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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 029082 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
USDOJ FOR DIRECTOR INTERPOL-USNCB 
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE, JOSE CARDENAS, AND GREG GATJANIS 
FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT 
PARIS PASS TO APP LYON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016 
TAGS: IR AR LE PGOV PREL FBI PTER KJUS ASEC PRT
KTFN, KISL, KIRF, OAS, IT, UK, FR, GM 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG 
ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH MARCH 13-15 INTERPOL 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN LYON, FRANCE 
 
Ref:  A. BUENOS AIRES 46   B.  2006 BUENOS AIRES 2749 and 
previous 
 
Classified By: Under Secretary Nicholas Burns for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U)  This is an action request; please see paragraphs 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 12. 
 
(U) SUMMARY 
----------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Argentina has asked for USG assistance in 
persuading Interpol to issue six Red Notices for five 
current and former Iranian officials and one Lebanese 
national thought by Argentina to be criminally 
responsible for the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli 
Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires.  Ambassadors 
for all action addresses, except Tel Aviv, are requested 
to approach host governments at the highest level to 
convey U.S. strong support in this matter.   Ambassadors 
also are requested to meet with their Argentine 
counterparts to discuss AMIA and U.S. interests and 
actions.   The AMIA attack killed 85 and wounded more 
than 150 individuals.  Argentina originally requested 
that Interpol issue Red Notices for eight Iranian present 
and former officials and one notice against a Hizballah 
terrorist leader.  Iran has formally objected to the 
eight Iranian notices and said that Argentina's request 
is political. The Interpol Executive Council (EC) will 
meet next week beginning on March 13 to consider a 
compromise whereby Red Notices will issue for five 
Iranian officials and the Hizballah terrorist leader but 
will not issue for a former Iranian President, a former 
Iranian Foreign Minister, and a former Iranian 
Ambassador.  Argentina supports this compromise as does 
the USG.  The GOA is concerned that the EC will decide 
against Argentina without a strong U.S. lobbying effort 
and we are prepared to pursue such an effort, as 
discussed below.  For guidance on the public posture to 
be taken by Embassy if necessary, including if asked 
guidance, please see paragraph 17. 
 
¶3.  (C)  If after reviewing this cable, Embassy 
determines that making the approach recommended here 
would be counterproductive to U.S. and Argentine efforts 
to obtain support for the Interpol compromise, Embassy 
should report this to Washington and await further 
guidance.  Further, if Embassies Berlin, Rome, and Madrid 
believe this approach would be counterproductive to U.S. 
efforts on behalf of U.S. personnel who are the subject 
of criminal proceedings, then Embassy should report this 
to Washington. 
 
¶4.  (C)  For Embassy Tel Aviv: Post is requested to 
convey the USG's interest in AMIA.  Post also should 
inquire and report on any actions that the GOI is taking 
at home or with other capitals with respect to the AMIA 
matter before Interpol. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Post should determine the most appropriate 
person at a senior level to deliver the demarche in order 
to achieve the desired results of support for Argentina's 
case at next week's Interpol Executive Committee meeting 
in Lyon, France, March 13-16.  Embassy should pursue the 
 
STATE 00029082  002 OF 005 
 
 
--  Thank host government for all past efforts to fight 
international terrorism. 
 
--  Remind or inform host government officials of the 
AMIA arrest warrants, noting that the GOA's request for 
Red Notices was made on the basis of a recently concluded 
GOA investigation of the AMIA bombing, 
 
--  Note that the AMIA bombing in 1994 was a heinous act 
of premeditated murder against innocent civilians and 
that Argentina is trying to bring to justice those its 
prosecutors have concluded are responsible for the worst 
act of terrorism to occur in South America. 
 
-- Note that we understand the Interpol Secretariat will 
recommend to the Interpol Executive Committee that 
Interpol 1) not publish Red Notices for three former 
Iranian officials (former President Rafsanjani, former 
Foreign Minister Velayati, and former Ambassador to 
Argentina Soleimanpour) and 2) support issuance of Red 
Notices for the remaining six suspects, including the 
Hizballah -IJO leader.  (See details in Background.) 
 
-- Note that in addition this recent Red Notice under 
consideration, Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah 
is the subject of two other Red Notices.  He is wanted in 
Argentina for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 
Buenos Aries and by the United States for his role in the 
1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 and related murders. 
 
-- The USG supports this compromise position developed by 
Interpol as appropriate under the circumstances.  It will 
help Argentina in its efforts to achieve justice in the 
wake of a major terrorist attack on its territory against 
innocent civilians.  It is also consistent with Interpol 
practice. 
 
--  Note that USG understands the GOA has already reached 
out to host government Foreign Ministry and government's 
ambassadors in Buenos Aires in all action addressee 
countries with representatives on the Interpol Executive 
Committee.  (Note:  Argentina and Singapore do not have 
diplomatic missions in each other's countries but the 
Argentine Charge in Indonesia has met in Singapore with 
GOS officials.)  GOA may also contact host government's 
Interpol Executive Committee member to provide further 
information on the case as the Red Notice process 
continues. 
 
