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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR KSUM XA SU CD CT FR
SUBJECT: PART II: AFRICA-FRANCE SUMMIT -- THE DARFUR 
SIDESHOW 
 
REF: A. PARIS 847 B. PARIS 578 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt.  Reas 
ons 1.4b,d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: President Chirac, on the margins of the XXIV 
Africa-France Summit in Cannes, facilitated a February 15 
Mini-Summit on the regional spillover of the Darfur crisis. 
Ghana President Kufuor, in his capacity as Chairman of the 
African Union, presided over the event, which took place in 
the presence of Mubarak, Sassou-N'guesso and Bongo.  The 
leaders of Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic 
agreed to a minimalist statement, the Cannes Declaration, 
that renewed a pledge against fomenting cross-border 
rebellion.  The Cannes Declaration lacked political substance 
and papered over the cantankerous and accusatory atmosphere 
at the Mini-Summit.  Deby was hostile and aggressive, 
according to sources.  This is the second of three cables on 
the France-Africa Summit.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Sudan, Chad and CAR Take Center Stage, Briefly 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) Bashir, Deby, and Bozize, at a February 15 Mini-Summit 
facilitated by Chirac, pledged in the "Cannes Declaration" 1) 
"to respect the sovereignty of each country and not to 
support armed movements in conformity with the Tripoli 
Agreement"; 2) to establish "active consultation bodies to 
bring together Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic"; 
3) to "support the continued engagement of the United Nations 
and the African Union."  However, the GoF privately 
discounted the declaration's importance, while asserting it 
kept alive efforts at dialogue and reaffirmed the objectives 
of the February 2006 Tripoli Summit to avoid regional 
conflagration.  The meeting's dynamics were cantankerous -- 
accusatory and contentious, with Deby evincing vocal 
hostility toward Bashir. 
 
¶3. (C) Sudanese President Bashir's decision to attend the 
Africa-France Summit made a Darfur initiative compulsory, if 
only to deflect criticism of the GoF for the invitation to 
Cannes.  Bashir had originally sought a bilateral meeting 
with Chirac.  (Note: Chirac held only two formal bilats.) 
The MFA previously claimed Khartoum had lobbied for a sidebar 
meeting, even suggesting the Government of Sudan was the 
source of news leaks about the plan when the GoF was still 
considering pulling the plug (Ref B).  In the event, Deby 
proved the fly in the ointment, resisting a group encounter 
as serving no purpose, according to both French Presidency 
and MFA sources.  Deby's participation was grudging. 
According to sources, Deby was agressive, lashing out at 
Bashir, who in turn responded defensively.  Central African 
Republic President Bozize, by contrast, was a model of 
equanimity and statesmanship, though he did draw attention to 
the presumed Sudanese role in at least two arms deliveries 
into CAR in 2006.  Of interest, Deby brought former rebel 
leader Mohamat Nour along to the meeting. 
 
¶4. (C) AU Chairman and Ghana President Kufuor officially 
presided at the Mini-Summit.  Chirac, the primary 
facilitator, included Mubarak.  Although not invited, 
Congo/Brazzaville President and former AU Chairman 
Sassou-N'guesso and Gabon President Bongo gained access to 
the venue before the parties arrived, presenting the 
organizers with a fait accompli and effectively gate-crashing 
the private gathering.  MFA Sudan Desk Officer Frederic 
Bouvier confided that Bongo even upstaged Kufuor by pointedly 
taking a position to Chirac's right, seizing the place of 
honor and asserting his stature as the doyen of African 
leaders. 
 
¶5. (C) Before the Cannes Summit, AF DAS-Equivalent Helene Le 
Gal had volunteered the MFA preference for as limited a 
gathering as possible, namely, principals plus the AU 
Chairman and Chirac.  Egypt's presence was not necessarily a 
positive, since it would create a regional imbalance, 
highlighting the absence of Libya and Eritrea, key players on 
Darfur and Chad who were not in Cannes.  Jacques Champagne de 
Labriolle, Deputy Counselor in the Presidency Africa Cell, 
disclosed in a February 21 conversation with Africa Watcher 
that the GoF in fact declined an overture from Eritrean 
President Isaiis Afwerki to attend the Darfur meeting because 
Afwerki refused also to take part in the Africa-France 
Summit. 
 
 
PARIS 00000848  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Sweeping Cote d'Ivoire under a Chadian Carpet? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Taking a cynical tack, Stephen Smith, independent 
Africa analyst and co-author of a prominent 2005 work, "How 
France Lost Africa," argued on February 24 that the Cannes 
Declaration and the Darfur Mini-Summit served to occupy the 
media and divert attention from the lack of meaningful GoF 
engagement on the Cote d'Ivoire crisis.  The post-conference 
claims of "intensive consultations" on Cote d'Ivoire made by 
Brigitte Girardin, the Minister-Delegate for Development, 
Cooperation and Francophonie, the GoF point person on the 
crisis, were pro forma assertions, MFA Desk Officer for Cote 
d'Ivoire Charlotte Montel conceded. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON