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DE RUEHRO #0400/01 0600936
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P 010936Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7297
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0601
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2211
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8411
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2360

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV XF UN LE IT
SUBJECT: ITALIAN MOD SAY LEBANESE ARMY STILL HAS A LONG WAY 
TO GO 
 
REF: ROME 0393 
 
ROME 00000400  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: POL M/C David D. Pearce for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) NEA DAS Danin met with senior Italian MFA and MOD 
officials to discuss developments in the Middle East Peace 
Process (MEPP) and Lebanon during February 22 and 23 meetings 
in Rome.  The Italians were receptive to the idea of 
establishing an informal working group (see reftel), but 
suggested broadening the mandate.  Danin shared evidence of 
continued arms smuggling across the Syria-Lebanon border, and 
underlined the need to develop additional mechanisms to 
pursue full implementation of UNSCR 1701.  The Italians 
shared our concerns, noting their troops were on the ground 
and that they were thus particularly sensitive to the 
threats.  They thought a sanctions committee the most 
realistic/achievable option for follow-up on 1701 and 
lamented that the current political crisis hampers the GOL 
from taking stronger action to implement the resolution 
themselves. 
 
¶2.  (C) The Italians provided an overall favorable assessment 
of the UNIFIL mission, but noted some problems exist and that 
the LAF currently lack the capacity to take on major 
operations given they often lack basics such as fuel for 
their vehicles.  On Iran, MFA DG for Political Affairs said 
Italy had seen the draft UNSC resolution on the nuclear issue 
and would support further UNSC action.  End Summary. 
 
Italian MOD: LAF Has a Long Way to Go 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Italian Joint Operations HQs (COI) MajGen Tommaso 
Ferro gave an overall positive assessment of UNIFIL 
operations during his February 22 briefing to Danin.  Ferro 
stressed UNIFIL's mandate required a policy of 'neutrality' 
and is limited to supporting the LAF and building their 
capacity to take action.  He said UNIFIL, which has been 
under Italian command since the beginning of February 2007, 
has a long way to go to increase the LAF's capacity to carry 
out serious operations, he noted they often lacked the basics 
such as fuel for vehicles. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ferro also noted there had been and still were some 
Chain of Command issues which the Italian military believe 
negatively impact UNIFIL's operational effectiveness.  He 
explained that currently the UNIFIL Force Commander has a 
dual Military and Civilian leadership responsibilities 
whereas the Italians would prefer to see the Civilian UNIFIL 
component placed under the Chief of Staff's Chain of Command. 
 On the logistics of the mission, he criticized the UN for 
being late in initially sending the civilian component of the 
mission into the theater of operation.  On the positive side 
he said Italy thought the Strategic Military Cell in NY, 
staffed primarily by troop-contributing nations and currently 
under Italian command, was operating effectively. 
 
MOD: "No Military Solution to Political Problem" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5.  (C) When Danin asked if increased intel sharing or a 
possible air-UNIFIL option could help UNIFIL prevent arms 
smuggling and obviate the need for Israeli overflights, Ferro 
disagreed.  He stressed UNIFIL's UN nature and need to remain 
neutral.  Ferro doubted Israel would want to share intel with 
UNIFIL since doing so would be sharing intel with every UN 
member nation.  Furthermore, Ferro argued, "you can't find a 
military solution to a political problem," implying a 
possible lack of will on the part of the LAF, due to the 
fragile political situation in Beirut, to take aggressive 
action to confront weapons smuggling. 
 
Tri-Lateral Meetings - Not Easy, But Good 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Danin briefed on the Secretary's recent meetings in 
Jerusalem and Berlin.  He stressed the importance of Middle 
East Peace to the administration, adding that the Secretary 
was highly motivated and actively engaged.  The trilateral 
meetings in Jerusalem with Israeli PM Olmert and Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas had gone well, although they had not 
been easy.  The Mecca agreement had made the situation more 
complicated, and noted that the Israelis feared being pushed 
 
ROME 00000400  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
into a process of having to negotiate with a Hamas 
government.  But the fact that the Secretary succeeded in 
bringing both sides together in the same room to talk about a 
political horizon, and Olmert's announcement that he wanted 
further discussions with Abu Mazen, were two positive 
outcomes. 
 
¶7.  (C) On the Mecca agreement Danin agreed it had been 
important to temporarily stop intra-Palestinian violence.  He 
added that the Palestinians themselves had urged the U.S. not 
to rush to embrace or denounce the agreement, but to continue 
the pressure, because this helps move the intra-Palestinian 
negotiations forward.  He noted that the agreement also made 
Israel more reluctant to transfer impounded tax revenues and 
the U.S. Congress hesitant to approve U.S. funding for 
Palestinian security forces. 
 
Italy Welcomes U.S. Engagement on MEPP 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The Italians expressed appreciation for the 
Secretary's active engagement.  MFA DG for Political and 
 
SIPDIS 
Multilateral Affairs, Giulio Terzi, noted that Italy, and 
Europe in general, tend to evaluate any movement in the MEPP 
positively as their greatest fear is seeing the situation 
"stuck".   They had appreciated U.S. counseling Israel not to 
rush to condemn the Mecca agreement before concrete results 
were available to be judged.  The PM's diplomatic advisor for 
the Middle East, Marco Carnelos, echoed Terzi's evaluation, 
saying actions, not words would count in the end. 
 
