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S E C R E T MOSCOW 001001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: IAEA KACT KNNP MNUC PARM PREL IR RS START
SUBJECT: U/S JOSEPH-RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK MEETING ON 
STRATEGIC SECURITY DIALOGUE: PART I 
 
REF: A. STATE 003773 
     ¶B. 06 STATE 201804 
     ¶C. 06 STATE 165526 
     ¶D. STATE 007445 
     ¶E. 06 STATE 028324 
     ¶F. STATE 004837 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
This is part one of a two-part cable. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  On January 29 in Moscow, Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security Robert 
Joseph and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak 
co-chaired a meeting on the Strategic Security Dialogue. 
They discussed a range of issues, including: 
 
     -- Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: The sides laid groundwork for developing a 
draft "common vision" and "attractive offer" for the Joint 
Initiative, and agreed to work on draft texts before they met 
in Ankara in mid-February. 
 
     -- Post-START Arrangement: U/S Joseph suggested that 
U.S. and Russian experts could meet. 
 
     -- Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: 
Discussions continued on developing a strong outreach program 
and on how best to expand the partnership after the February 
12-13 Global Initiative meeting in Ankara. 
 
     -- Trends and Directions in Defense Doctrine and 
Programs: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Green 
summarized steps the United States was willing to take to 
address Russia's concerns on U.S. conventional long-range 
ballistic missiles.  The U.S. side explained why a U.S. 
missile defense site in Europe posed no threat to Russia, and 
said discussions on this issue would continue in MFA and MoD 
channels.  The Russian MOD repeated a briefing on Russian 
military doctrine. 
 
     -- U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear 
Cooperation: U/S Joseph reiterated that conclusion of the 
agreement depended upon progress in working together on Iran. 
 
     -- Australia Group: There was no movement on the issue 
of the denial of Russia's membership in the Australia Group. 
 
     -- Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF): Russia 
objected in principle that Russian firms sanctioned by the 
United States under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act 
were prohibited from contracts for the Shchuch'ye CWDF 
project. 
 
     -- HEU Seizure in Georgia: DFM Kislyak complained that 
media reports mischaracterized Russia's response to the 2006 
diversion of highly enriched uranium from Russia to Georgia. 
 
     -- International Science and Technology Center (ISTC): 
U/S Joseph urged Russia to co-fund ISTC research projects and 
to pay ISTC employee salaries as a partnership goal. 
 
     -- Space Policy / China's Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Test: 
U/S Joseph said the United States had expressed concerns to 
China following its January 11 ASAT test.  He urged Russia to 
do the same.  DFM Kislyak again urged adoption of a UN 
agreement banning the weaponization of outer space. 
 
     -- India: The United States and Russia agreed to work 
for a positive outcome for India in the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG).  DFM Kislyak confirmed that Russia's sale of 
four reactors to India was contingent on the NSG revising its 
Guidelines. 
 
     -- Proliferation Finance: DFM Kislyak reported that 
President Putin signed a bill into law in January providing 
the legal authority to impose domestic financial measures and 
to guide the government's proliferation finance efforts.  U/S 
Joseph urged that the law be promptly implemented. 
 
     -- MTCR/Iskander-E Missile: U/S Joseph again sought 
assurances that the missile's front end was permanently 
attached to the missile's motor, and he again called for 
technical discussions.  DFM Kislyak had no new information, 
 
but promised to follow up.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Strategic Security Dialogue 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) DFM Kislyak opened the meeting by stating that 
U.S.-Russia strategic relations and the U.S.-Russia Strategic 
Security Dialogue were of paramount importance for 
U.S.-Russia relations.  U/S Joseph said the United States 
valued the dialogue and considered the agenda important.  Our 
bilateral efforts on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism showed that we could have a productive dialogue. 
The new Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear 
Nonproliferation was another example where the United States 
and Russia could play a leadership role in moving forward on 
issues of mutual importance.  He welcomed a frank and 
productive discussion -- both on issues of agreement and 
disagreement -- so we could find a way to move forward. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3. (C) DFM Kisylak expressed appreciation for the January 10, 
2007, paper on the Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear 
Nonproliferation that U/S Joseph had provided (Ref A).  He 
believed the U.S. and Russian visions for the Joint 
Initiative were similar.  The "attractive offer" needed to be 
further developed.  General concepts now needed to be 
interpreted into specific, viable measures.  Russia 
understood the main purpose of the Initiative was to address 
practical concerns of countries interested in developing 
nuclear energy.  A regional approach could be considered for 
the Middle East.  He noted that a report on the Initiative 
was due to President Putin in approximately one month, and 
outlined the preliminary Russian assessments and coordination 
that needed to precede the report. 
 