-- Explain to host government that the U.S. supports 
Argentina's request for international support for the 
Interpol approach.  Express our strong hope that host 
government will support the approach that has been 
developed at Interpol at the upcoming Executive Committee 
meeting in Lyon. 
 
Only if asked about immunity issues or other potential 
Iranian defenses: 
 
-- Note that our support is focused on the context of 
this specific case, drawing upon the following points as 
needed: (1) the individuals with the strongest bases for 
immunity are excluded, (2) Iran has not justified or 
explained the basis of any immunity for any of the 
officials, including the remaining lower level officials, 
(3) the attack on AMIA was a vicious terrorist act that 
specifically targeted innocent civilians for which the 
six individuals have been charged and (4) the approach is 
consistent with Interpol practice. 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
 
STATE 00029082  003 OF 005 
 
¶6.  (U)  Embassy should report results of efforts by 
cable to WHA/BSC - Drew Blakeney and NEA/IR - Sean Misko 
no later than March 9, 2007.  Please caption cables 
"SIPDIS" and include the IR and PTER tags.  We appreciate 
posts' assistance with this important demarche. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  On July 18, 1994, Argentina suffered its worst 
terrorist attack, when the Argentine-Israeli Mutual 
Association (AMIA) was bombed, killing 85 and wounding 
more than 150.  The attack came two years after a 
terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, 
which left 29 dead and destroyed the building.  The U.S. 
has supported an investigation against the individuals 
involved for over 12 years. 
 
¶8.  (U)  On October 25, 2006, an Argentine special 
prosecutor issued a formal investigative report on the 
terrorist bombing of AMIA.  On November 9, 2006 Argentine 
federal judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral issued arrest 
warrants against Iran's former President and current 
chairman of the Expediency Council Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, 
former Foreign Minister and current Khamenei advisor Ali 
Akbar Velayati, former Minister of Intelligence and 
current Assembly of Experts member Ali Fallahijan, former 
IRGC Commander and current Expediency Council member 
Mohsen Rezai, former Qods Force leader and current Deputy 
Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, former Ambassador of Iran 
(Buenos Aires) Hadi Soleimanpour, former Iranian Embassy 
(Buenos Aires) Cultural Attache Mohsen Rabbani, and 
former third secretary of the Iranian Embassy Ahmed Reza 
Asghari (a.k.a. Mohsen Randjbaran).  The report named 
Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah as well.  (FYI 
- In addition to being wanted in connection with the AMIA 
bombing, Mughniyah also is the subject of an Interpol Red 
Notice (requested by GOA) for the 1992 bombing of the 
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.  Further, on December 
27, 2006, Interpol issued a Red Notice, at USNCB's 
request, for Mughniyah for his role in the 1985 hijacking 
of TWA flight 847.  The Red Notice is based on 
Mughniyah's federal indictment in U.S. District Court 
District of Columbia for conspiracy to commit aircraft 
piracy and take hostages, murder, hostage taking, and 
aircraft piracy.) 
 
¶9.  (U)  On November 16, 2006 the GOA sent applications 
for the issuance of Red Notices to the International 
Criminal Police Organization ("Interpol") seeking the 
assistance of the other 185 Interpol member countries in 
bringing the charged individuals to justice.  The GOI 
challenged the Argentine application for Red Notices as 
politically motivated and also threatened to level tit- 
for-tat indictments of Argentine officials involved in 
the AMIA case.  Interpol agreed to hold issuance of Red 
Notices in abeyance until each side could explain its 
position. GOA and Iranian government officials met in 
Lyon, France, on January 22, to present their 
perspectives on the case.  After hearing GOA and GOI 
presentations, the Interpol Secretariat deferred action 
on the AMIA Red Notice applications to the Interpol 
Executive Committee which will meet March 13-16, in Lyon. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The Interpol General Counsel has since 
recommended not issuing Red Notices for three defendants. 
The notices against Rafsanjani and Velayati are not being 
issued in light of the head of state immunity.  The 
notice against Soleimanpour is not being issued because 
an earlier denial by the UK of a GOA extradition request 
for him demonstrated that there was insufficient 
evidence.  Proceeding with a Red Notice under such 
circumstances would unnecessarily put Interpol into a 
political conflict with its members.  The GOA has 
informed us that it is prepared to concur in these 
 
STATE 00029082  004 OF 005 
 
 
¶11. (C) The Argentine government has conducted a 
investigation and has concluded the AMIA bombing was a 
premeditated attack funded by the Iranian regime and 
executed by Hizballah.  The AMIA bombing killed 85 and 
wounded more than 150  innocent civilians; it was the 
deadliest terror attack in the hemisphere until September 
11, 2001.  An Argentine trial and conviction of the 
individuals sought would establish the Iranian regime's 
and Hizballah's role in this attack and underscore 
Tehran's flagrant violation of international law and 
callous disregard for the lives of innocent civilians. 
The issuance of Interpol Red Notices for the 6 
individuals (five Iranians and Mugniyah) noted above 
would advance U.S. counter terrorism policy objectives by 
supporting Argentina in its effort to prosecute those who 
it believes were responsible for this act of terror; 
spotlighting Iran's role as the leading state sponsor of 
international terrorism; increasing the costs to Tehran 
for its continued support of terrorism; and further 
exposing Hizballah's illegitimate, extremist agenda and 
role in carrying out terrorist attacks around the world. 
 
