VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #0827/01 0720955
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130955Z MAR 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

UNCLAS USEU BRUSSELS 000827 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM PREL EAID EU BE
SUBJECT: REFUGEE RETURNS IN EASTERN CONGO: A JOINT US-EU 
ASSESSMENT 
 
¶1. Summary: A joint USG-European Union assessment team 
composed of US representatives from PRM and OFDA traveled 
throughout Katanga and South Kivu provinces in January, 
finding a basic level of peace and stability, but continued 
sporadic human rights abuses perpetrated primarily by 
security forces and ex-combatants. Much remains to be done in 
terms of early recovery and development, but refugees are 
returning from neighboring countries and receiving assistance 
from UNHCR, NGOs, and other donors in their reintegration to 
Congo.  The delegation found seven areas in which 
interventions by all actors could improve the return process: 
 1) integrated response to return, 2) repatriation-return 
management, 3) planning and budget operations, 4) UNHCR 
coordination, 5) implementation of Project Profile, 6) 
implementation of humanitarian reform, and 7) greater 
involvement by the government of DRC.  All recommendations 
were made jointly by the US and EU, and this report 
represents the consensus view of the entire delegation. End 
summary. 
 
Overview 
-------- 
¶2. From Jan. 14-24, 2007, a joint delegation from the United 
States Government (State Department and USAID) and the 
European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid 
(DG ECHO) traveled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
to assess the return and reintegration of refugees and 
displaced people and to appraise the implementation of the 
various new coordination and funding mechanisms linked to the 
UN humanitarian reform process.  The delegation of eight core 
members was led by William Fitzgerald, US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, 
 
SIPDIS 
and Cees Wittebrood, head of the Africa unit for DG ECHO. 
The mission held meetings with government officials, UN heads 
of agency, and representatives of the international community 
and non-governmental organizations in Kinshasa.  It visited 
Lubumbashi, Moba, Pweto, Uvira, Baraka, and Fizi.  The 
mission also met with UNHCR in Bujumbura, Burundi, and 
concluded with a wrap-up debriefing in Goma. 
 
¶3. In general, the mission observed professionals from the UN 
and other international organizations, NGOs, and the 
government of DRC working well under extremely challenging 
conditions.  The mission witnessed a safe and dignified 
refugee repatriation by ship from Tanzania to Baraka, DRC, 
and noted extensive preparations for upcoming repatriations 
from Zambia to eastern Katanga Province.  The mission was 
able to move freely without escort and at no time felt either 
under threat or that it was in a hostile or dangerous 
environment. Nonetheless there was clear and widespread 
evidence of the destruction caused by the war, and reliable 
witnesses spoke of ongoing insecurity in more remote areas. 
In Kinshasa and Lubumbashi all interlocutors spoke of a 
recent but significant economic up-turn, with the cities 
certainly appearing vibrant.  However, the basic services in 
refugee return areas of Katanga and South Kivu appeared very 
limited, though some members of the team who had visited 
previously felt that significant progress had been made over 
the last year thanks to the humanitarian assistance and the 
efforts of the local communities themselves. 
 
¶4. The return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) begins a process of integration that may take years to 
complete. More than a decade of war has left homes, schools, 
and health centers in shambles.  There are still some 1.2 
million IDPs and some 400,000 refugees in neighboring 
counries.  Despite the vast needs in the DRC, most eturned 
refugees the mission spoke to were pleased to be home after 
years outside their native country.  Congo has a rare 
opportunity to consolidate its peace and democracy, which is 
still extremely fragile.  With the support of the 
international community, the Government of DRC can address 
many of the ongoing challenges in infrastructure, delivery of 
basic services, security, and rule of law.  IOs and NGOs are 
currently providing many of those services in areas of 
return, and the UN MONUC forces are providing a basic level 
of security, but at some point those responsibilities must be 
taken up by the Government of DRC. 
 