¶4. (C) U/S Joseph urged that, from the outset, the Joint 
Initiative have a global flavor to avoid the appearance of 
being a Western institution.  DFM Kislyak concurred.  U/S 
Joseph also urged that the Initiative support the expansion 
of nuclear energy in both industrialized and 
"industrializing" countries in a way that was 
proliferation-resistant.  Like Russia, the United States was 
considering a regional approach.  A timeline was needed.  To 
build momentum, it was important to identify the "low-hanging 
fruit," i.e., those suppliers and beneficiaries most likely 
to participate in the near term.  France, Japan, and some 
others could be considered prospective suppliers, and Eastern 
European states considered possible beneficiaries.  Next 
steps will involve the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and 
Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom).  It was 
important to engage states to assess their nuclear intentions 
(e.g., Egypt, Gulf states).  U/S Joseph emphasized that 
Presidents Bush and Putin had pledged to make the Initiative 
a priority and he reiterated the need to move forward on it 
expeditiously. 
 
¶5. (S) DFM Kislyak asked U/S Joseph for a U.S. assessment of 
nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and China, and 
Jordanian-Pakistani links, and expressed concern that 
Pakistan could market nuclear technology, including to 
Jordan.  U/S Joseph said he would look into it. 
 
¶6. (C) Assistant Secretary of State Rood and Mr. Rozhkov 
summarized the results of their January 26 Joint Initiative 
meeting.  The two sides had: 
 
      -- agreed that the Initiative's purpose should be to 
deter states from pursuing reprocessing and enrichment 
capabilities and, in return, to receive benefits; 
 
      -- proposed ideas to develop the "common vision" and 
"attractive offer;" 
 
      -- agreed on potential criteria for supplier states and 
beneficiary countries; 
 
      -- recognized that Argentina and Brazil would be 
special situations, as they would be both suppliers and 
beneficiaries; 
 
      -- agreed that India, Pakistan, and Israel should not 
be discussed until a later stage in the Initiative's 
development; 
 
      -- noted that North Korea and Iran were special cases 
that need to be addressed at higher levels; and 
 
      -- agreed that the next steps would be to approach some 
countries with these ideas. 
 
¶7. (C) A/S Rood and Mr. Rozhkov held a side meeting on 
January 29 to continue discussions on the Joint Initiative. 
After their meeting, they reported that they had: 
 
      -- agreed that the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism provided a good model for the Joint Initiative to 
Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation; 
 
      -- agreed that beneficiary states under the Joint 
Initiative should enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy 
without concerns over the return of nuclear waste; 
 
      -- agreed that the attractive offer should address 
financing and that the World Bank should be urged to agree to 
provide financial aid to promote nuclear energy; and 
 
      -- committed to provide draft documents based on the 
Global Initiative model by February 7 in preparation for the 
February 12-13 meeting in Ankara. 
 
¶8. (C) Securing a Commitment from Beneficiaries.  U/S Joseph 
emphasized that the Joint Initiative's key nonproliferation 
benefit would be the commitment we received from countries 
not to pursue the nuclear fuel cycle.  We must ensure the 
Initiative does not become an incentive for countries to 
pursue the fuel cycle, and we should not provide them nuclear 
energy capabilities without receiving such a commitment.  DFM 
Kislyak advised using constructive and respectful language 
when dealing with prospective beneficiaries.  He suggested 
pointing out that we are offering a technically reliable, 
economically attractive, and politically predictaZH*LPUsavQried the fuel cycle 
would only 
politicize the Initiative and discourage participation.  U/S 
Joseph also stressed that we needed to avoid discussions of 
countries' rights under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).  Perhaps commercial contracts and 
government-to-government agreements could be used to obtain 
their commitment.  In all cases, securing a commitment was 
key to moving forward. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Reactor Capacities.  Rosatom's Kuchinov noted that, 
given the diversity of countries in the world, small (100 MW) 
and medium (300 MW) size reactors would be needed under the 
Joint Initiative.  The reactor size needed by each 
beneficiary would depend upon the size and condition of that 
country's power grids.  He pointed out that Russia had begun 
construction of a 70 MW reactor to supply electricity and 
heat to a remote area in northern Russia.  Russia had also 
completed a Memorandum of Cooperation with Kazakhstan to 
develop and provide 300 MW submarine-type reactors.  DFM 
Kislyak asked what type of arrangement should be used to 
develop reactors for use by other countries, e.g., 
consortium, joint research, etc. 
 
