VZCZCXRO1440
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #0396/01 0601050
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011050Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5970
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2747

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 000396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017 
TAGS: KISL PHUM MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: LEADER OF ISLAMIST JCO DECRIES 
"DESPOTISM" AND "PERSECUTION" (C-NE6-01280) 
 
REF: A. 06 STATE 137289 
     ¶B. 06 RABAT 1414 
     ¶C. 06 RABAT 1371 
     ¶D. 06 RABAT 1105 
     ¶E. 05 RABAT 0503 
     ¶F. 04 RABAT 2214 
 
Classified by D/Polcouns Ian McCary for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: A senior leader of Morocco's Islamist Justice 
and Charity Organization (JCO) denounced the Moroccan state 
as a corrupt and despotic regime and claimed government 
"persecution" of the group and its members was much worse 
today than in the era of Hassan II, in our first conversation 
with the group since mid-2006.  The JCO calls for replacing 
the Moroccan monarchy through comprehensive constitutional 
reform, and is critical of the Islamist PJD's approach of 
engaging in the current political system.  Unsurprisingly 
given the GOM's current crackdown on the group, our 
interlocutor was vague when asked about the JCO's own 
leadership structure.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) After several months of unsuccessful attempts to make 
contact, Abdelwahid Motawakil, President of the JCO's 
Political Council and member of the group's four person 
Guidance Bureau, received poloff for a two-hour meeting on 
the evening of February 22.  The meeting took place in a 
relatively spartan villa in a middle class neighborhood of 
Sale, Rabat's poorer and more conservative twin city to the 
north.  The villa is the former residence of JCO Spiritual 
leader Sheikh Abdelsalam Yassin and now serves as the JCO's 
de facto headquarters.  (Note: Last fall, the aging and 
reportedly ill Sheikh Yassin traded his digs in Sale for a 
villa in the upscale Rabat neighborhood of Souissi.  End 
note.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
The State is Despotic and Corrupt 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Motawakil opened with a scathing denunciation of the 
Moroccan state - a corrupt and despotic regime interested 
only in preserving itself at the expense of the people, he 
maintained.  "It is a gross insult that 50 percent of the 
people of this country should live in illiteracy."  Poverty 
and degradation is a reality for the majority of Moroccans, 
he added - the state has taken no real interest in the 
welfare of the people.  On the contrary, he contended, the 
state believed an ignorant populace easier to control and 
exploit. 
 
¶4. (C) Corruption, Motawakil continued, is endemic and 
pervasive in Moroccan public life.  Tons of narcotics are 
grown and processed in Morocco, in front of the government's 
eyes.  Parliament members purchase their seats and the 
payment of bribes to police and bureaucrats is the norm. 
King Mohammed VI is more interested than his father in 
business, Motawakil maintained.  The King and his circle of 
friends are aggressively moving into the private sector, 
using their power and influence to crush competitors.  "We 
used to talk just about the political makhzen (elite power 
structure), now we are talking about the economic makhzen as 
well." 
 
¶5. (C) Asked about the unprecedented reforms and initiatives 
undertaken by Mohammed VI, many aimed at addressing bad 
legacies of his father's rule, Motawakil was dismissive and 
derisive.  There have been no "serious" efforts to combat 
poverty and illiteracy, he maintained, dismissing the King's 
National Human Development Initiative as a public relations 
ploy that would not reach the roots of the country's social 
and economic problems.  Likewise, the prosecution of a 
"handful" of parliament members for electoral corruption 
(Note: 15 elected candidates for the upper house were charged 
with corruption after the September 2006 elections End note.) 
and the occasional dismissal of a few senior officials, was 
purely symbolic, and always for reasons other than 
corruption, he maintained. 
 