¶5. The delegation found seven areas in which interventions by 
all actors could improve the return process:  1) integrated 
response to return, 2) repatriation-return management, 3) 
planning and budget 
operations, 4) UNHCR coordination, 5) implementation of 
Project Profile, 6) implementation of humanitarian reform, 
and 7) the role of the government of DRC.  This list is not 
meant to be exhaustive, or to indicate deficiencies on the 
part of local actors.  Rather, the delegation offers these 
 
observations to further our joint objectives.  The 
expeditious return of Congolese to their homes, in security 
and with dignity, will strengthen regional stability and save 
lives. 
 
Recommendation 1: Integrated Response to IDPs 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶6. The mission recommends that all actors work to provide 
similar levels of services to returned IDPs and refugees, and 
ensure there is a well-defined coordinating mechanism for 
assisting all returnees.  The delegation observed that 
traditional repatriated refugees received more services and 
attention than either IDPs or refugees who return home 
spontaneously. With minor exceptions, the IDPs in Congo did 
not go to camps, and thu are hard to identify andh IDPs becoming more and@ of civil conflict worlo the 
new realities oecause IDPs often do 
no`nternational humanitarian@ees, UN staff must devells to work closely withledging 
that these saacting in ways that 
ca@e first place).  The delegt the fh`vh`HQ`dership will be key in he 
community create a com the complex 
emergenQegation recommends: 
Qtween services providQs: More efforts must be melop 
an integrated holie return of all 
displand resources should b%sible at communities a. the welcome switch frual refugee children to sQpporting schools). Refugees 
who return spontaeously also should be afforded similar 
support to those who return under organized repatriaions. 
 
b. Designation of a lead agency responQible for IDPs: In DRC, 
UNICEF has provided IDQ services through its Program of 
Expanded Assistance to Returns (PEAR) and Rapid ResponseMechanism (RRM), both of which predate the Cluser Approach. 
These programs must be rapidly eQpanded to cover all areas 
where there are IDPs.  In general, however, there does not 
appear to be clarity in the Cluster Approach about 
responsibilities for IDPs other than in the area of 
protection. 
 
Recommendation 2: Management of Repatriation and Returns 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶7. The delegation recommends that UNHCR and other agencies 
develop better information about the decision-making process 
of returnees, and expedite processing of complicated cases 
from camps.  The joint delegation witnessed well-organized 
and well-executed refugee repatriations in South Kivu 
province.  In Katanga province, the mission saw that transit 
centers had been constructed for the anticipated arrival of 
returnees beginning in February 2007.  The mission, however, 
was concerned about the long build-up to the start of 
repatriation from Katanga and the lack of adequate 
cross-border consultations between UNHCR-DRC and UNHCR-Zambia 
(see Recommendation 4).  What also appears to be lacking is 
any coordinated collection and analysis of data about why 
refugees choose to return home and what factors influence 
that decision.  Field workers from UN agencies and NGOs rely 
upon hearsay and conventional wisdom, which often leads to 
faulty conclusions.  It results in ships and trucks operating 
far below capacity some weeks, and long waiting lines other 
weeks.  While the decision about whether and when to return 
will always vary by individual and be influenced by a number 
of changing factors (weather, security, health, etc.), some 
general conclusions could be drawn through a structured study 
of past experience.  For example, it was unclear what effect 
the recent elections in DRC had upon repatriation.  Some 
humanitarian workers believed it was a key factor holding 
back returns prior to December 2006; others believed it made 
little difference to the average farmer.  How much 
information do refugees in camps have about conditions in 
their villages back home?  Some workers believe the refugees 
know very little after being away for 8-12 years; others 
 
believe they are intimately aware of the smallest details 
thanks to networks of friends, relatives, and those who 
return home spontaneously and report back.  Cell phones are 
common, and each ship that returns from DRC to Tanzania 
carries bags of mail back to those in the camps. 
Specifically, the delegation recommends: 
 
a. In-depth interviewing of those who have returned (both 
spontaneously and through organized repatriations): Such 
information would allow for better estimations of future 
returnees, when it is time to move from facilitated to 
promoted repatriation, and what are the most urgent early 
recovery and development needs in the DRC. 
 
