VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1002/01 0681523
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091523Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8096
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0458
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0318
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6763

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: IAEA KACT KNNP MNUC PARM PREL IR RS START
SUBJECT: U/S JOSEPH-RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK MEETING ON 
STRATEGIC SECURITY DIALOGUE: PART II 
 
REF: A. STATE 003773 
     ¶B. 06 STATE 201804 
     ¶C. 06 STATE 165526 
     ¶D. STATE 007445 
     ¶E. 06 STATE 028324 
     ¶F. STATE 004837 
     ¶G. MOSCOW 01001 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
This is part two of a two-part cable, reporting on the 
January 29 meeting of the U.S.-Russia Strategic Security 
Dialogue chaired by U/S Joseph and Russian DFM Kislyak.  Part 
one is Ref G. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Australia Group / Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction 
Facility 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) DFM Kislyak asked whether U/S Joseph had anything 
new on the issue of the denial of Russia's membership in the 
Australia Group.  U/S Joseph said he did not. 
 
¶2. (SBU) DFM Kislyak used this occasion to complain that the 
U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was requiring 
that contracts supporting the construction of the Chemical 
Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye include a 
provision prohibiting the employment of Russian companies 
sanctioned under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 
Even though Russia did not plan to employ at Shchuch'ye any 
of the companies on the U.S. sanctions list, DTRA still 
intended to include this provision in Shchuch'ye contracts. 
Russia objected in principle, since it did not accept the 
validity of U.S. sanctions imposed on Russian companies. 
Accepting such provisions would imply that Russia accepted 
the validity of the sanctions.  DFM Kislyak asked U/S Joseph 
to work with Russia on the issue.  U/S Joseph said he was 
unaware of the issue, but would respond. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Highly Enriched Uranium Seizure in Georgia 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) DFM Kislyak complained that media reports in Georgia 
following the seizure of 100 grams of highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) there in 2006 had falsely alleged that Russia was the 
potential source of a flood of uncontrolled nuclear material. 
 Such statements were unacceptable.  A year prior to the 
reports Russia had provided the Government of Georgia a list 
of questions regarding the seizure, but Russia never received 
a response.  Russia had, in fact, dispatched a team of 
Russian specialists to the site in Georgia immediately 
following the seizure and had analyzed the samples.  This 
issue had become politicized and Russia was dissatisfied with 
its outcome.  He characterized the U.S. State Department's 
recent announcement as correct, but said leaks were being 
used for propaganda purposes. 
 
¶4. (C) U/S Joseph explained there was concern this was only 
the first portion of a much larger diversion of HEU.  The 
United States had worked bilaterally with Georgia on this 
issue, but the United States never intended to conduct this 
work without Russia's knowledge.  This was a case where good 
reporters had uncovered an exciting story.  Although the 
United States was sometimes concerned that Russia was 
withholding information, what was important was that the 
United States and Russia work together on nuclear forensics 
and under the Global Initiative.  U/S Joseph underscored that 
the transfer of this HEU across the Russian-Georgian border 
showed that there was a problem. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (SBU) U/S Joseph stated that the ISTC was an important 
tool which could play a significant role in the global war on 
terrorism.  He indicated that, due to U.S. budgetary 
pressures, the United States would like Russia to consider 
co-funding some of the ISTC's research projects and paying 
ISTC employee salaries as a partnership goal.  The United 
States thought this was ripe for a partnership with a focus 
on joint research in counterterrorism and nonproliferation. 
 
U/S Joseph suggested that DFM Kislyak's personal involvement 
would be helpful in ensuring such funding issues were 
addressed.  U/S Joseph provided a paper summarizing U.S. 
views on the ISTC. 
 
¶6. (SBU) DFM Kislyak agreed to have the Russia study the 
paper.  He believed that the ISTC produced good scientific 
work, but that the center's mission needed to be reviewed on 
a comprehensive basis.  The original mission had been to 
employ scientists, not to pursue specific initiatives.  The 
center's legal basis needed to be changed to enable joint 
projects under existing Russian taxation laws.  A strategic 
review of how best to use the center could easily be done. 
 
------------ 
Space Policy 
------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Space Talks in Paris.  MFA Arms Control and Security 
Department Director Antonov reported that A/S DeSutter 
(State/VCI) and he had a productive meeting on space 
activities in Paris on January 25.  During the meeting, 
General Buzhinskiy presented a briefing on Russia's space 
policy and A/S DeSutter provided the draft text of a Joint 
Presidential Statement on the free access to and use of space 
for peaceful purposes.  Antonov considered the draft joint 
statement a good idea, but said it would require some 
adjustments.  He questioned why the United States had not 
responded to Russia's October 19, 2005, non-paper titled "On 
the Development of a Russian-U.S. Dialogue on Military Space 
Activities" (Ref E), which included a proposal on CBMs and 
industry-to-industry cooperation.  He suggested that each 
side raise questions on the other's space policy briefing and 
that they continue the space dialogue during the second half 
of 2007. 
 
