VZCZCXRO4011
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0256/01 0821531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231531Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7672
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0825
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: UN-BROKERED TALKS HIT SNAG; SPEED BUMP OR MAJOR 
COLLISION? 
 
REF: NICOSIA 205 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4(b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Two week ago, there was cause for Cyprus 
Problem optimism.  Hairline cracks were showing in hard-line 
President Tassos Papadopoulos's coalition, Brussels appeared 
to be tiring of Nicosia's maximalist position on Turkish 
Cypriot direct trade, and T/C leaders mostly were behaving, 
attempting to regain the moral high ground.  Feeling 
pressured though not quite cornered, Papadopoulos made 
limited concessions, taking down the Ledra Street wall 
(Reftel), eliminating pre-conditions on the crossing point's 
opening, and apparently instructing negotiator Tasos Tzionis 
to adopt a more accommodating position in talks with Turkish 
Cypriot counterpart Rashid Pertev.  UN sources March 16 
claimed the representatives had agreed to "an arrangement" 
that would allow the committees and working groups envisaged 
in the "July 8 Process" finally to convene; at their next 
meeting (March 19), UN SRSG Michael Moller hoped to dot the 
last "i" and issue a formal announcement.  That never 
happened.  In their readouts March 20, G/C media claimed the 
T/C side had sidelined the talks by tabling a slew of 
Ankara-ordered demands, an account that our UN interlocutors 
in part confirmed. 
 
¶2.  (C) Moller believed a below-the-radar approach might have 
broken the impasse.  Instead, however, the wily Papadopoulos 
issued a high-minded but clearly T/C-baiting statement late 
March 20, calling for an immediate commencement of the July 8 
process and subsequent leaders' meetings.  Predictably, Talat 
hit the roof, refuting Papadopoulos's claims on the 
"arrangement's" validity and canceling the follow-on 
Tzionis-Pertev meetings.  UN officials calling on the T/C 
leader March 21 later described him as "shell-shocked and 
lost."  Officially, the "TRNC Presidency" has announced that 
Talat is "reflecting" on the process, but there is no word 
when the communities might re-commence negotiations.  In 
addition to the local dynamics, much of the T/C side of the 
story seems grounded in electoral machinations and 
civilian-military jostling in Ankara.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Even Limited Movement Causes Celebration 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Prior Embassy reporting has documented Papadopoulos's 
March "charm offensive," evinced best by the President's 
March 9 order to remove the wall at Ledra Street, a necessary 
step in establishing a Buffer Zone crossing there. 
Underpinning the tack change was both domestic and 
international dissatisfaction with RoC policies and behavior. 
 At home, coalition mate AKEL was warning Papadopoulos not to 
assume that its support was iron-clad, and even a prominent 
member of the President's own DIKO party was criticizing his 
handling of the CyProb.  Meanwhile, Brussels-based officials 
were pressing the President to open Ledra soonest and engage 
the Turkish Cypriots in good-faith dialog under the July 8 
Process framework.  Other elements of Papadopoulos's 
"softening" included a retraction of certain pre-conditions 
on Ledra Street -- removal of the "TRNC national" symbols, 
primarily -- and an apparent instruction to Tzionis to craft 
an arrangement acceptable to Turkish Cypriots for the 
long-delayed start-up of the July 8 talks. 
 
¶4.  (C) Various Embassy sources reported a greater pace of 
activity in the Tzionis-Pertev meetings in early March, the 
sides horsetrading and exchanging non-papers at every 
setting.  On March 5, the Greek Cypriots leaked their letter 
to Moller, in which they floated a framework which became the 
basis of the "arrangement."  The G/C's "Proposal for the 
Immediate Initiation of the Implementation of the 8 July 2006 
Process" ordered the communities to a) finalize the lists of 
technical committees and working groups to be established, 
and b) each propose one committee and one working group for 
immediate establishment.  Taking advantage of the momentum 
created with the four bodies' creation, the Coordination 
Committee (Moller, Tzionis, and Pertev) would work to 
establish others as circumstances warranted. 
¶5.  (C) G/C media began to carry stories intimating that a 
July 8 Process deal looked imminent.  In an above-the-fold 
article March 12, leading daily "Phileleftheros" claimed the 
technical committees "could get to work as early as 
tomorrow," since the latest Tzionis proposal "left no room 
for the 'Turks' to reject it, as it took into consideration 
T/C concerns."  UNFICYP contacts appeared equally optimistic, 
with Moller informing the Ambassador that same day that he 
and the sides' representatives had reached agreement on how 
 
NICOSIA 00000256  002 OF 004 
 
 
to move forward.  The G/Cs had shown noteworthy flexibility, 
Moller complimented.  Pertev had only to secure the approval 
of Talat for the formal talks to commence. 
 
