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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN/MISSILE DEFENSE: USD/P EDELMAN, 
A/S BOUCHER, AND D/NSA O'SULLIVAN BRIEF ALLIED PERMREPS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Eric Edelman, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, 
and Deputy National Security Advisor Meghan O'Sullivan 
briefed Allied PermReps on the latest U.S. thinking on Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and missile defense in a coffee session at 
USNATO on March 12.  On Iraq, they elaborated for Allies that 
the surge of U.S. forces into Baghdad was the essential 
enabling element of a political, economic, and diplomatic 
strategy designed to help the Iraqi government make the tough 
choices needed to chart a forward course.  On Afghanistan, 
they outlined U.S. assistance and priorities, and U.S. 
engagement with Pakistan.  USD/P Edelman reminded Allies that 
U.S. missile defense plans for Europe were to counter the 
Iranian threat, and that the U.S. will continue the 
established pattern of consultation on cooperation with 
Russia and offers by Allies.  Questions focused on handling 
Pakistan, missile defense, and U.S. contacts with Iran.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶2.  (C) USD/P Edelman made clear that the surge of U.S. 
forces into Baghdad is not intended to resolve the situation 
militarily.  Rather, military operations are intended to 
create the political space for the Iraqi government to take 
the necessary steps to solve problems and chart an Iraqi way 
ahead.  Though the strategy was only a few weeks old, he 
cautioned, a decrease in sectarian killings in Baghdad, the 
reopening of markets, and other indicators provide grounds 
for cautious optimism.  He noted, however, that spectacular 
VBIED attacks would continue and drew attention to the recent 
spate of terror attacks on Shiite pilgrims. 
 
¶3.  (C) Deputy National Security Advisor O'Sullivan 
reinforced USD/P Edelman's remarks and outlined the main 
tenets of the new Iraq strategy.  She stressed that Iraq was 
in the early stages of the new plan and we are only in a 
position to note the inputs to the strategy, not evaluate the 
outcome.  She noted that the Iraqi surge battalions had 
arrived in Baghdad.  Both she and USD/P Edelman pointed to 
the positive anticipated effects from Parliament's expected 
passage of a hydrocarbons law, which will ensure that Iraq's 
oil resources are a national patrimony, not to be used to 
benefit any one segment of the population over another.  On 
the economic and political fronts, O'Sullivan outlined the 
plan to increase numbers of USG civilians embedded with 
military units outside of the Green Zone doing on-the-scene 
economic development work, and anticipated greater Sunni 
participation in upcoming provincial elections.  She told 
PermReps that the March 10 Iraq neighbors conference was 
constructive, and in response to a question from Spain, 
stated that no official bilats had been held between the U.S. 
and Iran, but that delegates had spoken informally.  USD/P 
Edelman underscored the need to keep strong international 
pressure on Iran to live up to its non-proliferation 
obligations. 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶4. (C) USD/P Edelman said that he personally did not use the 
term "Taliban spring offensive," to characterize resurgent 
Taliban activity, because it lent an air of legitimacy to 
Taliban actions.  Noting that the Taliban had adjusted 
tactics following the successes of the international 
community in 2004-2005, he reminded PermReps of the U.S. 
commitment to a comprehensive approach, encompassing military 
operations, reconstruction, development, and civil society 
 
USNATO 00000170  002 OF 002 
 
 
activity.  He pushed back strongly against the conventional 
wisdom in Europe that the U.S. only focuses on military 
operations, noting that U.S military counterinsurgency 
doctrine emphasized that 80% of an effort was political and 
economic. 
 
¶5.  (C) A/S Boucher outlined the comprehensive approach and 
noted U.S. priorities in training and equipping Afghan 
national security forces, building roads, constructing 
electricity infrastructure, reforming the justice sector, and 
fighting narcotics.  The Administration had asked for $11.8 
billion from Congress for this, he said, and he sensed a 
supportive mood on the Hill.  He told Ambassadors that the 
Afghan government was making much greater progress on poppy 
eradication this year as compared to last, and was on track 
to add six to eight more provinces to the "poppy free" list. 
Helmand remained a serious challenge, but a nearer-term goal 
was to declare northern, western, and central Afghanistan 
poppy-free.  Turning to strategic communications, and 
effective cooperation between the Afghan government, ISAF, 
and nations, he highlighted the key role of the Afghans' new 
National Communications Coordination Center (NC3).  The Dutch 
PermRep noted that the U.S. policy on Iraq sounded very much 
like the policy onAfghanistan -- a development he welcomed. 
 
-------- 
Pakistan 
-------- 
 
¶6.  (S) A/S Boucher said that Secretary Rice would be 
traveling to Pakistan in the coming month or so.  He pointed 
to U.S. economic support for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones 
in Pakistan's border region as a key part of our 
relationship.  In response to comments by the UK, Canadian, 
and Romanian Ambassadors on how best to deal with President 
Musharraf, A/S Boucher said that the Pakistanis want 
recognition of their accomplishments in the war on terrorism, 
and the difficulties they face.  We are frank and clear in 
our bilateral discussions with them, he assured, but we talk 
as partners in a common cause.  He stated that Pakistan is 
looking to build a relationship with NATO, and urged a visit 
to Islamabad by SYG de Hoop Scheffer.  USD/P Edelman reminded 
Allies that the region comprising the Pakistani-Afghan border 
had never been under the control of any government or 
authority; President Musharraf needed help from partners to 
realize his commitments in the war on terrorism there.  He 
counseled Allies to push the Pakistani government privately 
to do more, without further complicating Musharraf's 
challenging domestic political situation. 
 
--------------- 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) In response to a question from the Czech ambassador, 
USD/P Edelman told Allies we continue to talk with the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Denmark, and the UK on our European missile 
defense plans.  He reiterated the goal was to stay ahead of 
the Iranian missile threat, and that we continue to offer 
possibilities for cooperation to the Russians.  He pointed to 
the upcoming Reinforced NAC on April 19 with LTG Obering as 
an opportunity for further consultation, and while noting 
that missile defense under a NATO rubric would certainly need 
NAC approval, hoped that movement at NATO could occur in 
parallel with U.S. initiatives. 
 
¶8.  (U) The delegation has cleared this cable. 
NULAND