VZCZCXRO0652
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #5309/01 0792110
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 202100Z MAR 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 7805
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 9027
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 9620
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5066
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 5778
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 2599

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 035309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD EUN
SUBJECT: ENGAGING EU COMMISSIONER FOR ENLARGEMENT OLLI 
REHN IN HELSINKI 
 
REF: HELSINKI 70 
 
Classified By: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY DANIEL FRIED 
FOR REASONS: 1.4 (b) AND (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 3. 
 
¶2. (C) EUR/ERA appreciates Embassy Helsinki,s initiative in 
reaching out to EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn as 
reported in Helsinki 70, and encourages future meetings 
whenever Rehn visits Helsinki.  EU Commissioners can provide 
valuable insights into issues of deep interest to the Bureau 
and the Department.  This cable provides guidance on key 
issues in Rehn,s EU Enlargement portfolio. 
 
¶3. (C) Action Request: The Department requests that Embassy 
Helsinki schedule a meeting with Olli Rehn on his next visit 
to Helsinki to discuss issues relating to EU enlargement. 
Post may refer to the following guidance in engaging Rehn on 
next possible occasion: 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
TURKEY/CYPRUS 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Finnish EU Presidency brokered a compromise over 
Turkey,s non-compliance with the Additional Protocol to the 
Ankara Agreement that helped keep Turkey,s EU accession 
process alive.  But the affair has drastically narrowed the 
scope for progress in the negotiations and soured an already 
poisonous atmosphere surrounding those talks.  Under the 
pressure of national elections, nationalism is on the rise in 
Turkey.  Turkey insists that only when the EU lives up to 
commitments made prior to Cyprus, accession to lift the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots ) notably through 
implementation of aid and trade regulations ) will it allow 
Greek Cypriot vessels access to Turkish ports as it is 
required to do for ships of all EU members. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The EU approved  ,259 million in aid to the Turkish 
Cypriot community in fall 2006. Implementation of funded 
projects has met with both practical and political obstacles; 
it remains to be seen whether all available funds can be 
contracted by the 2009 deadline.  Although the January 22-23 
EU Council called for work to resume on the Commission,s 
direct trade regulation for the Turkish Cypriots, it is 
unclear if the German EU Presidency will be able or willing 
to outmaneuver the Greek Cypriots.  Movement on trade and aid 
could have beneficial spillover effects for a permanent 
Cyprus settlement process under UN auspices, which will 
almost certainly have to precede Turkey,s entry into the EU. 
 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
¶6. (SBU) With the opportunity to resolve Kosovo,s status 
this year, the international community is well positioned to 
assist the Western Balkans move beyond the conflict of the 
1990s and firmly on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration. 
We need to focus on our objectives of regional stability and 
economic prosperity for all the countries of southeast Europe 
and of the region as a whole. At Thessaloniki in 2003, the EU 
Council declared that the Balkans, future was within Europe, 
but countries in the region have no clear sense of what that 
means.  2006 was essentially a lost year for EU enlargement 
in the Western Balkans; only Croatia got &closer to 
Europe,8 by completing several chapters of the acquis 
communautaire. 
 
¶7. (C) Elsewhere in the Western Balkans, EU discussions on 
integration have offered little reason for optimism.  With 
full membership seemingly a distant prospect, successive EU 
presidencies have focused on a consolation prize ) travel 
liberalization ) but that too has proven elusive.  The 
current modest objective of visa facilitation is largely 
confined to containing planned increases in visa fees.  Such 
damage limitation does little to make travel easier; on the 
contrary, the Western Balkans now face visa requirements for 
travel to new EU members Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
 
STATE 00035309  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) The last significant obstacle for Bosnia to conclude 
a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU 
stems from its failure to meet the EU criteria on police 
reform.  The U.S. supports EU pressure on Bosnia to create 
more integrated, professional nationwide police structures. 
However, the EU,s leverage on overall reforms will only 
increase once Bosnia is in the Stabilization and Association 
process.  We will continue to support EU and Office of the 
High Representative (OHR) efforts to forge a Bosnian 
agreement that meets the EU,s police reform criteria, but 
encourage the EU to demonstrate flexibility on what it deems 
to meet these criteria. 
 
¶9. (SBU) We support further EU-Serbian integration, 
particularly in relation to a Kosovo decision. Constructive 
integration entails engaging Serbia on war crimes issues. 
SAA negotiations were suspended and membership in Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) was denied due to Serbia,s non-cooperation 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), namely, the failure to arrest and transfer 
to The Hague fugitive Ratko Mladic.  In December, NATO 
granted PfP membership to Serbia; the EU should consider the 
impact that restarting SAA talks would have on a Kosovo 
decision as well as ensuring that Serbia is mindful of its 
obligation to cooperate with the ICTY. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Stability in Balkan countries is highly dependent 
on their prospects for integration with Europe.  We are not 
asking for shortcuts to integration ) only for clear 
indications that the Western Balkan countries will enter the 
EU eventually, and that the timing depends on the pace of 
their reforms.  The EU needs to move beyond the current 
standstill:  it should provide a starting date for accession 
talks with Macedonia; issue clear and realizable goals for 
Bosnian police reform; and find a way to overcome the impasse 
over SAA negotiations with the new Serbian government. 
 
----------------------------- 
Policy Background Information 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The U.S. supports the EU enlargement process as a 
means to promote peace, stability and reform in aspirant 
countries and the region as a whole.  Key U.S. policy points 
are as follows: 
 
REHN,S LEADERSHIP 
 
-- We are preaching to the converted when we talk to you 
about the importance of building on the EU,s greatest 
achievement: extending the zone of peace, liberty and welfare 
across the European continent. 
 
-- You have been an articulate champion of the need for 
further enlargement, for the good of existing members as well 
as future ones. 
 
-- We welcomed your February 26 speech in Berlin and its 
emphasis on the EU membership perspective as the greatest 
transformative force in Europe. 
 
-- As you indicated in the speech, the dynamic economic 
growth resulting from enlargement is also the greatest 
assurance that Europe will be a force to be reckoned with 
throughout the 21st century. 
 
-- How can the U.S. help overcome some EU countries, 
nervousness about further enlargement? 
 
TURKEY/CYPRUS 
 
-- Although the Finnish Presidency-brokered compromise over 
Turkey,s non-compliance with the Additional Protocol to the 
Ankara Agreement helped keep Turkey,s EU accession process 
on track, the EU should take special care in the current 
political environment that it sends positive signals to 
Turkey regarding its EU accession prospects. 
 
-- It is important that EU live up to its obligations to lift 
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community.  The October 
agreement to disburse  ,38.1 million of  ,259 million in 
aid was a good start, but the EU must now face down Greek 
Cypriot opposition to implement the 24 projects that are 
already funded, such as university scholarships, and 
accelerate the disbursal process for the remainder to avoid 
losing credibility and momentum. 
 
STATE 00035309  003 OF 004 
 
 
-- Most importantly, the EU should take rapid steps to 
approve the Direct Trade Regulation for the Turkish Cypriot 
community.  This regulation must not contain conditions, such 
as a return of Varosha, that pre-judge a permanent settlement 
on Cyprus. 
 
-- The United States, overarching objective in Cyprus is to 
help foster a comprehensive settlement that reunifies the 
island into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.  We actively 
support the efforts of the United Nations to reconcile 
differences and find common ground for a settlement.  The EU 
can play a positive role by making progress on aid and trade 
to the Turkish Cypriot community; doing so will have positive 
effects on a permanent settlement. 
 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
Back to a Regional Focus on Integration 
 
 -- The EU integration process is the most important factor 
for stabilizing the Balkans.  Back-sliding, refugee flows, 
emigration, and violence remain real possibilities if EU does 
not decisively move toward integration.  Security missions 
are a band-aid, not a cure. 
 
-- Technical debates about elements of a Kosovo status 
settlement have overwhelmed planning for the prosperity and 
stability of the region as a whole.  We should get back to a 
focus on regional stabilization, and Euro-Atlantic 
integration as the prime catalyst. 
 
-- The institutional changes encouraged by the integration 
process can lay the foundation for increased investment and 
job creation.  They also provide structures for modern 
administration and regional cooperation needed to combat 
organized crime. 
 
-- Nationalism and criminality disguised as nationalism have 
been root causes of instability in the region.  Through 
integration, nationalism can be curtailed substantially by 
improving economic conditions and, to a lesser extent by 
rendering borders less important. 
 
A Need for Clarity, and Momentum 
 
-- 2006 was largely a lost year for bolstering EU enlargement 
hopes in the Western Balkans, except in Croatia, which 
successfully concluded some chapters in accession 
negotiations. 
 
-- EU policy on enlargement vis-~-vis the Balkans needs to be 
made clear and made clear soon. 
 
Serbia 
 
-- EU talks with Serbia on a SAA have been suspended for a 
year, making membership prospects more distant at a critical 
time in the region. 
 
-- NATO granted Serbia PfP membership.  Similarly, the EU 
should look for an opportunity to resume SAA negotiations 
with Serbia, within a timeframe conducive to a Kosovo 
settlement, while ensuring that Serbia cooperates with the 
ICTY. 
 
-- Your previous public statements on SAA for Serbia have 
been particularly constructive.  We support further 
statements clarifying the EU,s engagement strategy with 
Serbia, such as through the SAA process. 
 
Bosnia 
 
-- Achieving an SAA will be a landmark achievement for Bosnia 
and should help drive additional reforms.  We will continue 
to support EU and OHR efforts to forge an agreement among 
Bosnians that meets the EU criteria on police reform. 
 
-- In light of the SAA,s importance as an engine for 
achieving broader and more rapid economic and political 
reform, we encourage the EU to demonstrate maximum 
flexibility in determining whether Bosnia has met these 
criteria. 
 
Macedonia 
 
 
STATE 00035309  004 OF 004 
 
 
-- Macedonia was granted candidate status in December 2005, 
but there is no starting date for accession talks and no 
plans for setting one. 
 
-- Macedonia has made impressive economic reforms and is 
working to re-establish a productive government-opposition 
dialogue.  The EU can and should plan to start accession 
talks. 
 
Moving Forward 
 
-- Without clarity that all of southeast Europe is moving 
toward Euro-Atlantic structures, nationalism, demagoguery, 
crime and their toxic progeny will continue to thrive in the 
region. 
 
-- The U.S. is not asking for a short-cut to EU membership. 
But every country should have a sense that it is on track for 
EU (and NATO) membership, and the timing depends on each 
country's progress. 
RICE