b. Following up with no-shows to convoys and ships: In 
general, the number of refugees who actually show up on any 
given day of a repatriation is far below the number who 
signed up. Those who handle logistics never know why scores 
of refugees opted out at the last minute.  Follow-up visits 
could determine whether there is a pattern to the reasons 
given.  If the reasons are based on rumor or false 
information (e.g. resettlement possibilities to the US or 
other third countries), UNHCR, and NGO staff could correct 
misperceptions before they become widespread. 
 
c. Targeting job-training in refugee camps more specifically 
to realities back home: Many Congolese refugees are receiving 
training in camps for trades that are either oversubscribed 
or non-relevant in most villages.  Subsistence farming is the 
reality in eastern Congo for all but a few of the returnees, 
and the delegation recommends that camp training focus more 
on improved agricultural production.  The delegation heard a 
sobering NGO report on ecological devastation to Lake 
Tanganyika caused in part by poor fishing and farming 
practices, an issue that could be addressed and possibly 
reversed by appropriate training in the camps.  FAO would 
seem to be a logical agency to take the lead on this issue. 
 
d. Expediting the resolution of complicated cases to increase 
the pace of repatriation:  A significant number of camp 
residents are consistently rejected for repatriation because 
their cases are deemed problematic by UNHCR (incomplete or 
inconsistent records; separated children; medical issues; 
etc.).  The delegation recommends that HCR expedite those 
cases, assigning dedicated staff if necessary, so that they 
are not all left until the end, thereby slowing and 
prolonging the repatriation. 
 
e. Expediting the repatriation of refugees from the Republic 
of Congo (Brazzaville):  The mission was disappointed at the 
slow rhythm of return from ROC but notes with satisfaction 
and anticipation UNHCR's assurances that, all things being 
equal, the process will be concluded by the end of the year. 
 
Recommendation 3: Planning figures and assumptions 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶8. The mission urged UNHCR to develop more accurate 
repatriation planning figures, to separate fixed 
and variable costs, and to keep donors apprised of ongoing 
revisions.  UNHCR has proposed annual planning figures for 
repatriation that consistently have far exceeded what was 
eventually achieved.  For some operations the difference has 
been more than threefold.  The funding implications for 
donors are obvious, as donors link their funding levels to 
UNHCR's planning figures and are thus confronted with 
increased and unacceptable unit costs.  The mission 
recognizes that UNHCR reviewed its targets and budgets for 
2006, however this was only done in the last quarter of the 
year, effectively preventing donors from readjusting their 
contributions and thus making the most effective use of their 
funds. The result has been an increasing loss of confidence 
in the planning figures and budgets proposed by UNHCR and 
thus a consequent apprehension in committing funds.  The 
proposed Congolese repatriation figure for 2007 is set at 
98,000.  The delegation considers that, though this may be 
theoretically feasible on paper, the technical and political 
assumptions on which the estimate is based are extremely 
optimistic.  The delegation understands that the myriad 
elements that influence repatriation are extremely difficult 
to predict.  Despite recent political advances in DRC, the 
delegation remains unconvinced, based on past experience, 
that the proposed repatriation figures are achievable. 
Consequently, funding the entire budget at once may not 
appear reasonable from the perspective of some donors. 
Specifically the delegation recommends: 
 
a. UNHCR revise its annual repatriation figures based on past 
experience: Also, by attention to Recommendation 2 above, 
 
UNHCR should be able to establish more accurate assumptions. 
 
b. UNHCR break down its budget for donors in terms of fixed 
and variable costs:  The delegation realizes that UNHCR has 
certain fixed costs in order to carry out existing 
obligations and to be fully prepared for the repatriation 
process.  Nonetheless the delegation highlights the fact that 
UNHCR must expect that some donors will wish to modulate 
their contributions to match the actual rhythm of 
repatriation.  Consequently, the mission recommends that, if 
UNHCR is unable to revise its current planning figure for 
2007, it should provide donors with a clear distinction 
between its fixed and variable costs and demonstrate how 
these variable costs change according to the number of 
refugees actually repatriated. 
 
c. Keep donors apprised of ongoing budget revisions: UNHCR 
should alert donors in a timely fashion to any adjustments in 
variable costs resulting from any reduction or increase in 
the rhythm of repatriation. 
 
 
Recommendation 4: UNHCR Coordination and Tripartites 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶9. The delegation recommended that UNHCR increase 
cross-border coordination, increase its Katanga field 
staffing, improve communication among field offices, 
regularize communication with DRC humanitarian actors and 
partners, and encourage the early conclusion of remaining 
tripartite agreements and the holding of regular tripartite 
commission meetings.  The delegation recognizes that UNHCR 
has established cross-border meetings, as well as more casual 
contacts among offices involved in the DRC repatriation. 
However, the mission observed in the field that many 
communication gaps exist.  Specifically, the delegation 
recommends: 
 
a. Increased cross-border coordination:  There are gaps in 
coordination across borders that contribute to delays in 
repatriation operations.  An early emphasis on cross-border 
planning will ease logistics throughout the return operation 
from Zambia.  Katanga offices should meet regularly with 
counterparts in Zambia to iron out specific details of the 
return operation including target dates for convoys.  The 
mission was pleased to learn of a scheduled late January 
meeting, and encourages nsultations. 
 Furtherh to increase the cross-bor`rmation regarding refugee , and areas of origin. ommunication 
should b`fices should incorporat@om the South Kivu operatioreturns from Zambia. 
 
b. facilitate coordinatiol ensure that adequate 
place to et`s p Incentives to servQst be increased 
untiQound. 
 
c. Improved # field offices:  The 
deeed for UNHCR to increaseexchange of information among its field offices.   Because 
field offices report directly to Kinshasa, the offices are 
not well informed about each other's activities and planning. 
 In addition, field offices should be sharing and learning 
from best practices.  In particular, the CPIA (Comite 
Provinciale Inter Agence) is not informed, which means that 
clusters are not informed, as is the case in Uvira. 
 
d. Improved coordination with partners and other humanitarian 
actors:  UNHCR should coordinate more closely with partners, 
other humanitarian actors and potential partners in regions 
of return, including the dissemination of information from 
cross-border exercises so that humanitarian actors can target 
their interventions appropriately. 
 
e. Expedited completion of Tripartite Agreements:  The 
Mission recognizes that the conflict in DRC has spread 
refugees across more than nine countries and that tripartite 
 
agreements are subject to political will often outside 
UNHCR's control.  However it is noted that tripartite 
agreements remain to be signed between DRC/UNHCR and Rwanda, 
Burundi and Uganda.  All parties concerned should take 
measures to conclude these as soon as possible.  Existing 
commissions should meet regularly in order to expedite the 
ongoing 
repatriation process. 
 
Recommendation 5: Project Profiling and ProGres Database 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶10. The mission encouraged UNHCR to allow transfer of data 
from UNHCR Tanzania to UNHCR Congo, to give regional IT staff 
authority to change software, and to complete the 
installation of digital fingerprinting equipment.  Taking 
full advantage of proGres is one way to address many of the 
information gaps mentioned above in Recommendation 4.  After 
significant investment from donors in the Project Profile 
exercise, UNHCR has failed to use this tool to full advantage 
in the DRC operation.  UNHCR Congo does not have access to 
proGres data from UNHCR Tanzania concerning refugees 
scheduled for repatriation.  The database is configured in a 
way that does not allow UNHCR Congo to enter local data 
correctly.  Local offices cannot change the database to 
correct this problem.  Specifically, the delegation 
recommends: 
 
a. Allowing UNHCR Tanzania to transfer refugee information to 
UNHCR Congo: The argument that information protection 
precludes exchange of data appears specious. The data is 
available to UNHCR DRC in other forms.  In fact, the data 
exchange is already underway in Tanzania-Burundi operations. 
The present policy only prevents the effective use of proGres 
data, thereby slowing the pace of information exchange and 
preventing effective refugee services. 
 
b. Removing barriers to software adaptation:  ProGres 
formatting is not sufficiently flexible to meet mission 
needs.  As the system is developed, programmers should be 
guided by input from the field, and local IT people should be 
authorized to make minor formatting changes to the database, 
which would enable field offices to enter relevant data and 
produce reports, such as passenger manifests for use by 
cross-border operators.  In a region with ongoing 
repatriation, a regional proGres administrator would be 
helpful. 
 
c. Completing the installation of digital fingerprinting 
equipment: UNHCR should complete the installation of the 
proGres project by installing the fingerprint function for 
the system in all locations.  Fingerprint records are 
effective in preventing refugee recycling.  UNHCR has 
overcome technical problems that prevented fingerprinting in 
the recent past, and is already using fingerprinting 
effectively in some locations. 
 
Recommendation 6: UN Humanitarian Reform 
----------------------------------------- 
¶11. The mission recommends that the Cluster Approach not 
become simply a disbursement vehicle for the Pooled Fund, and 
that the Early Recovery Cluster become more active.  A new 
set of coordination and funding mechanisms has been 
introduced  in the DRC over the past year, including the 
Cluster Approach, the  Central Emergency Response Fund 
(CERF), and the Pooled Fund.  Still in the pilot phase, these 
new tools are not widely or consistently understood by 
partner agencies and NGOs across the national, provincial, 
and district levels.  On the positive side, the Cluster 
Approach appears to have at least revitalized coordination 
among stakeholders.  The process has expanded to include 
Government of DRC agencies such as REGIDESO (water company) 
and the National Commission for Refugees (Commission 
Nationale pour les Refugies, or CNR), which is very positive. 
 Many partners said the multi-sectoral assessments that 
Clusters support are effective.  The delegation also heard, 
however, that partners consider the Cluster process to be 
inefficient, causing additional work and too many meetings. 
Although the Cluster system was not designed as a funding 
mechanism, it has become one in DRC because of the 
Humanitarian Coordinator's decision to allocate the Pooled 
Fund (joint humanitarian financing by several bilateral 
donors, most notably the UK) through the Clusters. 
 
¶12. Another concern heard by the delegation is that a lack of 
clarity exists on how programs chosen for funding by the CERF 
and Pooled Fund through the Cluster process are to be 
monitored and evaluated.  NGO partners do not seem to be 
clear on whom they ultimately are accountable to between the 
 
Pooled Fund and the Clusters.  Many of the Clusters appear to 
be functioning efficiently and well in DRC with the exception 
of the Early Recovery Cluster, co-chaired by UNDP and UNHCR. 
In eastern Congo, there was little sense that the Early 
Recovery Cluster was organized and functioning as it should 
be.  This is a particularly vital time for early recovery in 
Congo, and a lack of coordination in the transition from 
relief to development could have long-term repercussions for 
repatriation.  Specifically, the delegation recommends: 
 
a. The Clusters not lose track of their core mission:  If the 
DRC finds that distributing Pooled Funds through the Clusters 
makes sense, the Cluster Leads must ensure that the Clusters 
do not only become funding disbursement vehicles.  The 
Clusters must maintain their central role as coordinating 
bodies to address gaps in the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance and to insure the quality and coherence of 
activities with respect to the Humanitarian Action Plan for 
DRC.  NGOs and partners in the field must be informed about 
the overall goals of the Cluster Approach and its role in 
humanitarian reform. 
 
