VZCZCXRO9914
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRO #0472 0671532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081532Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7385
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0278
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 2236
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 8452
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 2385
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCJAAS/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000472 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017 
TAGS: PREL OIC UN IZ
SUBJECT: ITALIANS PROBE IRAQ, IRAN ON BAGHDAD CONFERENCE 
 
REF: STATE 28320 
 
Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse 
lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) PolMinCouns delivered reftel points to MFA Director 
General for Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Affairs Cesare 
Ragaglini on March 7.  Ragaglini said Italy believed the 
conferences were a step in the right direction and would 
support the outcome whether or not Italy received an 
invitation.  Nevertheless, the GOI had contacted the Iraqi 
Government to query on possible G8 participation.  Italy 
believed that Iraq Compact participants and G8 donor 
participants would provide critical economic support to any 
outcome.  The Iraqi Government told Italy that it was open to 
wider participation but Iran had been opposed.  The GOI 
contacted the Iranian government and was told the Iranian MFA 
would review the matter.  (On March 8, Ragaglini's office 
director called Pol M/C and said the Iranians had indicated 
they would favor Italian attendance, either alone or as part 
of the G8.  Formosa said the GOI would follow up with the 
Iraqis.) 
 
¶2. (C) Ragaglini said it would be important for U.S. 
officials to meet not only with Iran on Iraq, but also with 
Syria "for the sake of Lebanon".  Pol M/C said the USG was 
prepared 
to discuss Iraq, and especially our concerns about 
Explosively Formed Penetrators, with Iran.  By contrast, he 
had seen no indication of similar plans to talk to Syrian 
officials.  Ragaglini said he had just returned from Lebanon 
and the situation there seemed completely blocked; everyone 
professed to be willing to talk, but no one was making any 
move to do so.  On Iran, the GOI had told Iranian Deputy FM 
Said Jalili that the decision to reject the Secretary's offer 
to talk on nuclear issues had been a serious miscalculation 
by Iran.  Noting his own service in Iran, he counseled 
patience if there were a bilateral session, and urged that, 
even if Iraq were the priority, the USG signal to the 
Iranians openness to discussions.  Pol M/C told him the fact 
of any such meeting -- and none had been scheduled yet -- 
would be significant in itself but it was often useful to 
keep such initial encounters focused on a few specific items. 
 
SPOGLI