¶10. (SBU) U/S Joseph explained that the United States was 
approaching this issue in a comprehensive manner through the 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).  Further work will 
be required on disposition of spent fuel.  We also need to 
look at proliferation vulnerabilities; fuel assurances; 
working with other countries to get them involved in 
scientific and technical ways; fuel leasing; and use of small 
reactors.  Much was in the formulation stages and the United 
States expected to have available a number of alternatives. 
 
¶11. (C) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Funding. 
DFM Kislyak drew attention to forecasts predicting a 60% 
expansion in the global use of nuclear energy in the next 20 
years.  He believed, therefore, that the proliferation of 
nuclear technologies would need to be addressed.  He warned 
that the IAEA safeguards inspection regime and technical 
cooperation program could not be sustained within the current 
system of voluntary contributions.  We urged development of a 
political and technological strategy.  U/S Joseph agreed and 
 
suggested working this issue bilaterally before involving 
other countries.  Based on his recent discussions in Japan, 
he believed Japan might be willing to support.  G8 financial 
support might also be considered.  These functions needed to 
be funded. 
 
---------------------- 
Post-START Arrangement 
---------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) NPT Article VI Reductions.  DFM Kislyak said Russia 
considered it very important to assure critics that the 
United States and Russia were continuing NPT Article VI 
reductions.  A straight-forward approach -- more than just 
"joint propaganda" -- would be needed.  U/S Joseph reminded 
DFM Kislyak that the Moscow Treaty contains a commitment to 
reductions.  U.S. emphasis was on the tremendous disarmament 
record to date, a record not recognized by many other 
countries.  That was not propaganda.  There needed to be an 
appreciation of the value of nuclear weapons in 
nonproliferation efforts.  DFM Kislyak said they each had 
delivered this message during the 2005 NPT Review Conference. 
 Other countries acknowledged the message, but have continued 
to argue that the NPT nuclear weapons states (NWS) were not 
committed to their Article VI obligations.  He acknowledged 
this was sometimes a cover-up for countries like Iran.  The 
United States and Russia needed to continue their reductions. 
 U/S Joseph replied that 
the United States would deploy the nuclear weapons necessary 
to meet its security requirements, and would not be driven by 
the old arms control theology -- a theology for the 
Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
¶13. (C) Codifying Reductions.  U/S Joseph noted that U.S. 
strategic force levels were decreasing, not because of an 
arms control treaty, but because U.S. requirements had 
changed.  DFM Kislyak asked why the United States had been 
willing to codify reductions under the Moscow Treaty.  U/S 
Joseph said it was because Russia had declared its intent to 
pursue reductions to the same levels that the United States 
had already declared it would pursue.  He noted that 
codifying again the START limits of 1600 (delivery vehicles) 
and 6000 (attributed warheads) would legitimize levels higher 
than the levels actually deployed today by each side.  Why 
would we want to legitimize higher levels?  DFM Kislyak asked 
whether the United States and Russia could spell out their 
post-START intentions in a manner that showed they were not 
going to recreate the arms races of the past starting in 
¶2009.  U/S Joseph commended DFM Kislyak's formulation -- "not 
to recreate the arms races of the past" -- and believed it 
was useful for Russia to make that statement. 
 
¶14. (C) U.S. Response to Russian Aide-Memoire.  U/S Joseph 
articulated the following responses to issues raised in 
Russia's December 8, 2006, aid-memoire (Ref B): 
 
      -- On retaining START limits: Today U.S. and Russian 
force levels were much below the START limits and the limits 
bore no relationship to the actual strategic forces on either 
side.  The security situation had changed significantly and 
both sides had adjusted their force postures.  The United 
States considered the Moscow Treaty limits as sufficient. 
 
      -- On continuing the START provisions not to base 
strategic offensive arms outside national territory: The 
issue concerns the stationing or long-term movements of U.S. 
heavy bombers outside national territory.  The United States 
had shown those movements were unrelated to Russia and it 
would not be useful to continue notifying them. 
 
      -- On not locating deployed SOA outside facilities 
agreed by the Parties: The United States was not sure what 
Russian problem this would address. 
 