¶6.  (C) In person, Pertev displayed far less optimism.  The 
March 5 G/C proposal was nothing new, the T/C negotiator 
informed Emboffs March 9, but only a re-hashing of earlier 
non-papers; he did not understand why it was garnering such 
attention.  While committing to study the two-committee, 
two-group initiative, Pertev claimed the Turkish Cypriots 
could never accept it as-is.  Although the Greek Cypriots had 
not mentioned property in the context of this particular 
proposal, their insistence that both the working group and 
technical committee agendas "be open to any issue raised by 
either side" was an open door for the G/Cs to introduce the 
show-stopping substantive issue of property into the 
technical committee arena.  This tactic was evidence, Pertev 
felt, of their bad faith and of a desire not to see real 
progress on the July 8 track. 
 
--------------------------- 
Meeting Outcome Disappoints 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) No milestones emerged from the March 19 meeting. 
"Turkish Side Blocks Agreement for Start of Technical Talks" 
trumpeted "Philelefteros" the following day.  While Pertev 
had not rejected the G/C's latest offer outright, the paper 
continued, his insistence in avoiding any discussion of 
property amounted to a de facto "no."  Refusal to tackle the 
land issue betrayed the spirit of the July 8 Process, since, 
according to UN Undersecretary Ibrahim Gambari's formulation, 
"all matters were open to discussion."  Opposition daily 
"Politis" rued that the negotiations would have to 
re-commence completely, since the expectation that the sides 
were close to agreement had proven false. 
 
¶8.  (C) Ever the optimist, Moller privately refuted accounts 
that the talks had collapsed.  Pertev had, however, 
introduced several "pathetic" and "dilatory" conditions to 
initiating the committees' work.  The principal show-stopper 
was a new T/C demand that the sides agree, in writing, that 
each had the right NOT to discuss issues raised by the other. 
 Other requests included changing the names of various 
committees and working groups, even though Talat earlier had 
ok'd the nomenclature.  Pertev had "seemed ashamed" to be 
bringing up the new demands, Moller explained.  (Note:  We 
have learned that the T/C backpedaling came on the heels of a 
series of visits by high-level Turkish delegations.  AKP Vice 
President Nihat Ergun headed one on March 18, ostensibly to 
attend the CTP,s party congress.  Meanwhile, there are 
reports that Turkish MFA U/S Apakan, DU/S Berk, and DG Ahmet 
Dibek made an unpublicized visit to the island at the same 
time, although the Turkish Cypriots have -- even in private 
-- been uncharacteristically reticent to provide a read-out, 
or even to confirm it occurred.  End Note.) 
 
------------------------ 
And the Blame Game Is On 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Hopes the two sides might break the deadlock 
discreetly disappeared late March 20.  In a written 
statement, Papadopoulos called on T/C leader Talat to 
"jointly and immediately start implementing the 8 July 
Agreement."  Heavy with passive voice -- perhaps to highlight 
the achievements, but more likely to hide the actors -- the 
president assured that great problems had been addressed, 
differences bridged, progress made, agendas coordinated, and 
procedures for putting the groups and committees to work 
finalized.  Papadopoulos invited Talat to meet a week after 
the bodies had convened and started their work.  "I sincerely 
believe...that the 8 July 8 process can soon produce results 
and create the necessary dynamic for the solution of the 
Cyprus Problem," the President ended. 
 
¶10.  (U) The fireworks began shortly afterward.  Talat's 
spokesman Hassan Ercakica delayed his weekly briefing one 
hour, announcing that his "president" would address media 
directly.  Flanked by Pertev and Ercakica, a furious Talat, 
despite the fact that he had also selectively leaked on many 
occasions, blasted the G/Cs for revealing the contents of the 
"arrangement" despite the sides' agreed media blackout. 
There was no comprehensive agreement, the T/C leader 
countered, but only "some overlapping views and certain 
conformities."  Papadopoulos sought only to burnish his image 
with his statement, Talat believed.  In the same way the 
demolition of the Ledra Street wall had coincided with 
 
NICOSIA 00000256  003 OF 004 
 
 
Tassos' trip to Brussels for a Council meeting, this latest 
PR effort was occurring just as Tzionis was in Belgium to 
discuss the EU's Direct Trade Regulation.  For eight months 
Papadopoulos had endeavored to prevent movement on the July 8 
Agreement; this recent about-face was all about politics, 
Talat argued. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Turkish Side At Fault, Witnesses Say 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) In subsequent readouts, UNFICYP contacts provided 
additional detail on the March 19 T/C turnabout.  Pertev had 
demanded not only an opt-out clause on discussing property, 
DCM Wlodek Cibor told us March 20, but also to rename various 
working groups and technical committees.  More than semantics 
were at play; Cibor understood why Tzionis would (and did) 
oppose changing "Defense" to "Security and Guarantees," since 
the updated name almost presupposed a future role for Turkish 
military "guarantor" forces on the island.  Pertev had 
traveled to Turkey the week before, purportedly on personal 
business.  Had he received updated marching orders there? 
Cibor questioned.  That was certainly the Greek side's 
perception.  Off the record, the UN diplomat thought Talat 
had "snapped" at his rebuttal press conference.  Moller 
intended to call on the T/C leader that day, to determine 
what he had meant with his "enough is enough" comments. 
 
¶12.  (C) In their March 21 meeting the UN chief had found 
Talat shell-shocked and still seething over Papadopoulos's 
statement, revealed UNFICYP PolOff Tim Alchin at a diplomatic 
corps dinner March 21.  While the "TRNC President" did not 
want to put the representatives' talks on long-term hold, the 
T/C side was seeking time to formulate its next steps.  Talat 
had canceled the Pertev and Tzionis's March 22 follow-up, 
Alchin noted, and it was unlikely the sides would reconvene 
before March 26. 
 
------------------- 
The Latest/Greatest 
------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Attempting to ensure this latest interruption is 
brief, the Embassy, in coordination with like-minded missions 
here, is urging Turkish Cypriots to re-engage on the July 8 
Process.  In a March 23 pow-wow, the Ambassador, Moller, and 
the German and British chiefs of mission agreed that Talat's 
recent moves put at risk his credibility with both the 
international community and his own electoral base.  The UN 
chief added that higher-ups in the Secretariat "would not and 
should not look kindly on Talat blithely discarding a process 
that Gambari had created in July and then salvaged in 
November."  The Ambassador will join fellow P-5 
representatives March 26 to debate the usefulness of a joint 
call on Talat, which might provide him limited cover from 
hard-liners within the TGS, local Turkish Forces, and the 
opposition UBP and DP.  In public commentary, we will 
emphasize that both sides must put aside their pre-process 
bickering and get to the table. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C) In this latest installment of the CyProb drama, 
Papadopoulos again demonstrated his peerless command of 
tactics.  Just two weeks ago he seemed on the defensive, with 
coalition partners sniping and even the normally suck-up 
media questioning his leadership.  Yet with a few (un-bold) 
strokes, he has quieted his opposition and the press, and is 
again striding the high ground.  We surmise the President 
truly does want to see the committees up and running soon, if 
only to quiet his pro-solution G/C detractors.  We are 
certain, however, they will make only as much progress as 
Papadopoulos deems politically beneficial. 
 
¶15.  (C) Mirroring the President's craftiness and poise, 
unfortunately, was Talat's predictability and prickliness; an 
ambush he should have avoided instead beckoned him in.  Were 
we to write his playbook, he would replace tit-for-tat 
attacks on his G/C counterpart with full engagement under the 
July 8 framework -- there, he might smoke out Papadopoulos's 
real intentions as the negotiations play out.  In all 
fairness, however, Talat faces pressures the G/C leader does 
not.  While we cannot say for sure what message last week's 
mainland delegations brought, it seems likely they gave a 
go-slow signal to the Turkish Cypriots; one of Talat,s close 
political allies confirmed to us that the "president" is 
 
NICOSIA 00000256  004 OF 004 
 
 
nervous about making any moves given the "delicate political" 
situation on the mainland.  As our Embassy Ankara colleagues 
have noted, the Turkish Cypriot leader increasingly appears a 
proxy in a broader battle between the AK Party and the TGS, 
one that's bound to escalate as Turkish elections near.  His 
room to maneuver, to avoid future Papadopoulos traps, thus 
seems scant. 
 
¶16.  (C) As we judge it, the best way to protect our multiple 
interests -- preserving Talat and his agenda, supporting the 
UN process, removing Cyprus as an irritant in international 
fora, and managing impediments to Turkey's EU accession 
process -- is for the USG actively to advocate a kick-off of 
the July 8 Process, which can provide a labor-intensive means 
of keeping the issues on the back burner during the looming 
electoral exercises in Turkey and Cyprus. 
SCHLICHER