¶12.  (C)  In supporting Argentine efforts, an important 
USG interest is in ensuring that we do so in a way that 
does not undermine our efforts to defend U.S. officials 
from foreign prosecutions relating to official conduct. 
These risks are minimized in this case because of its 
specific context, including the fact that the individuals 
with the strongest bases for immunity are excluded, Iran 
has not justified or explained the basis of any immunity 
for any of its officials, including the remaining lower 
level ones, the approach is consistent with Interpol 
practice, and it does not prevent Iran from raising 
immunity or other defenses bilaterally in the context of 
a specific extradition request.  It is therefore 
important that our support for Interpol's compromise 
approach be tied to this specific case.  If, and only if, 
host governments raise questions or concerns about 
immunity issues or other potential Iranian defenses, post 
should note that our support is focused on the context of 
this specific case, note some of the specific factors 
enumerated above, and request further guidance as 
necessary. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Either country taking issue with a decision of 
the Executive Committee may petition the Interpol General 
Assembly, meeting in Morocco in November 2007, for a 
final and decisive vote on the issue. 
 
¶14.  (U)  A Red Notice is an international "wanted" 
notice that provides information on the identification of 
fugitives charged with or convicted of serious crimes. 
Red Notices are issued by Interpol in Lyon at the request 
of one of the 186 Interpol member countries. The country 
initiating the notice commits to seeking the provisional 
arrest and extradition of the fugitive in question should 
he or she be located. Prior to issuance, the Interpol 
General Secretariat (IPSG) reviews each proposed Red 
Notice to ensure compliance with the Interpol 
Constitution. In particular, the General Secretariat 
reviews the Red Notice application to ensure compliance 
with Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution, which 
prohibits Interpol from engaging in activities of "a 
political, military, religious, or racial character." 
 
¶15.  (U)  Additional historical background:  Interpol 
issued Red Notices in November 2003 for 12 individuals 
implicated in the AMIA case, but the GOI complained of 
investigative irregularities by the Argentine judge 
involved in the earlier investigation of the bombing and 
the issuance of the warrants upon which the Red Notices 
were based.  Based on the GOI's complaint, the Interpol 
Executive Committee cancelled the Red Notices in 
 
STATE 00029082  005 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG 
ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH MARCH 13-15 INTERP 
September 2005.  On September 21, 2005, the GOA 
petitioned the Interpol General Assembly then meeting in 
Berlin to reinstate the Red Notices, but the General 
Assembly voted overwhelmingly to support the Executive 
Committee's decision to cancel the notices.   A new 
prosecutor and judge have been leading a new 
investigation over the past two years.  Based on their 
more complete and professional investigation, they have 
issued new indictments and arrest warrants now under 
consideration by Interpol. 
 
POINTS OF CONTACT 
----------------- 
 
¶16.  (U)  Please contact the following individuals by 
email for any further background information or talking 
points on any aspect of the demarche to meet our 
objectives:  WHA - Drew Blakeney/Caroline Croft, NEA/IR - 
Sean Misko/Tim Standaert, S/CT - Arnold Sierra/Patrick 
Worman, L/LEI - Emily Daughtry. 
 
PUBLIC POSTURE 
-------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Approaches to host governments should be non- 
public through appropriate diplomatic channels.  It is 
important that Argentina remain in the lead of this 
effort and that our role be perceived as a supportive 
rather than leading one.  If asked by press or others 
about USG position, posts can, on the record: 
 
--  Acknowledge that USG strongly supports Argentina's 
efforts to permit Red Notices to be delivered for certain 
present and former Iranian officials in this AMIA case. 
 
--  We support the Jewish Community of Buenos Aires. 
 
--  In February, both AG Gonzales and U/S Burns assured 
AMIA leaders that we would support justice in this case. 
 
--  The attack on AMIA was a vicious act of terrorism. 
Argentina has conducted a comprehensive investigation and 
believes that present and former Iranian officials were 
behind this act of murder.  We support their efforts to 
see that those responsible for this terrorist act are 
brought to Justice. 
 
--  Posts should not/not get into a public discussion of 
any immunity or related issues that might be raised. 
 
 (If necessary, other questions can be referred back to 
Washington for consideration.) 
RICE