VZCZCXYZ0034
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #1043/01 0870926
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD9A6DEF WSC4358-695)
R 280926Z MAR 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, GENEVA FOR CD DEL - AMB ROCCA 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL EUN PTER KN IR IN CH
SUBJECT: U.S. - EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND 
NONPROLIFERATION, FEBRUARY 22-23, 2007 
 
Classified By: Classified by USEU PolMinCouns Larry Wohlers 
for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
SUMMARY: 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The U.S.-EU Troika disarmament and nonproliferation 
consultations under the German presidency demonstrated many 
common interests and a willingness to engage frankly but 
cordially.  They did not hide, however, the well known 
divergence of views on how to approach these key issues.  In 
particular, the Europeans remained firm in their support for 
the primacy of approaches based on formal agreements and 
established institutions, while the U.S. made clear that it 
preferred results-based arrangements.  On specifics: 
      -- Both sides supported FMT negotiations at the CD, 
but the U.S. made clear it would not agree to an Ad Hoc 
Committee on outer space, even at the cost of no FMCT 
negotiations. 
 
      -- The U.S. and EU place emphasis on positive momentum 
in the NPT review process and hope to resolve procedural 
questions quickly. 
 
      -- The IAEA,s Committee on Safeguards and Veriication 
is in difficulty; its future may be decided by results at the 
June Board of Governors, meeting. 
 
      -- The two sides agreed on the need for a strong 
approach toward Iran and were pleased at progress on the 
DPRK, although the U.S. made clear the process had only 
started. 
 
      -- Preparations for the U.S.-EU Summit should begin 
soon and should focus on a limited number of significant 
items.  The U.S. supported the inclusion of some actionable 
items, which could enable measurement of progress. 
 
U.S. - EU engagement remains key to progress on non- 
proliferation and disarmament issues 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) February 22-23 U.S.-EU Troika discussions on 
disarmament and nonproliferation (CODUN/CONOP) began with  a 
brief assessment of U.S.- European Union (EU) cooperation in 
these areas, as well as a review of recent non-proliferation 
and disarmament conferences. 
 
¶3. (SBU) German Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament 
Ruediger Luedeking opened discussions by emphasizing the 
commonality of values shared by the EU and the U.S. on 
nonproliferation and disarmament.  These values should be 
deepened, but reflect no difference in respective  objectives 
-- only differences on how to reach the objectives.  He added 
the EU and U.S. should not be "shy about where we differ." 
EU Personal Representative on Nonproliferation of WMD 
Annalisa Giannella suggested continued informal contact and 
communication on key issues and earlier collaboration and 
discussion prior to major conferences. 
 
¶4. (C) U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament 
Christina Rocca noted the important impact that informal 
U.S.-EU brainstorming could have on substantive engagement, 
especially in international forums.  U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Sec-retary of State for International Security and 
Non-proliferation Andrew Semmel said that attempts should be 
made to manage differences in a manner that is not overtly 
pubQc.  Neither side has a "monopoly on good ideas." EU 
insight into respective opinions and positions among the 27 
EU member states would be especially beneficial, he added. 
 
Multi-lateral approach 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Rocca noted a slight difference in the 
dynamic of solving problems between the EU and the U.S. 
The U.S. wants to confront problems and considers actual 
results and tangible outcomes to be most important to the 
achievement of non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. 
The U.S. sometimes believes that the EU places all its 
emphasis on agreed documents. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Luedeking responded that multilateralism is a key 
component of EU strategies.  The multilateral treaty system 
 
 
should ideally operate as the common denominator for all 
countries and allow the UN the role of ultimate arbiter of 
compliance.  Luedeking dubbed this a &norms-based8 approach 
to diplomacy. Europeans considered that they needed a legal 
basis provided by such a system to provide legitimacy to such 
result-oriented activities as the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI).  Giannella added that the EU's attachment 
to a multilateral treaty system is primary and pervades all 
realms of EU undertakings.  She noted that every country must 
feel it is "in the system" and that the system cannot work 
effectively if it is not truly multilateral. 
 
¶7. (C) Portuguese Ambassador Carlos Frota asked whether the 
Six-Party Talks, which were "somewhat multilateral," could be 
replicated in other fora.  Semmel reminded representatives 
that in the case of the DPRK and Iran, negotiations and 
strategies were worked through the U.N. Security Council 
system. 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Luedeking expressed the importance of an 
established legal framework, fortified institutions and 
common rules which have norms by which all countries must 
abide.  In the case of PSI, small arms and ammunition 
proliferation in Africa and the recent Chinese anti-satellite 
(ASAT) test, multilateral approaches are the only ones that 
could truly be effective.  Referencing the Chinese ASAT test, 
Luedeking stated that we cannot unilaterally prevent 
space-based assets.  Instead, common rules on how space is 
used and how to protect space-based assets are important. 
 