      -- On retaining the START conceptual framework: The 
United States did not understand what Russia meant by its 
proposal to retain, for the most part, the START conceptual 
framework.  What was Russia trying to address? 
 
¶15. (C) General Buzhinskiy responded that Russia could not 
accept the U.S.-proposed CBM approach.  It was unclear what 
the United States intended by its proposal.  For example, 
what data would be exchanged and how often?  Would data be 
exchanged if there had been no change in the data?  Would the 
 
data be disaggregated by location or type of item?  U/S 
Joseph explained that Russia's approach hypothesized about a 
problem that did not exist.  That was not productive.  It 
would be helpful to know what problems that Russia was trying 
to address.  The United States and Russia should focus their 
resources on the issues of today that would have a 
fundamental difference, e.g., the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism, nuclear energy, and nonproliferation.  DFM 
Kislyak said Russia believed CBMs could be useful if they 
were self-constraining measures.  Stand-alone CBMs would not 
be enough. 
 
¶16. (C) Proposed Meeting of Experts.  U/S Joseph suggested 
that U.S. and Russian experts meet to discuss the 
U.S.-proposed CBMs and to find a mutually agreeable way 
forward.  He believed that an expert-level discussion could 
be useful, but not if it involved a discussion of constraints 
on strategic offensive arms.  He made clear that, if the 
experts met, they would not conduct an article-by-article 
review of the START Treaty.  DFM Kislyak agreed, suggesting 
instead that the purpose of the meeting should be to identify 
elements of an arrangement that could be worked out.  The 
experts could take elements from the U.S. and Russian papers 
and develop a third paper.  U/S Joseph agreed to give this 
approach a try, with the experts meeting in the context of 
pursuing a framework.  The focus would be on a set of CBMs 
and measures considered useful in the context of the new 
relationship.  DFM Kislyak explained that Russia was looking 
for predictability and confidence-building.  The question of 
how to put the arrangement on paper would be another issue. 
U/S Joseph made clear that the United States was willing to 
pursue a framework for confidence-building and 
predictability, but did not want to bring back an arms 
control approach. 
 
¶17. (C) U/S Joseph and DFM Kislyak agreed that the meeting of 
experts would not be considered negotiations, and it would 
not be held in Geneva, Helsinki, or Vienna.  DFM Kislyak 
declined to indicate who would lead Russia's team, but said 
Russia would inform the United States within a few weeks. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) U/S Joseph said he was impressed with all elements in 
the draft work program, and that so many countries were 
pursuing initiatives to support the Global Initiative's 
principles.  He urged developing a strong outreach program 
and making arrangements for other states to join the 
Initiative after the Initiative meeting in Ankara on February 
12-13, 2007. 
 
¶19. (C) DFM Kislyak suggested agreeing on an approach for 
attracting new partners (e.g., globally or region-by-region; 
consider NPT membership or not).  He asked how the Initiative 
should handle Pakistan given that the Taliban posed a 
proliferation threat.  He believed that a decision should be 
made at Ankara to invite Pakistan to join, and that Ukraine, 
South Africa, and Brazil were major countries which needed to 
be involved.  He also asked to consult with the United States 
on how to deal with Israel.  U/S Joseph understood that at 
Ankara the partners would discuss expanding the Initiative's 
partnership and that a number of other countries would 
endorse the Statement of Principles.  He believed there was a 
practical need to define a set of criteria for accepting new 
partners (e.g., a candidate's nonproliferation record, 
contribution to global representation, and potential for 
making substantive contributions).  He also believed it would 
be difficult to say that certain countries could not 
participate even 
though they had endorsed the Statement of Principles.  DFM 
Kislyak concurred that the partners needed to agree. 
 
¶20. (SBU) U/S Joseph and DFM Kislyak agreed to hold bilateral 
discussions on the day prior to the start of the multilateral 
meetings in Ankara in order to coordinate positions on Global 
Initiative issues.  In addition, DFM Kislyak confirmed that 
Kazakhstan had agreed to host the third meeting of the 
Initiative.  U/S Joseph suggested informing the other 
partners. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
Trends and Directions in U.S. and Russian Defense Doctrine 
 
and Programs 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Russia's Military Doctrine.  General Buzhinskiy 
provided copies of an eight-page briefing on "Directions and 
Trends of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." 
He confirmed that it was the same briefing presented at the 
September 15, 2006, meeting of the strategic security 
dialogue (Ref C).  He remarked that the current doctrine was 
adopted in 2000, and was designed to be adaptable to cover 
all developments. 
 