¶8. (SBU) U/S Joseph said the United States was pleased with 
the outcome of the space talks in Paris.  He noted there were 
countries that did not share U.S. and Russian views about the 
free access to and use of space.  He made clear that the U.S. 
dependence on the free use of space would continue to grow in 
support of the U.S. national security posture, and its 
foreign policy interests and economic security.  He believed 
the existing multilateral treaties relating to space were 
sufficient, in particular the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.  He 
suggested that the United States and Russia could explore 
principles of peaceful uses of outer space. 
 
¶9. (C) Chinese ASAT Test.  U/S Joseph called attention to the 
January 11 ASAT test conducted by China, underscoring that 
the United States found it most disturbing.  He noted that 
the space debris caused by the event posed a threat and 
represented a danger to manned space flight.  The United 
States warned China (Ref F) that an ASAT capability was 
inconsistent with China's public statements on the prevention 
of an arms race in outer space.  The United States asked 
China what its next steps would be, and hoped Russia would 
express similar concerns.  The United States did not see arms 
control as the solution to this situation, nor did it think 
that the situation would prompt an arms race in space. 
However, it should be a wake up call for the United States 
and Russia. 
 
¶10. (C) DFM Kislyak replied that Russia was not opposed to an 
arms control approach since it brought countries together. 
In view of the Chinese test, he recommended considering the 
draft agreement before the UN First Committee banning the 
weaponization of outer space.  U/S Joseph asked what lessons 
Russia drew from arms control.  He noted that, in the past, 
countries could not even agree on a definition of "weapons" 
as they related to space.  He believed that the United States 
and Russia were vulnerable in space and that treaties 
engendered complacency.  DFM Kislyak acknowledged that Russia 
had major resources in space.  He asked how the United States 
planned to protect its space assets.  He believed that a 
political instrument, such as a UN Security Council 
resolution, was the best means in the near term and was 
better than nothing. 
 
¶11. (C) U/S Joseph asked whether Russia had approached the 
Chinese with Russia's concerns regarding the ASAT test.  It 
appeared to the United States that Russia was unwilling to 
raise concerns about the test with China.  DFM Kislyak 
replied that Russia had tried.  It was told by China that the 
 
event was an experiment and that China would work with Russia 
on preventing an arms race in space.  Russia expected China 
would continue ASAT testing.  U/S Joseph said that China 
might be able to deploy an ASAT capability soon.  DFM Kislyak 
said Russia did not know.  However, there was a need to 
improve the defensive posture of our space assets. 
 
¶12. (S) DFM Kislyak asked whether the United States would 
respond in kind to the ASAT test.  U/S Joseph said he did not 
think so.  The United States did not have the capability, nor 
was it developing it.  DFM Kislyak said Russia was developing 
a satellite capability that "would be a weapon of choice." 
He also said Russia was concerned that the United States had 
already developed dedicated satellite interceptors.  If the 
United States put interceptors in space, it could place at 
risk huge numbers of Russia's military and technological 
capabilities, both ground- and space-based, even in 
peacetime.  U/S Joseph noted that Russia had many 
capabilities to disable or destroy satellites.  He recalled 
that Russia once expressed fear that the U.S. space shuttle 
was an ASAT capability, even though Russia had the same 
inherent capability for anti-satellite development.  U/S 
Joseph summarized that both the United States and Russia were 
in a situation where their space assets were at risk.  What 
had become clear to the United States was that there was a 
great deal of intent to stop the United States from using 
space to enhance its missile defense capabilities.  That was 
inconsistent with allowing space to be used for ballistic 
missiles to attack another country. 
 
¶13. (SBU) DFM Kislyak believed that the U.S. and Russian 
positions on the peaceful use of space were very close.  U/S 
Joseph said the United States concurred on the peaceful use 
of space.  DFM Kislyak urged that the United States consider 
Russia's October 19, 2005, non-paper.  U/S Joseph said the 
United States would, along with the proposed joint statement 
on the free access to and use of space for peaceful purposes. 
 
----- 
India 
----- 
 
¶14. (C) DFM Kislyak said there were a number of issues 
relating to the U.S.-India Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear 
Cooperation (Section 123 Agreement) that were unclear and 
required further work.  Despite Russia's encouragement, India 
was not working with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement. 
This was significant since many other countries were 
watching.  Russia was disturbed that India believed it would 
no longer have difficulties with the NSG now that it had an 
agreement with the United States.  Russia would have more 
discussions with India and Russia stood ready to help.  U/S 
Joseph said the United States made clear what the sequencing 
would be now that there was U.S. enabling legislation for 
civil nuclear cooperation with India.  An IAEA-approved 
safeguards agreement was required first, followed by a 
positive NSG decision, and then Congressional approval of the 
Section 123 Agreement.  DG ElBaradei did not think there 
would be a problem negotiating a safeguards agreement.  U/S 
Joseph hoped an Additional Protocol would also be negotiated. 
 He and DFM Kislyak agreed to work for a positive NSG outcome. 
 
¶15. (C) Nuclear Testing.  DFM Kislyak asked whether nuclear 
testing would be covered in the Section 123 Agreement.  A/S 
Rood replied that, while some in India considered this a make 
or break issue, Prime Minister Singh had stated that allowing 
for nuclear testing in the agreement was unnecessary. 
Secretary Rice had made clear the agreement would be off if 
 
SIPDIS 
India tested a nuclear device.  U/S Joseph said this had been 
made clear at every level.  He added that each NSG member 
would need to make its own decision on what the NSG 
implications of an Indian nuclear test would be.  The U.S. 
position on this issue was clear.  DFM Kislyak did not think 
India planned to initiate nuclear testing anytime soon. 
However, should the United States resume testing, he believed 
that India would be punished, in effect, if it were not 
allowed to test without losing NSG cooperation.  U/S Joseph 
disagreed, explaining that the United States and Russia were 
NWS under the NPT, while India was not. 
 
¶16. (C) Sale of Russian Reactors.  DFM Kislyak confirmed that 
Russia's sale of four reactors to India would be contingent 
upon the NSG revising its Guidelines.  He also confirmed that 
two of the four reactors were not grandfathered under the 
 
existing Guidelines.  U/S Joseph said he felt more justified, 
therefore, in moving forward on the U.S.-India Section 123 
Agreement. 
 
--------------------- 
Proliferation Finance 
--------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) DFM Kislyak informed U/S Joseph that, on January 10, 
President Putin had signed a counter-proliferation bill (No. 
281-FZZ) into law.  This provided legal authority to impose 
domestic financial measures and would guide the Russian 
government's proliferation finance efforts.  U/S Joseph asked 
whether regulations would be published and provided to 
Russian financial institutions to instruct them on what 
measures to take.  DFM Kislyak said a Presidential Decree 
would be issued with guidelines and regulations.  According 
to Mr. Antonov, the Decree could be combined with an 
amendable annex of specific proscribed entities that would be 
the targets of law enforcement action.  U/S Joseph urged that 
Russian financial institutions expeditiously implement this 
law and carefully scrutinize their financial transactions 
with the DPRK and Iran.  The purpose here was to disrupt 
illicit activities.  DFM Kislyak noted that Russia's measures 
would not necessarily match those of the United States. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Missile Technology Control Regime: Iskander-E Missile 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶18. (S) U/S Joseph reiterated that the United States sought 
assurances that the front end of the Iskander-E was 
permanently attached to the missile's motor.  He called again 
for technical discussions on the issue.  DFM Kislyak replied 
that the Iskander-E used a construction which precluded 
detachment of the nose section from the part of the missile 
containing the engine and guidance section.  He questioned 
why discussions were needed.  U/S Joseph asked whether the 
front section was bolted or welded.  He said the United 
States was not asking for proprietary information.  Mr. 
Antonov replied that the information that Russia had provided 
on this issue was the same as what the United States had 
provided in the case involving the transfer of Army Tactical 
Missile System (ATACMS) to Turkey in 1996.  PDAS Elliott 
asked whether detachment of the front section would require 
specialized tools that the Libyans would not have.  DFM 
Kislyak had no further information on how the front section 
was permanently attached, but he promised to follow up.  U/S 
Joseph said the biggest U.S. concern was to ensure that 
Russia did not transfer the missile to Iran or Syria.  DFM 
Kislyak declined to make such a commitment. 
 
¶19. (U) Meeting Participants. 
 
U.S.: 
 
U/S Robert Joseph, State/T 
A/S John Rood, State/ISN 
ASD(Acting) Joseph Benkert, OSD 
PDAS Stephen Elliott, State/VCI 
DASD Brian Green, OSD/Strategic Capabilities 
William Tobey, DOE/NNSA 
Jim Timbie, State/T 
Tim Katsapis, State/T 
David Dowley, NSC/Defense Policy and Strategy 
Richard Trout, IC/WINPAC 
Tim MacGregor, State/VCI 
Charles Miller, OSD 
Scott Roenicke, JCS/J-5 
 
Russia: 
 
DFM Sergey Kislyak, MFA 
Igor Neverov, MFA/Department of North America 
Anatoliy Antonov, MFA/DVBR 
Oleg Burmistrov, MFA/DVBR 
Oleg Rozhkov, MFA/DVBR 
Sergey Koshelev, MFA/DVBR 
Vladimir Venyevtsev, MFA/DVBR 
Andrey Belyakov, MFA/DVBR 
Andrey Belousov, MFA/Department of North America 
Vladimir Kuchinov, Rosatom 
Marina Belyayeva, Rosatom 
Gen-Lt. Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MOD 
 
 
¶20. (U) U/S Joseph has cleared this message. 
RUSSELL