¶9. (C) On the recent Chinese ASAT test, Ambassador Rocca made 
clear that the U.S. would not support development of new 
legal regimes to govern space activity.  She argued that 
appropriate treaties already exist. 
 
U.S. - EU Summit Preparation:  U.S. Focus on Action 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) DAS Semmel led discussion on U.S.-EU Summit 
preparation.  He raised the following issues as possible 
"deliverables" for the April 30 U.S.-EU Summit to be held in 
Washington:  Proliferation Financing; UNSCR 1540, Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty; U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
Initiative; Universalization of the Additional Protocol; 
Global Partnership; Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism; Problems of IAEA Funding; Strengthening the NPT; 
and Strong statements on Iran and North Korea.  He solicited 
EU responses and perspectives. 
 
UNSCR 1540 
 
¶11. (SBU) Semmel asked whether the Summit could be used to 
spur UNSCR 1540 implementation. 
 
¶12. (C) Semmel noted the U.S. considers 1540 implementation a 
key priority that must go beyond gathering information and 
progress to plugging gaps/implementation.  He noted the U.S. 
already has in place relevant programs, such as the Export 
Control and Border Security program(EXBS), and said that 1540 
reporting varies, and assistance in helping certain countries 
writing reports is important.  He said countries should be 
encouraged to ask for assistance.  Semmel recommended 1540 
implementation be considered an "actionable" item at the 
Summit and G8 meetings. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Giannella said that 1540 is important because it 
sets a universal standard for all countries, but the problem 
is implementation.  The EU, she said, has supported 
implementation financially and politically and facilitation 
of three regional 1540 seminars in Beijing, Accra and Lima. 
This illustrates that the EU attaches a great deal of 
importance to implementation. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Giannella noted it has not been easy to convince 
smaller countries that non-existence of a nuclear program in 
a country should not lead to a "do nothing" stance.  She 
noted helping countries to draft reports would be a step 
forward.  The EU's December 2006 WMD Strategy (update) noted 
support for national implementation of 1540 as well as EU 
efforts on export controls, which help in 1540 
implementation. 
 
¶15. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said that Germany and Norway 
have planned an export controls seminar to be held in New 
York City on March 27.  Luedeking asked Semmel the U.S. view 
 
 
on the role of the 1540 Committee, its results to date and 
its future.  Semmel responded that one difficulty the 
Committee has faced is recruitment of qualified experts -- 
including finding new experts with others' retiring.  U.N. 
self-imposed requirements for geographic balance hinders and 
slows recruitment of qualified panel experts. While the 
Committee's expiration is not immediate, the international 
community must begin assessing whether the Committee should 
be extended.  Semmel emphasized the need for the Committee to 
develop actual products. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ludeking asked whether development of a "Best 
Practices Guide" would be helpful.  Semmel responded it could 
perhaps be helpful if broad enough to cover pertinent issues 
for over 190 countries. 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Global Initiative 
to Combat Terrorism (GI) 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶17. (C) Luedeking and Giannella expressed concern that while 
the EU fully endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI), it was never invited to participate &in its own 
right8 as a member.  The EU is disappointed it has not been 
invited to participate in the Global Initiative to Combat 
Terrorism (GI) given that it is a supranational body with a 
special role to play.  They argued that EU member states have 
handed over sovereignty in some areas (e.g., EURATOM) to the 
EU as an institution and expressed regret that Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kislyak opposed EU involvement in the GI. 
 
¶18. (C) Giannella noted the Commission is preparing a paper 
on nuclear terrorism and that a stability instrument will be 
adopted in June 2007.  The instrument will address dual use, 
export controls, trans-shipment, illicit trafficking, and 
port issues. 
 
¶19. (C) Giannella indicated the EU is willing to transmit its 
relevant competencies and potential added-value consistent 
with the principles of GI to the U.S.  She stated that this 
was done two years ago for PSI, but did not result in U.S. 
agreement that the EU be included as a member of PSI.  DAS 
Semmel was amenable to the EU offer to transmit its 
competencies. 
 
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 
------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) Ambassador Rocca briefed the troika on informal 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) meetings held the week 
of February 5 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. 
She indicated that the new structure will clearly show which 
countries are obstructionist.  Rocca added that the U.S. 
would not agree to a PAROS Ad Hoc Committee, even if the 
price was no FMCT. 
 
¶21. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said he was not sure the 
strategy to isolate a particular country would work. 
Ambassador Rocca responded that this is the result of the new 
structure put in place by the presidents.  The real source of 
opposition to moving forward on an FMCT is China and 
Pakistan, both of whom are linking issues.  The US will not 
accept linkages.  She also urged others to convince India to 
support FMCT negotiations, as India has pledged to do as part 
of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. 
 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶22. (C) Ambassador Luedeking questioned when the U.S. would 
ratify all of the CCW protocols, as well as the amendment to 
Article One, which extends its jurisdiction to internal 
conflicts.  Doing so would help in the campaign to get 
non-parties to adhere.  Alex Liebowitz (Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation) responded that 
the Administration had put all the outstanding CCW measures 
in the top category of agreements for which it was seeking 
Senate advice and consent for ratification. 
 
First Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty 2010 Review Conference 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶23.  (C) Ambassador Luedeking said that the EU's April 2005 
Common Position for the last Review Conference remained 
 
 
valid.  The EU was committed to respecting the basic bargain 
contained in the treaty as the review process went forward. 
He appreciated the flexibility he had seen in recent 
discussions with the U.S. and urged a quick resolution of 
procedural issues, along the lines of the approach taken 
during the last review process.  The West should not be seen 
as blocking substantive discussions. 
 
¶24. (C) DAS Semmel said he was willing to discuss the agenda 
issues before the preparatory meeting and said that the U.S. 
will emphasize compliance and enforcement and will address 
the issue of disarmament confidently and clearly.  On the 
issue of NPT withdrawal, he added it was important not to 
amend Article 10 but to interpret it in a way that there were 
known and expected adverse consequences a country would face 
if it contemplated withdrawal, in effect, a deterrence to 
withdrawal.  Semmel also questioned whether the NAM should 
always be entitled to the presidency of the review conference 
or whether it should rotate among the groups.  He also 
suggested that one might consider ways of moving forward for 
consideration by the plenary those agreements on issues 
reached by different Review Conference committees. 
Ambassador Luedeking believed the rotation issue was very 
delicate. 
 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
----------------------------- 
 
¶25. (C) Ambassador Luedeking emphasized the EU was firmly 
committed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and 
felt it was particularly important given North Korea's 
nuclear tests.  He hoped the U.S. would continue to work with 
the CTBTO Prepcom and noted the problem of the backlog of 
U.S. dues owed to the organization.  He cautioned that some 
countries lost their right to vote as a result of non-payment 
of dues.  The EU wants the U.S. to remain involved, 
particularly in the International Monitoring System.  Rocca 
and Semmel made clear that the U.S. position on the CTBT had 
not changed and that Senate approval was not in the cards. 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency Committee on Safeguards 
and Verification, Preparation of the Board of Governors 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶26. (C) DAS Semmel led by stating that the IAEA,s Committee 
on Safeguards and Verification (CSV) was intended to 
strengthen inspections and safeguards.  However, the 
non-aligned had prevented it from reaching agreement on 
recommendations from the IAEA Secretariat.  The U.S. would 
have to reassess its support if the CSV could not agree on 
concrete proposals to present to the Board of Governors (BOG) 
in June.  Ambassador Luedeking said his impressions were the 
NAM had "hijacked" the CSV to pursue its own aims. The EU, he 
said, was supportive of an orderly "wind down" of the CSV. 
EU Council representative Stephan Klement agreed with the 
negative interpretation of NAM behavior and said in the event 
there was no endorsement of the CSV mandate, it would 
automatically expire in June.  He added that Egypt and Syria 
had not been helpful in the process.  DAS Semmel said the 
U.S. would look for a way to help until June, but there was 
not yet a position on extension of the CSV for another two 
years. 
 
Multilateral Nuclear Approaches 
------------------------------- 
 
¶27. (C) DAS Semmel expressed U.S. support for providing 
reliable fuel services to countries which choose not to 
pursue enrichment and reprocessing technologies.  Luedeking 
agreed and said the EU is also supportive of fuel supply 
assurances but is awaiting the IAEA Report on the subject 
expected in June.  He said the international community needs 
to make a greater effort to inform and convince countries 
that the issue is important and would not nullify  Article IV 
rights in the NPT. 
 
¶28. (C) DAS Semmel said no surprises were expected in the 
IAEA report.  He understood, however, that the IAEA is 
seeking additional assistance.  He added that commercial fuel 
supply did not appear to be a problem, but there is a need to 
develop a system that puts the IAEA at the core. 
 
¶29. (C) Luedeking said efforts to convince NAM countries of 
the advantages of such a system would be worthwhile.  The EU 
will make this point at the NPT preparatory committee. 
 
 
Semmel emphasized the importance of a strong EU statement on 
the matter and highlighted again the importance of states 
clearly understanding they would not be asked to forfeit 
Article IV rights under the NPT. 
 
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Initiative 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶30. (C) EU reps were very interested in where things stood on 
the initiative.  Luedeking asked specific questions about the 
Hyde Act and how the Act's conditions matched with India's 
"clear refusal to accept more conditions."  He indicated the 
EU was informed that Indian Prime Minister Singh is under 
pressure domestically and interprets the Act's requirements 
as "recommendations" that are non-binding and that should not 
be part of a bilateral agreement. 
 