¶22. (C) Noting that Russia was concerned about NATO's 
November 2006 Riga Communique listing energy security as an 
issue, General Buzhinskiy said Russian military doctrine (and 
the briefing) now took into account depletion of energy 
resources and emergence of various inter-state conflicts. 
Russia preferred to resolve all issues by non-military means, 
but reserved the right to protect its military and economic 
interests.  This was nothing new. 
 
¶23. (C) Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.  U/S Joseph recalled 
that during their September 2006 meeting, they had discussed 
Russia's increased reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons 
(NSNW).  He asked whether there had been a change since then. 
 General Buzhinskiy said Russia had never declared a greater 
reliance on NSNW.  Such weapons were merely part of Russia's 
defense potential.  The actual number of such weapons had 
been reduced.  Only the percentage of these weapons relative 
to Russia's conventional weapons had increased.  U/S Joseph 
noted that the U.S. NSNW inventory had been reduced by 
95-100%, while Russia's NSNW inventory had not.  Thus, the 
focus was now on Russia's NSNW.  He asked whether that should 
change.  General Buzhinskiy replied that the U.S. and Russian 
geographic situations were much different.  MFA Director of 
Security and Disarmament Affairs Antonov offered that Russia 
provided figures on its NSNW in a report to the United 
Nations in April 2005. 
 
¶24. (C) Nuclear Stockpiles.  U/S Joseph said the Reliable 
Replacement Warhead (RRW) discussion would continue to play 
out.  He noted that the RRW would be a new design, but it 
would not provide new capability.  He further noted that the 
U.S. and Russian approaches to maintaining their nuclear 
stockpiles were different.  Whereas the United States 
considered the Stockpile Stewardship Program to be the most 
efficient way to lengthen the life of its stockpile, Russia 
continued to produce new nuclear weapons.  General Buzhinskiy 
acknowledged that this was a difficult issue to address, but 
that the pattern which U/S Joseph suggested still existed in 
Russia.  There were a number of nuclear weapons depots and 
storage sites and it was a costly program to maintain.  He 
could not comment further, because he was not in charge of 
those matters. 
 
¶25. (C) Conventionally Equipped Long-Range Ballistic 
Missiles.  U/S Joseph offered in the spirit of transparency 
and confidence-building to address Russia's concerns 
regarding conventionally equipped long-range ballistic 
missiles.  Responding to Russia's concerns that it would 
misinterpret a conventional launch as nuclear, DASD Green 
said there was no indication that Russian forces had 
overreacted in past practice or that Russian doctrine would 
cause them to do so.  DASD Green summarized the following 
steps that the United States was willing to take to address 
Russia's concerns on this issue: 
 
     -- operate long-range ballistic missiles only at the 
direction of the President; 
 
     -- use command and control procedures with the same 
surety and positive control as those that are used for 
nuclear weapons to prevent any unauthorized launch; 
 
     -- keep the systems and procedures separate from those 
used for nuclear weapons; 
 
     -- commit not to fly over Russian territory with a 
conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile; 
 
     -- engage Russia in other confidence-building measures, 
including participation in exercises and wargames; 
 
     -- continue to consult on this issue with the Russian 
 
MoD, and in other U.S.-Russia channels; 
 
     -- use a number of existing communication channels, 
e.g., MOLINK pre-positioned messages. 
 
¶26. (C) DFM Kislyak asked when the United States would 
provide notification in the case of the launch of a 
conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile.  DASD 
Green said this was still an open question, but that 
operational security issues would need to be considered.  DFM 
Kislyak reiterated that Russia was very concerned how it 
would differentiate a conventional missile from a nuclear 
missile given that the reaction time available to 
decision-makers would be very limited.  Acting Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Benkert added that conventionally armed 
 
SIPDIS 
long-range ballistic missiles would be discussed during the 
following week's meeting between Secretary of Defense Gates 
and Defense Minister Ivanov, and that the United States 
expected to provide a paper on the issue then.  U/S Joseph 
said this was an important capability and discussions would 
continue on it in this and DoD-MoD channels. 
 
