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C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000493 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016 
TAGS: PBTS PHUM PGOV MO FR GE SP
SUBJECT: RABAT POL COUNSELORS INFORMALLY DISCUSS WESTERN 
SAHARA 
 
Classified By: Classified by Polcouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Spain hosted Polcounselors from U.S., U.K., France and 
EU-President Germany for an informal discussion of Western 
Sahara developments March 14.  In general, participants noted 
the intensity of Moroccan diplomatic efforts, including 
multiple consultations with U.S., France, and Spain.  The 
energy of the initiative, however, did not appear to be 
matched by any apparent breakthrough on the substance of 
autonomy that could convince the other side.  The broad 
outlines of the autonomy plan, which have been universally 
briefed, suggested Rabat would retain full control, and did 
not go far beyond what was in the 2003 plan.  That had been 
rejected out of hand by Baker and governments. 
 
¶2. (C)  The French continue to broadly support the Moroccan 
position.  They believe that the GOM effort should be 
encouraged by the UNSC by some explicit mention and also 
support encouraging the parties to negotiate.  After some 
informal discussions with Van Walsum, the French were 
concerned that SYG Ban Ki Moon will be very conservative on 
his report to the Council.   It will be his first and he will 
likely want to keep the text of the last report.  The French 
continue to insist on self-determination, but the act of 
self-determination can be an institutional arrangement that 
is endorsed by a vote that comes way down the line.   They 
were to have formal discussions with Van Walsum in Paris this 
week 
 
¶3. (C) The Germans will try to forge a common European 
position but are not confident of doing so.  For Europe as a 
whole, the principal interest is that Morocco has been an 
island of stability in a crucial but shaky near neighborhood. 
 This stability must be preserved, so a solution to the 
Sahara problem that destabilizes Morocco proper is 
undesirable. 
 
¶4. (C) The Spanish host was not happy.  For Spain, the Sahara 
is now a hot domestic political issue.  Last week,  in the 
joint declaration of the Zapatero visit, they had agreed to a 
statement cautiously praising the Moroccan proposals as a 
basis for progress.  The Algerians then raised the price of 
gas exports to Spain by a hefty amount described in the press 
as 20 percent. (Comment: This move, possibly worth hundreds 
of millions of dollars, may have been in the cards anyway. 
End comment.)   The Spanish Parliament unanimously (including 
Zapatero's own Socialist party) appeared to repudiate this 
endorsement by voting for a bill proposed by leftist splinter 
parties to return to the historical Spanish approach focusing 
on self-determination.  King Juan Carlos, in Algiers this 
week, tried to dodge the issue and was accommodated by 
Bouteflika.   FM Moratinos, with the King in Algiers, 
published an op-ed walking the cat back on the Moroccan 
proposals, stressing Spanish rejection of unilateral 
solutions, and support for negotiations without 
preconditions. 
 
¶5. (C) Polcouns briefed on his recently completed trip to 
Sahara.  GOM consultation with the Sahrawi has been minimal, 
but there appeared to be interest in the prospect of a plan. 
Local observers believe that most of the original Sahrawis 
were still opposed to Moroccan overlordship, but they now 
admitted to being a minority of current population in the 
territory.  Both pro and anti-government Sahrawis mostly want 
to manage own affairs, the difference is trust, which is 
eroded by continuing, if modestly abating, human rights 
violations.  It appeared that the Moroccans have put in a lot 
of work on their proposals, and it now looked like they will 
at least have a plan to put on the table in April, but no one 
has yet seen anything that will win many additional Sahrawi 
hearts and minds. 
 
¶6.  (C) Algeria remained a thorny question for all.  Algiers 
is beginning to react to the GOM diplomatic offensive, but 
has stuck tightly to its insistence on the Baker formula. 
France said Algiers is like a boxer in a corner, and could 
lash out.  Levers to persuade them are few, as the Spanish 
have discovered.  Opening the border with Morocco will 
benefit the Kingdom and Algeria both, but the latter doesn't 
need it.  The only fruitful area of collaboration, as noted 
by the German, was counterterrorism, but this may not be 
enough to foster a rapprochement.  Russia may have some 
 
influence with the Algerians, but the French said their 
Embassy in Moscow commented that the Russian were unlikely to 
play a constructive role (apparently without haing directly 
posed the question to the GOR).  They unhappily recalled 
GAZPROM-SONATRACH discussions on forming a cartel.  The 
French believed that giving the Algerians some formal status 
in the negotiations, not as a party, which they refuse, but 
as a Godfather (parrain) could provide some incentive. 
 
¶7. (C)   On next steps, the French have advised the GOM to 
present their plan first to the UNSYG to include in his 
report, and to the April UNSC president, the UK.  The U.K. 
said they expected to see a Moroccan draft during their UNSC 
presidency. 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
Riley