¶9.  (C) Terzi stressed the need to find a way to bring 
humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians and improve 
freedom of movement.  His concerns were echoed by the 
Director General for Middle East, Cesare Ragaglini, who noted 
it was also in Israel's best interests to improve 
humanitarian conditions to avoid radicalizing the Palestinian 
population.  Ragalini said the European Commission was 
looking into ways to improve the financial mechanisms 
available for delivering aid to the Palestinians, especially 
in Gaza.  On freedom of movement, Ragaglini reported the EU 
was working on renewing EUBAM Rafah's mandate, which expires 
May 24.  He noted the EU (and Italy) would like some 
guarantees that the crossing will be open for at least ninety 
percent of the time as opposed to closed for ninety percent 
of the time, as it is currently, before agreeing to renew the 
mandate.  Then they hope to be able to move quickly on Karni. 
 
Danin: Keep the Pressure On 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) PM advisor Carnelos was careful to highlight that PM 
Prodi consistently supports the Quartet's three conditions in 
all of his conversations/statements; however Carnelos and his 
MFA colleagues asked if the international community might be 
able to give Abu Mazen more room to maneuver by adopting a 
more flexible interpretation on conditions necessary for 
lifting the embargo.  Ragaglini pointed out that the PLO's 
original charter had called for the destruction of Israel, 
but years of negotiations had moderated their platform.  He 
hoped the IC could encourage Hamas to take the same path more 
quickly. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Danin stressed that now is not the time to moderate 
the international community's position on the three 
conditions.  Fatah needs to use this time wisely to 
consolidate their support and take measures to reform their 
party.  Additionally, Abu Mazen and other Fatah leaders have 
said the pressure is helping them move Hamas to a negotiated 
solution. 
 
Toward Full Implementation of 1701 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) On Lebanon Danin pressed the Italians on ways to 
strengthen UNSCR 1701 implementation and discussed possibly 
setting up an informal contact group to discuss technical 
aspects of doing so.  The Italians were receptive, but 
suggested broadening the mandate (see reftel).  Danin also 
suggested exploring an air-UNIFIL option to discourage 
Israeli overflights, establishing a UN Sanctions committee to 
enforce the 1701 arms embargo, exploring the Italian proposal 
for border monitors on the Syrian border, expanding UNIIC's 
mandate to include recent bus bombings in Bikfaya and the 
importance of moving forward with establishment of the Hariri 
 
ROME 00000400  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Tribunal as soon as possible. 
 
¶13.  (C) Mideast DG Ragaglini thanked Danin for sharing U.S. 
intelligence and said he would appreciate opening a 
diplomatic channel to continue such exchanges.  He agreed the 
problem of weapons smuggling in Lebanon was serious but 
warned it should not be used as a pretext for Israel to take 
a negative stand on UNSCR 1701 implementation.  DG for 
Political Affairs Terzi said Italy shares our concerns 
regarding continued weapons smuggling but noted UNIFIL's 
effectiveness is directly linked to the effectiveness of the 
GOL's control over the LAF, and the political will of the 
GOL.  Closer control of the Syrian Lebanese border is 
desirable, but may not be realistic at the moment. 
 
¶14.  (C) Ragaglini reported Syria had not accepted the 
Italian proposal for even an unarmed civilian border 
monitoring mission on their side of the border and that 
Siniora would be unlikely to accept the idea of a UNIFIL or 
UN presence on the Lebanese side of the border without Syrian 
approval.  Terzi noted the idea of border monitors is further 
complicated because it would entail a new initiative either 
on the part of the EU or the UN.  He expressed frustration 
with the EU's decision-making process, which he called 
"horrendous" and suggested a more realistic goal may be 
establishing a sanctions committee.  Terzi noted the legal 
framework for a sanctions committee already existed in UNSCR 
¶1701. 
 
¶15.  (C) Terzi said Italy would support establishment of the 
Tribunal by the UNSC through Chapter VII; however, he thought 
support from some other non-permanent members might be more 
difficult.  Terzi also said he agreed with expanding UNIIC's 
technical assistance to investigate the recent bus bombings. 
 
 
IRAN: Italy Supports further UNSC Action on Iran 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶16.  (C) Danin told MFA DG for Political Affairs Terzi we 
were working on a draft UNSCR, which we hope to table soon. 
He asked for Italy's help to move the resolution adopting 
follow-on measures through the Council quickly.  He stressed 
any delay or division among the Council will send the wrong 
message to Iran and weaken the credibility of the Council. 
 
¶17.  (C) Terzi agreed the UNSC must continue to apply 
pressure and said he had seen a draft of the new resolution 
and we could count on Italy's full cooperation and support. 
He asked that we stay in touch.  He noted Italy was 
particularly concerned with the speed with which Iran has 
been installing new cascades underground.  On the national 
level, he said Italy was working to close loopholes in 
banking and financial laws while also working for a common EU 
position which would be effective immediately. 
 
¶18.  (U) DAS Danin has cleared this cable. 
SPOGLI