--------------- 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
¶27. (C) DFM Kislyak expressed Russian concerns regarding a 
U.S. missile defense site in Europe.  Russia did not believe 
this capability would be designed solely to counter an 
Iranian missile threat.  It would constitute a 
reconfiguration in U.S. strategic presence that included a 
deployment of U.S. strategic forces in Europe and, for the 
first time, beyond the original NATO borders.  Russia did not 
take this lightly and would need to do a full assessment. 
Russia believed this system would be the first step in a 
larger effort and could cause complications for the strategic 
situation.  The silos would be close to Russian borders. 
Moreover, the silos, which were very similar to Minuteman II 
ICBM silos, could be used to deploy strategic missiles.  The 
United States was creating a system in which Russia would not 
participate and that would not be friendly to Russia. 
 
¶28. (C) General Buzhinskiy added that Russia had not been 
convinced by the briefings that the United States had 
provided on this issue.  He noted that the intermediate-range 
ballistic missile threat had not materialized by 2005 as the 
United States had predicted when it withdrew from the 1972 
ABM Treaty.  He also noted that locating a "mobile" U.S. 
radar with ground detection capability in the Caspian region 
would provide the United States the ability to observe 
Russian strategic forces' means of delivery. 
 
¶29. (C) U/S Joseph pointed out that the United States had 
repeatedly addressed Russian concerns regarding U.S. missile 
defense plans, and it would continue to do so.  Last week 
Russia was notified that President Bush made a decision to 
move forward on discussions toward the goal of deploying 
missile defense interceptors in Poland and a mid-course radar 
in the Czech Republic (Ref D).  Russia was also informed that 
this was not a decision to move forward on deployment. 
Senior DoD officials had briefed Russian Defense Minister 
Ivanov on these plans in November 2005, and the United States 
had also used NATO meetings to provide transparency on the 
issue.  U/S Joseph urged that the United States and Russia 
continue to work together so Russia had the information it 
needed to have confidence for its assessment.  The United 
States had worked hard to ensure this deployment was not 
misperceived as a threat to Russia.  We should continue this 
discussion in MFA and MoD channels. 
 
¶30. (C) ASD (Acting) Benkert added that senior DoD officials 
had explained to Minister Ivanov in November why the physics 
and geography were such that the interceptors and radar in 
Europe would not pose a threat to Russia.  The number of 
interceptors would be too small and the radar would not be 
well-positioned to counter Russian strategic missiles. 
Secretary Gates intended to discuss this issue further with 
 
SIPDIS 
Minister Ivanov.  The United States recognized that the 
November discussions may not have fully convinced the 
Russians, and it was willing to continue the dialogue to 
address Russian concerns, including at expert levels. 
Responding to statements by Russian officials that Iran did 
not pose a strategic threat, DASD Green added that the United 
States had recognized it would take a long time to deploy a 
 
missile defense system against such a new missile threat. 
 
¶31. (C) European/NATO Missile Defense.  DFM Kislyak continued 
to link U.S. missile defense plans with any European/NATO 
missile defense plan.  He asked how a NATO-Russia missile 
defense plan might be integrated into a U.S. or NATO 
architecture.  DASD Green responded that the NATO-Russia 
theater missile defense plan would focus on shorter range 
threats, while the U.S. missile defense would focus on longer 
range threats.  ASD(Acting) Benkert said NATO had completed 
only a feasibility study on the question of missile defense 
for NATO.  He believed there was a need to add the NATO 
question to future U.S.-Russia missile defense discussions. 
 
¶32. (C) Patriot Missiles.  DFM Kislyak asked whether the 
United States would deploy Patriot missiles to protect the 
missile defense silos in Poland.  DASD Green replied that 
there would be no technical reason to deploy Patriots for 
missile defense purposes.  Poland had expressed interest in 
broader strategic relations with the United States, and this 
would be discussed by the two countries. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
U.S.-Russia Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶33.  (C) U/S Joseph acknowledged the progress made toward 
finalizing the draft U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful 
Nuclear Cooperation ("Section 123 Agreement").  He noted that 
issues including technology sharing and reprocessing had yet 
to be resolved.  The United States would soon provide Russia 
proposed language relating to those issues.  U/S Joseph 
reminded DFM Kislyak that completion of the agreement 
depended upon progress in working together on Iran.  DFM 
Kislyak challenged that President Bush had assured President 
Putin there would be no objection to completing the 
agreement.  U/S Joseph cautioned that the agreement, once 
signed, would need to set before Congress and that Congress 
would weigh the agreement based on Russia's nonproliferation 
record with regard to Iran.  He had been very clear about 
this from the outset. 
 
¶34. (U) U/S Joseph has cleared this message. 
RUSSELL