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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL FR NATO PARM AF IZ IR MOPS MNUC KCFE
MARR 
SUBJECT: DOD USDP EDELMAN AND FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR 
ARAUD DISCUSS MISSILE DEFENSE, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, IRAN 
 
 
Classified By: AMB Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY: During a March 15 meeting with USDP Edelman, 
MFA Political Director Araud accepted fully the U.S. right to 
deploy MD in the Czech Republic and Poland while noting the 
need for careful Russia management. Agreeing with Edelman 
that this was more a problem of politics than physics, Araud 
expressed concern that the U.S. might be considering 
deployment of an MD element to Georgia and asked whether the 
U.S. also had plans to push for Georgian participation in 
NATO's MAP process in connection with the 2008 summit.  Araud 
responded to Edelman's description of PRT successes in 
Afghanistan with a request for documentation and analysis of 
PRTs that might serve to produce a more favorable GOF 
attitude following the upcoming presidential elections, 
reiterated familiar concerns about the need to keep France 
and other NATO governments informed in advance of ISAF 
operations, and said France would raise as a matter of 
Alliance principle Turkey's denial of blanket authorization 
for ISAF-related overflights at NATO if France and Turkey did 
not reach an understanding soon.  In response to Edelman's 
briefing on the surge in Iraq, Araud agreed that Iran was 
reassessing its operations in Iraq in response to the recent 
operations against the IRGC(QF) in Iraq and the dispatch of a 
second carrier battle group to the Gulf.  However, he saw no 
moderating of Iran's "obsession" with enrichment and said the 
Iranian's were using Russia's current refusal to deliver fuel 
as another argument for an indigenous capability.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) DOD Under Secretary for Policy Eric Edelman and 
Ambassador Stapleton met March 15 with MFA Political Director 
Gerard Araud to discuss missile defense, Afghanistan, and the 
situation in Iraq.  Araud was joined by Policy Planning 
A/S-equivalent Pierre Levy, IO PDAS-equivalent Marc 
Giacomini, Strategic Affairs A/S-equivalent Philippe Carre, 
Advisor to FM Douste-Blazy for Strategic Affairs and North 
America Francois-Xavier Carrel-Billard, Nonproliferation 
Affairs DAS-equivalent Philippe Errera, Strategic Affairs 
office desk officer for missile defense issues Arnaud Mentre, 
NATO desk officer for Afghanistan Xavier Chatel, and Special 
Assistant to the Political Director Gael Veyssiere.  POL/MC, 
LtGen John Sattler of J-5, Military Assistant COL Tracy 
Warren, LTC Nate Lucas of OSD, LTC Chad Lemond of DATT, and 
POL Deputy (notetaker) accompanied Edelman. 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
--------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Ambassador Edelman briefed on U.S. deployment plans, 
explaining U.S. sites were optimal to intercept missiles from 
North Korea but that the Czech and Polish sites were needed 
to defend fielded forces and European allies against an 
eventual Iranian threat.  He reviewed U.S. efforts at 
transparency within NATO and with Russia, including in the 
NATO-Russia Council, and pointed out the contradiction 
between Russian opposition to a U.S. site defending against 
Iran and Russia's own claims that it needed to abrogate the 
INF Treaty for the same reason, among others.  Finally, 
noting Russian statements that they would prefer a U.S. site 
in the UK even if technically such a site would theoretically 
enable interception of a Russian missile, he concluded that 
the Russian problem appeared to be one of politics, not 
physics. 
 
¶4.  (C) Araud responded that the U.S. had a right to defend 
itself, that Poland and the Czech Republic were friends and 
allies who had the right to agree to missile sites, and that 
the Russian complaints and implicit threats were 
unacceptable.  He agreed that the Russian reaction was 
political in essence, and, recounting Putin's ravings during 
the most recent meeting of Foreign and Defense ministers in 
Moscow, cited traditional Russian fears of encirclement close 
to their "geopolitical borders" and their rekindled imperial 
ambitions.  The Poles and Russians attached a similar 
importance to a U.S. presence -- if for opposite reasons. 
But Russian reactions still needed to be taken into account, 
since they had consequences for Europe.  He said France's 
position of calling for more dialogue reflected its status as 
a concerned observer; while the Germans had perhaps 
overreacted to the U.S. announcement, the situation created 
was also uncomfortable for France.  Edelman acknowledged the 
concern and stressed the continuing importance the U.S. 
 
PARIS 00001063  002 OF 003 
 
 
attached to cooperation with Russia on Iran, Kosovo, and 
other issues. 
 
¶5.  (C) Carre asked whether Russia had accused the U.S. of 
violating NATO commitments on stationing and infrastructure 
on the territories of new members.  Edelman responded that 
the Russians had not yet raised the issue in any of his 
conversations, adding that any deployment would involve 
neither substantial forces nor bases. 
 
¶6.  (S) Edelman pointed out that the likelihood that any 
potential Iranian missile would invariably cross Russian 
territory, with the possibility of significant debris, might 
yet persuade Russia to take a more cooperative approach. 
Araud responded that concerns about debris, and the 
possibility that a missile might be intercepted over German 
territory, might help explain the stronger German reaction. 
 