b. The Early Recovery Cluster become more active:  If 
recovery and development needs in return areas are not 
properly identified and tackled, displaced people may cease 
returning home and those who have already repatriated will 
face gaps in basic services.  It is incumbent upon this 
Cluster to ensure that other agencies and the government 
assume their full responsibilities in order to respond 
adequately to relief-to-development challenges. 
 
c. The Cluster system must not dilute UNHCR's clear mandate 
for refugees:  The cluster system was essentially set up to 
highlight and cover gaps in services to IDPs and specific 
non-refugee vulnerable populations.  It was not intended to 
force UNHCR to share its responsibility for refugee 
management to a Cluster.  UNHCR must retain its recognized 
mandate with respect to refugees. 
 
Recommendation 7: Government of DRC Participation 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶13. The mission recommends that the Government of DRC fund 
civil servant salaries, repair and maintain key roads, and 
reform the justice and security sectors.  The Government of 
DRC must become more involved in humanitarian assistance and 
development.  The mission fully appreciates the constraints 
presented by lack of funding and capacity, but the government 
must increase its participation and responsibility for 
ensuring the return and re-integration of its own people. 
The Commission Nationale pour les Refugies (CNR) is well 
placed to coordinate the government facilitation of the 
return process within the DRC since it represents many 
important ministries.  However, its budget is far too small 
to match its mandate. 
 
¶14. The delegation heard several times from employees of 
international organizations and NGOs in the field that the 
best thing the Government of DRC could do is stay out of 
their way.  The mission also heard from Government of DRC 
officials that the government will be prepared to step 
forward once the international community has completed its 
humanitarian work.  Both approaches are understandable in 
times of crisis, but not in the current environment.  Now 
that DRC has moved beyond war and has conducted democratic 
elections, it is time for the government and the 
international humanitarian 
community to work more closely.  It is the government's 
responsibiliQy, security and 
welQ  Specifically, the delega. The Government of DRC servants: 
The fact ten unpaid or underpaide pace of repatriatio. areas of security and ederpaid soldiers 
create security cncerns and lack of pay for teachers make itQ 
impossible to staff existing schools.  The CNRshould receive 
much greater funding to work through its member ministries to 
ensure that basc health, education, and social services are 
rovided in areas of return. 
 
b. The Government takes over the maintenance of key roadways: 
Infrastructure needs in Eastern Congo are enormous.  The 
humanitarian community has been repiring and opening key 
roads, but without the articipation of the Government of DRC 
in repair and maintenance, most roads will not last beyond 
one rainy season, leaving citizens isolated from services and 
markets. 
 
 
c. The Government of DRC must proceed with the reform of its 
security and judicial sectors with the assistance of the 
international community:  The lack of effective rule of law 
prevents adequate resolution of land tenure disputes, safe 
reintegration of refugees and IDPs, prosecution of criminals, 
and other issues directly affecting local communities.  In 
addition, the government must ensure that the space in which 
the humanitarian community operates is respected in terms of 
free movement, security, lack of unreasonable administrative 
hindrances, and other threats that impede the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
¶15. The full delegation was composed of the following US 
participants: William Fitzgerald, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State, PRM; Antoinette Ferrara, Director, Disaster 
Response and Mitigation, Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, USAID; Jay Nash, OFDA Senior Program Officer, 
Kinshasa; Wendy Henning, Program Officer, Central Africa 
Region, PRM; Dana Francis, Refugee Officer, US Mission to the 
European Union, Brussels; and George Frederick, Refugee 
Coordinator, Great Lakes Region, Kampala. The European 
Commission participants were Cees Wittebrood, Head of Unit 
for Africa region, DG ECHO; Philippe Maughan, Desk Central 
Africa, DG ECHO; Patrick Vercammen, DG ECHO, Kinshasa; Yves 
Horent, DG ECHO, Dar es Salam; and Fausto Prieto, DG ECHO, 
Bukavu, DRC. 
 
GRAY 
.