-------------------- 
No Point in Engaging 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Motawakil explained the JCO's policy of eschewing 
electoral politics.  "The parliament can pass laws and 
ministries can make rules but we all know that decisions are 
taken in the Palace," Motawakil commented.  The people have 
no ability to realize change under the current system.  The 
people know this - hence their widespread apathy, he 
asserted.  The political parties exist to support, directly 
 
RABAT 00000396  002 OF 004 
 
 
or indirectly, the Palace and its interests.  "The political 
class is not trusted."  The Islamist Justice and Development 
Party, (the PJD - expected to perform well in the September 
parliamentary elections) will, like other parties, be 
powerless to implement real reform, he predicted.  "You lose 
credibility if you compete and can't deliver," Motawakil 
stated, this will be the fate of the PJD, he added. 
 
------------------------- 
National Charter Proposal 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In this context, Motawakil maintained, the only 
practical and peaceful means of change is to call a 
conference for a new "national charter" in which all sectors 
of Moroccan society could participate. (Throughout the 
conversation Motawakil emphasized the JCO's commitment to 
"peaceful and gradual change" - "you cannot rule by force," 
he stated several times.)  Delegates to the national charter 
conference envisioned by the JCO would shape a new 
constitution through consensus.  "If the majority were in 
favor of preserving the monarchy, we would disagree, but we 
would accept the majority view." 
 
¶8. (C) Motawakil was evasive about what type of government 
and society the JCO would envision for Morocco.  He did not 
address poloff's question about the application of Sharia' 
law. (Note: The "dreams" or "visions" of JCO spiritual guide 
Sheikh Yassin, in which the monarch is toppled and replaced 
by a just leader with prophet-like attributes have been well 
publicized, including on the JCO's own website.  End note.) 
 
---------------------- 
Persecution of the JCO 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Motawakil claimed that "persecution" of the JCO is far 
worse under the reign of Mohammed VI than it was under Hassan 
II.  Since 1999, the GOM has become much more active in 
blocking the JCO's public activities, he stated, recalling 
the closure at the beginning of the decade of "summer camps" 
set up by the JCO where "more than a hundred thousand" 
members and their families could bathe in the ocean in a 
"proper moral atmosphere."  After the GOM, through police 
action, forced these facilities shut, the JCO organized mass 
outings to existing public beaches, to which the authorities 
responded, in 2001 and 2002, with mass arrests of adult male 
would-be beachgoers.  "Even when we try to organize a picnic 
in the forest, the gendarmes block the roads and turn back 
the buses." 
 
¶10. (C) Motawakil complained the authorities have recently 
been raiding JCO meetings held at private houses, 
particularly in the northeast towns of Oujda and Nador. 
"Because we are not allowed to have public meeting halls, we 
meet quietly in members' houses," he explained.  In the past 
three months, five such meetings have been raided in the 
Oujda region, leading to brief mass arrests but (more 
seriously) the sealing off of the houses used.  "As of last 
week we have a pregnant mother, and her four children, cast 
onto the street in their pajamas by police, with their house 
sealed off," he exclaimed.  "There have been four similar 
cases in recent months."  (Note: Stories about the raids and 
house closures have appeared widely in the local press.  End 
note.) 
 
--------------- 
Legal Purgatory 
--------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Asked for clarification of the JCO's status under 
Moroccan law, Motawakil winced.  "Don't try to understand, 
there is no logic applied."  The JCO is not a licensed NGO, 
but no law prohibits its existence, he maintained.  "The JCO 
is deemed illegal because the state says we are illegal. 
They don't need a real basis in law to do this."  (Note: The 
GOM has previously rejected the JCO's attempts to register 
under Morocco's association law.  After the JCO stepped up 
outreach activities in 2005, the GOM's legal stance toward 
the group became more aggresive, maintaining that it was not 
only unrecognized but illegal - operating in violation of the 
association law.  End note.) 
 
¶12. (C) Motawakil passed poloff a document prepared by the 
JCO's "lawyers' council" containing statistics summarizing 
recent government legal actions against the council. 
According to the document, in the eight month period from 
June 1 2006 to February 20, 2007 641 JCO members (12 women) 
were facing prosecution (mainly for membership in an illegal 
association and related activities), with the highest 
proportion (387) in the Fes-Oujda region. 
 