¶31. (C) DAS Semmel provided a detailed update on the legal 
and technical processes and the various steps and procedures 
underway or needed to complete the initiative as well as the 
legal safeguards included in U.S. law.  Luedeking indicated 
the EU has no Common Position on the Initiative.  All want to 
integrate India into the nonproliferation mainstream; they 
differ on how to do so. Semmel urged the EU to support the 
Initiative and promised to keep the EU fully informed. 
 
Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) 
---------------------------- 
 
¶32. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said participation in HCOC 
meetings was diminishing.  He said that Germany would host a 
seminar in Vienna on May 30 to focus on implementation 
concerns and noted that the EU attaches a particular 
importance to confidence-building measures.  He said that the 
issue of U.S. non-compliance with pre-launch notifications 
was a concern.  If there were no progress on this issue, we 
might see the end of HCOC.  He encouraged U.S. participation 
at the seminar. 
 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) During a brief discussion of this issue, Luedeking 
thanked the U.S. for supporting membership by EU states that 
were still not MTCR members. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶34. (C) Luedeking said that, given Iranian lack of 
compliance, the EU is ready to go beyond UNSCR 1737, with 
further action possibly including travel bans; expanded 
coverage of sanctions (to include all items on the Missile 
Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Supplier Group lists); 
and separate autonomous lists.  Luedeking noted that Iran's 
Arab neighbors are concerned that they are in a "tougher spot 
than Israel" because they have no nuclear deterrent and fear 
that Iran will become the dominant regional power. 
 
¶35. The EU continued to believe negotiations with Iran were 
important, Luedeking continued.  He said the fact that Iran 
was unable to divide the EU-3 (France, Germany, United 
Kingdom) plus 3 (China, Russia, U.S.) was important, albeit 
surprising to Iran.  Iranian President Ahmadinejad was 
playing on his public's broad support for a nuclear program. 
The EU did not want its position to be portrayed as 
contributing to the misery of the Iranian people.  It must 
remain clear, he added, that EU actions were not meant to 
punish the Iranian people. 
 
¶36. (C) DAS Semmel said there is real concern that Iran may 
have acquired the nuclear knowledge, skills and technology to 
indigenously develop centrifuges.  At stake, Semmel added, 
were the reputations and credibility of the UN and the 
International tomic Energy Agenc. Semmel suggested that 
aditional listings and export credits be considered and 
argued that unity and steadfastness are critical.  Sanctions 
must be multi-lateral, meaningful and represent some "bite." 
He concluded by stating that the consequences of a lack of 
success with Iran would be monumental. 
 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶37. (SBU) In discussions on Six-Party Talks on DPRK, DAS 
 
 
Semmel characterized the recent Agreement as a "victory for 
diplomacy," but noted the U.S. had "been down this road 
before," and was, therefore, cautiously optimistic. 
Luedeking said the EU remained concerned due to DPRK's 
performance in the past and noted that a troika of EU 
political directors plans to visit DPRK in early March.  The 
troika will have broad terms of reference, he said, including 
human rights. 
 
¶38. (C) The EU has internally discussed how it can be 
involved in support of a solution given the EU is outside of 
the Six-Party framework.  The overall sentiment, he said, is 
supportive of the Agreement, but there are concerns the EU 
has been "left out" of the negotiating process, but will at 
some point be asked "to go to the cashier." 
 
¶39. (C) Semmel responded that the Agreement benefits all EU 
countries and the EU, as well as its member states who are 
important implementers of UNSCR 1718.  The EU troika trip to 
Pyongyang should make clear to DPRK representatives that the 
EU will strongly implement financial sanctions, be 
unequivocal in solidarity with the Six-Party process and 
should not lead o "leaks or gaps" in support, Semmel said. 
 
¶40. (C) A brief discussion on the future of the Korean 
Economic Development Organization (KEDO) ensued with 
Ambassador Frota asking if there was a possibility that KEDO 
might be kept in being, even as a paper organization. 
Luedeking indicated there were financial claims outstanding 
and that Japan was worried due to loans it had made and the 
issue of liability.  He understood Japan was considering 
financing limited staff support to "wind down" KEDO in an 
appropriate manner.  The next opportunity for KEDO decisions 
to be taken would be at the next Executive Board Meeting 
scheduled for March 29.  Semmel responded that the U.S. was 
not supportive of continuing KEDO. 
 
¶41. (SBU) Luedeking closed by commenting that the meeting 
contributed to a better understanding between the two sides. 
It showed the U.S. and EU had the same objectives, even if 
sometimes different recipes for moving forward.  He urged 
that the two sides keep in close touch, especially in light 
of the U.S.-EU Summit on April 30. 
 
¶42. (U) Amb. Rocca and DAS Semmel have cleared on this cable. 
 
MCKINLEY