VZCZCXRO0102
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHVJ #0615/01 0791148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201148Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5724
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - THE PERILOUS POLITICS OF RECALL 
INITIATIVES 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Since the October 2006 elections, eight 
Bosnian municipal councils, mainly in the Eastern portion of 
Republika Srpska (RS), have begun initiatives to remove their 
mayors.  Though recall is ostensibly a tool for holding 
accountable a mayor who does not perform his/her duties, 
politics, not good governance, has driven all eight recall 
initiatives.  RS PM Milorad Dodik's party has launched most 
of them and their targets have been almost exclusively other 
RS-based parties.  Not all have been successful.  Regardless, 
their impact on the local political environment is often 
poisonous and distracts local officials from the business of 
governing.  The trend is disturbing, and while some local 
politicians see the danger, it is unclear whether any party 
will make a serious attempt to amend entity and state level 
laws to rein in the potential for recall abuse.  In our 
judgment, the greatest danger lies recall initiatives 
becoming tools for ethnically-based power struggles.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
Recall - How It Works 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Each of Bosnia's 142 municipalities (79 in the 
Federation, 62 in Republika Srpska and Brcko District) are 
governed by a directly-elected mayor and a municipal council. 
 Bosnia's state-level election law sets out overarching rules 
and regulations for mayoral and assembly elections (e.g., 
eligibility for office, oversight by the Central Election 
Commission, campaign finance).  However, entity-level 
election laws and laws on local self-government provide 
mechanisms for removing a mayor prior to expiration of 
his/her mandate if he/she does not perform his/her duties in 
accordance with the law or does not implement the decisions 
of the municipal assembly.  Though not identical, these laws 
are broadly similar for the Federation and Republika Srpska. 
 
¶3. (SBU) A recall motion may be initiated in one of two ways: 
1) by a motion from one-third of municipal councilors, or 2) 
by voters directly via petition to the municipal council. 
The petition must include the signatures of 10 percent of 
voters registered in the municipality.  If a majority of 
municipal councilors approves the recall motion, then a 
recall referendum must be scheduled within 30 days.  A simply 
majority of voters casting ballots in favor of recall is 
sufficient for the referendum to pass and to terminate the 
mayor's mandate.  There are no minimum turnout requirements. 
The Central Election Commission (CEC) must certify the 
results, however.  Elections must be held for a new mayor 
within 60 days of a successful recall referendum.  The 
recalled mayor may stand as a candidate. 
 
Politics, Not Performance, Behind Recent Recall Motions 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although recall was intended as a tool for municipal 
councils and voters to hold mayors accountable for their 
performance in office, good governance and democratic 
accountability have not driven any of the eight recall 
initiatives since the October 2006 national elections.  Seven 
of these have occurred in RS (most in the Eastern RS) and one 
in the Federation.  RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik's 
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) has been the 
driving force behind five of the seven recalls in the RS. 
The targets have been Serb Democratic Party (SDS) mayors in 
Cajnice, Celinac, and Lopare, the Socialist Party (SP) mayor 
of Foca, the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) mayor of 
Osmaci, and the dissident SNSD mayor of Vlasenica.  Most 
independent observers believe SNSD is seeking to take 
advantage of the electoral momentum from its sweeping 
victories in 2006 entity and state level elections to 
strengthen its political position in the Eastern RS. 
 
¶5. (SBU) SNSD has had to rely on support from other political 
parties to push recall motions through local assemblies, 
however; and these coalitions have varied from municipality 
to municipality with local rather than state-level 
considerations driving them.  For example, though Foca's SP 
mayor was the target of an SNSD-led recall, the SP supported 
SNSD's recall motion against the SDS in Celinac.  SDA, an 
SNSD victim in Osmaci, supported the Foca recall motion.  In 
addition to the SNSD, SDS and the Serb Radical Party (SRS) 
launched a recall initiative in the RS that targeted the SDA 
 
SARAJEVO 00000615  002 OF 002 
 
 
mayor of Srebrenica, Abdurahman Malkic (Note: SDS and SRS 
launched their Srebrenica initiative in December 2006, well 
before the recent International Court of Justice-inspired 
events there.  It never came to a vote. End Note.) The 
Federation's sole recall initiative was led by SDA against 
one of its own mayors in Bosanska Krupa (near Bihac). 
 
Not All Ends Well 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The rush to recall started in Osmaci in October 
2006, where a previously divided Bosnian Serb majority 
municipal council (11 councilors in six different parties) 
united behind SNSD to pass a recall motion against the 
Bosniak SDA mayor, Edin Ramic.  Though turnout for the 
subsequent recall referendum was low, only 30 percent, it 
passed with 90 percent support.  One month later, the SNSD 
candidate won the election to replace Ramic.  (Note: Under 
the new passive voter registration system, voters are 
automatically registered to vote in the municipality where 
they collect benefits, and absentee balloting required 
complicated pre-registration.  Many Bosniak returnees to the 
RS and most Bosniaks displaced from the RS are registered in 
the Federation.  Consequently Ramic's base of support was 
significantly eroded.  This is unlikely to have impacted the 
outcome, however, given the surge of Bosnian Serb support for 
SNSD. End Note.)  SNSD's success in Osmaci may well have 
encouraged the subsequent recall initiatives. 
 
¶7. (SBU) SNSD's recall effort in Cajnice has started off well 
(from SNSD's perspective), with 70 percent voters supporting 
the referendum to recall the municipality's SDS mayor, but 
the Central Election Commission (CEC) has yet to certify the 
results.  Elsewhere, recall referenda have run into trouble. 
The referendum passed in Vlasenica, but the CEC found that 
voting materials for absentee voters were sent out late. 
Since the referendum passed by only 307 votes, less than the 
number of registered absentee voters, the CEC instructed the 
municipal authorities to repeat the voting for this category 
of voters.  The CEC is likely to issue a similar ruling in 
Foca, where the ousted mayor lost by just 149 votes and 
alleges a similar mishandling of absentee ballots.  The 
referendum prompted by SDA internal bickering in Bosanska 
Krupa failed.  The recall initiative in Lopare failed 
altogether and never reached the referendum stage, just as in 
Srebenica (see paragraph five above). 
 
Comment - Damage is Still Done 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Recall initiatives are legal in Bosnia, so there is, 
in principle, nothing wrong with a municipal council 
exercising its right to remove a mayor.  Nonetheless, recall 
initiatives tend to poison the local political environment 
and distract mayors and municipal councils from the task of 
governance.  If there are serious grounds for recall, such as 
corruption, then this is a price worth paying. 
Unfortunately, high-minded concern for democratic governance 
has not been the driving force behind Bosnia's nine recall 
initiatives.  The absence of voter-led recall initiatives 
only underscores this point.  It is encouraging that the CEC 
has been effective in its oversight role and, errors in 
managing absentee ballots notwithstanding, that there has 
been no significant fraud.  Some politicians in the RS, such 
as Banja Luka's SNSD Mayor Dragoljub Davidovic, have 
suggested the need to curb recalls, by requiring two-thirds 
of a municipal council to pass a recall motion and/or 
requiring the council to disband if the referendum fails.  It 
seems unlikely, however, that the parties in power will 
muster the political will for such changes before they have 
recalled the mayors they deem vulnerable.  The failure of 
referenda in Vlasenica and Foca, following eventual 
repetition of absentee voting, could mean the recall fad will 
fade.  We hope so, since the current recall trend with its 
endless election cycle is not healthy. 
MCELHANEY