RABAT 00000396  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
"Are You for Freedom or Not?" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) Motawakil urged the U.S. to condemn the GOM's 
"persecution" of the JCO, in clear violation of recognized 
human rights principles, he maintained.  "One word from the 
U.S. and the whole situation could change," he believed. 
"Either you are for democracy or you not," he challenged, "if 
you support freedom, show us that you mean it.... if not, 
continue to support autocracy, but do not be surprised if 
this leads to violence and anarchy." 
 
¶15. (C) Poloff responded that human rights and political 
reform are central features of our bilateral dialogue with 
the GOM.  The U.S. has long been a leader in advocating 
universal human rights principles including freedom of 
religion, freedom of association, and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest.  Our annual human rights report publicly documents 
various USG concerns about human rights practices in Morocco, 
including those against the JCO. 
 
--------------------- 
The Nature of the JCO 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Though extroverted for most of the conversation, 
Motawakil became reticent when queried about the JCO's 
membership, organization, and leadership structure.  He 
declined to provide a total membership statistic "for 
security reasons." (Note: Outside estimates of JCO membership 
range from 50 to 500,000.  End note.)  "Wherever you go in 
Morocco, you will find us," he stated.  "Even in Layoune and 
Dakhla, we have many members." (Motawakil declined to 
elucidate a position on Western Sahara, but blamed the 
current political impasse on the Moroccan state's brutality. 
"Moroccan brutality and violence created the Polisario," he 
stated.) 
 
¶17. (C) The group's public face and spiritual head, Sheikh 
Abdelsalam Yassin, sits at the top of the JCO's leadership 
pyramid.  Directly beneath him is the four person "Maktab 
al-Irshad" (guidance bureau), of which Motawakil is a member, 
elected every three years by the Shura Assembly, a broad 
membership gathering.  Motawakil's own Political Council, 
which reports to the guidance bureau, has 11 members, three 
of whom are women.  Motawakil advised that the JCO also has 
"standing committees" on youth affairs, education, labor, and 
women's issues. 
 
¶18. (C) Motawakil was reluctant to delineate any hierarchy 
within the JCO.  "We strive for justice, but also for 
spiritual perfection, the two cannot be separated, it is the 
duty of all of us to work as hard as we can for all of these 
goals."  He rejected the common English translation of the 
group's Arabic name "Al-Adl wal Ihsane."  "Al Adl means 
'justice,' but 'charity' is a poor translation for 'ihsane' - 
we prefer to call ourselves "justice and spirituality." 
(Note: Hans Wehr, the Arabic-English dictionary of record, 
defines 'ihsane' as "beneficence, charity, performance of 
good deeds." End note.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶19. (C) Despite the occasional innuendo, we are not aware of 
any credible allegations linking the JCO to organized 
violence or terror (though JCO-linked student groups have 
certainly been known to intimidate and occassionally brawl 
with rivals on campuses across the country).  The GOM's tough 
line toward the group is doubtless based on the JCO's 
anti-monarchial stance - which constitutes a potentially 
serious political challenge, rather than an immediate public 
security threat.  While the Islamist PJD is scathing in its 
criticism of the GOM, they profess loyalty to the Monarch and 
recognize the King's religious role as "Commander of the 
Faithful."  This core difference with the JCO appears to make 
the country's two most significant Islamist groupings 
irreconcilable.  The JCO's absence from the electoral arena 
is nothing new.  In any case, the JCO would not be allowed to 
organize its own political party without pledging allegiance 
to the Monarch.  While it is difficult to quantify, it is 
virtually certain that the JCO's rejection of electoral 
participation dilutes the impact of PJD candidates, who might 
otherwise look to JCO members and sympathizers as part of 
their natural constituency in the parliamentary elections 
coming this September.  End comment. 
 
****************************************** 
 
RABAT 00000396  004 OF 004 
 
 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
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****************************************** 
 
Riley