats to 
the State of Qatar, and which stem from the State of Qatar's 
hosting of the ISAF functions currently being undertaken 
within the Combined Air Operations Center at al Udeid Airbase 
and NATO's request to the State of Qatar to allow NATO 
personnel to function in support of the ISAF mission.  In 
this context, the security of the State of Qatar is of 
concern to the Alliance. 
 
13.(C) RFG Continued: Should Washington consider the above 
outlined approach too extensive, it could consider an 
alternative approach for NATO to pursue in which it 
substitutes pursuing a broad agreement with Qatar with a 
package of considering Qatar an ISAF contributor (and thus 
adding it to ISAF format meetings - a possible prestigious 
opportunity for Doha), signing an annual individual 
 
USNATO 00000172  003 OF 003 
 
 
cooperation plan for Qatar, offering mobile training teams 
from the Middle East Training and Cooperation Initiative 
(METCI), and asking the SYG to send the para. 11 security 
assurance language in a letter to the Amir or Heir Apparent, 
perhaps in conjunction with a personal trip to Doha. This 
alternative approach could be a fall back plan as well, 
should Allies not reach agreement on a common approach next 
week. 
 
14.(C) Comment:  Based on Allied internal discussions of how 
far they are willing to go in striking a bargain with Doha 
and Simmons' past accounts of his exchanges with Qatar, there 
would appear to be considerable gaps between NATO and Qatar's 
positions on this possible agreement.  Depending upon the 
extent to which he is willing to engage personally, SYG de 
Hoop Scheffer may be able to narrow that gap. Still, it is 
unclear if the combination of substantive negotiation and SYG 
personal diplomacy will suffice to bridge the differences 
between NATO and Qatar.  We will know more in early April 
after Simmons returns from Doha with reactions to the 
bracketed text NATO plans to offer.  End Comment. 
NULAND