BUT WHAT ABOUT GEORGIA? 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Araud asked if, as has been reported, the U.S. was 
thinking of basing a radar site in Georgia, commenting that 
while the U.S. had the right to do so, this would be viewed 
by Russia as a red flag.  Edelman acknowledged that, to be 
fully effective, the system would eventually need a forward 
radar site, but this could be in Turkey, Georgia, or even 
Azerbaijan.  Noting that the Russians themselves had a radar 
site in Azerbaijan, he explained to Araud that the U.S. at 
one point had proposed a cooperative arrangement at the same 
site with the Russians (the Russians had yet to respond). 
Araud asked whether the U.S. would be pushing to admit 
Georgia into the NATO MAP process in 2008, which he said 
would pose new difficulties for Russia.  Carre added that 
eventual NATO membership for Ukraine was also a 
consideration.  Edelman registered the French concerns, 
noting that Russia had not raised concerns about Georgia and 
Ukraine in its discussions with the U.S. of MD. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Edelman described the improving economic situation in 
Afghanistan; noted his just-held talks with the Afghans on 
security, economic development, counter-narcotics, and 
governance; and noted the Administration's USDOL 11.8 billion 
assistance request for Afghanistan.  Afghan military 
capabilities were improving, with police capabilities still 
lagging.  President Karzai was feeling encouraged by U.S. and 
NATO support.  Additional UK and Polish battalions would be 
arriving soon in advance of any potential Taliban "spring 
offensive."  Edelman explained that this was not a "military" 
campaign at all, but more a terrorist one directed against 
schools, health clinics, police stations, and economic 
development -- in short, the fundamentals of civilization. 
 
¶9.  (C) Edelman recounted his visit to a U.S.-led PRT in 
Jalalabad, an operation which he described as proving 
effective.  In response to a number of Araud's questions, 
Edelman explained how PRT activities were nested in brigades 
in order to serve as an enabler for reconstructive activity. 
Araud noted that the current French Administration "did not 
believe in PRTs," but indicated that this might change after 
the elections.  He asked if the U.S. had documentation on and 
analyses of the PRTs that it would be prepared to share (with 
the eventual aim of changing minds).  Edelman undertook to 
provide him materials as quickly as possible.  (NOTE:  As a 
first step, Post provided Araud's office March 16 with USIP 
reports and USAID's June 2006 interagency study on PRTs in 
Afghanistan.) 
 
¶10.  (S) Araud asked if the Achilles operation was a response 
to current Taliban activity or was designed to preempt it. 
Edelman and Gen Sattler explained that it was essentially 
intelligence driven and designed to block Taliban 
infiltration routes and protect infrastructure. 
Carrel-Billard asked whether Afghan troops had a significant 
role in the operations and were gradually taking over. 
Edelman and Gen Sattler responded that Afghan troops fought 
well, but that they lacked enablers and mobility; it was for 
this reason that U.S. trainers were embedded in them. 
 
¶11.  (C) In a brief exchange, Araud reiterated familiar 
 
PARIS 00001063  003 OF 003 
 
 
French concerns that French political authorities be informed 
in advance of major ISAF operations.  U.S. participants noted 
that the issue had been raised and appeared to have been 
satisfactorily addressed at the March 14 NAC. 
 
¶12.  (C) Edelman and Sattler noted that there would be a 
rotary wing shortfall in the south with the rotation out of 
U.S. equipment and hoped France might be able to think about 
helping there or in other areas.  Araud expressed the hope 
that the U.S. properly recognized the contributions France 
was already making, including the recent decision to move an 
aircraft carrier into the Arabian Sea.  Edelman assured him 
that this was the case. 
 
¶13.  (C) Araud raised Turkey's decision to cease providing 
blanket overflight authorization for ISAF missions, saying 
that this affected Alliance operations and was therefore a 
matter of principle.  Edelman agreed with the French position 
that Allies should adhere to their NATO responsibilities. 
Araud expressed the hope that France and Turkey would resolve 
their differences at a meeting scheduled for March 20.  If 
not, he said, France would take the issue to the NATO Council 
(NAC). 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶14.  (C) Edelman noted that while it was still early to draw 
definitive conclusions about current operations in Baghdad, 
the initial phases were proceeding well.  Operations had 
proceeded effectively, and there had been no political 
interference by the PM with operations.  Sectarian killings 
had declined somewhat.  Economic activity appeared to be on 
the increase.  On the political side, the hydrocarbon law had 
passed the Council of Ministers, an important step forward. 
The key to future success hinged on being able to build in 
the areas cleared and held, but the U.S. had plans to deploy 
ten additional PRTs in the near future. 
 
¶15.  (S) Araud asked about the Iranian role.  Edelman noted 
that, while an Iranian hand was still visible in IED attacks, 
the U.S. decision to pursue Iranian agents more actively and 
to deploy an aircraft carrier to the region appeared to be 
have catalyzed a process of reassessment.  Araud agreed, 
affirming that Iran was worried about a possible military 
operation.  Edelman agreed this was probably the case, while 
reiterating that the U.S. had no current plans for attacking 
Iran.  Araud discerned signs of Iranian willingness to 
negotiate, although they continued to refuse suspension of 
their nuclear activities.  They were obsessed by enrichment, 
he said, and were now citing the Russian refusal to deliver 
fuel to Bushehr as a justification for an indigenous 
capability. 
 
¶16.  (U) This message was cleared by USDP Edelman. 
 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON