VZCZCXRO9196
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0257/01 0781459
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191459Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6575
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS MASS BA OFFICIALS BILAT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, 
ADMIRAL FALLON'S MARCH 22-23 AND 27-28 VISITS TO BAHRAIN 
 
REF: STATE 33984 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1.  (C) Admiral Fallon, we warmly welcome your March 22-23 
and 27-28 visits to Bahrain.  The fifty-year U.S. Navy 
presence in Bahrain is the centerpiece of the U.S.-Bahrain 
bilateral relationship.  Bahrain considers the Navy to be its 
defense against external threats, starting with Iran, and has 
recently taken important steps to enhance bilateral relations 
further.  Bahrain generally supports our Iraq policy but 
believes we should withdraw from major population centers, 
leaving only a rapid-reaction force in country.  The GOB is 
mistrustful of the Iraqi government and wants to see PM 
Maliki make greater movement toward reconciliation with 
Iraq's Sunnis and a willingness to work more closely with its 
Arab neighbors.  Bahrain is an enthusiastic participant in 
the interagency Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) initiative.  At 
the last meeting, on March 8 in Washington, Crown Prince 
Salman pushed hard to get Patriot missiles for Bahrain.  The 
CP met with the Vice President, Secretary Gates, Deputy 
Secretary England, and others during his visit. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
---------- 
Objectives 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (C) What we want from the visit: 
 
-- Continued cooperation on regional maritime operations, 
including in Coalition Task Forces (CTF) 150 and 152 in and 
around the Gulf. 
 
-- Close coordination on Iran policy. 
 
-- Support for U.S. policy in Iraq and a commitment for 
pro-active Bahraini engagement with Iraq's leadership, at a 
minimum at the upcoming Arab League Summit and Iraq Neighbors 
Ministerial meeting. 
 
----------------------------- 
Issues of Interest to Bahrain 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Bahrainis will want to hear from you on: 
 
-- A reaffirmation of the Navy's long-term commitment to 
Bahrain and U.S. interest in protecting Bahrain. 
 
-- Recognition of Bahrain's public and private steps to align 
with and support the United States, including recent 
senior-level visits to Washington, participating in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, joining the Coalition Task 
Forces and deploying a special forces contingent to 
Afghanistan. 
 
-- Your thoughts on the way forward in Iraq, with particular 
emphasis on the Iraqi government's responsibilities and ways 
the GCC can engage and assist. 
 
-- Strategies to contain Iran while avoiding a military 
confrontation. 
 
------------------- 
Key Issues to Raise 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) We suggest you raise the following points: 
 
-- Recognize the long history of mil-mil cooperation with 
Bahrain, most notably through hosting NAVCENT.  Reaffirm the 
commitment of the U.S. Navy in Bahrain. 
 
-- Appreciate the positive steps the government has taken on 
counter-terrorism since the departure of Navy dependents in 
2004 and caution on the need to remain vigilant. 
 
-- Praise Bahrain's support for OEF, OIF, and U.S. policy on 
Iraq and Iran.  Commend Bahrain for sending its Special 
Forces contingent to Afghanistan in support of OEF, hosting 
and participating in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
exercise Leading Edge in October 2006, and formally joining 
the regional coalition naval task forces. 
 
-- Solicit views on the way forward on Iran and Iraq. 
 
-- Pledge to continue the close coordination between our two 
countries on Iran. 
 
 
MANAMA 00000257  002 OF 004 
 
 
------------------------ 
Issues Background Briefs 
------------------------ 
 
------------------ 
Military Relations 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The U.S. Navy has worked closely with Bahrain for 
more than 50 years. When the U.S. Fifth Fleet was 
re-commissioned in 1995, Bahrain took the then-controversial 
step of being the first Gulf state to provide host government 
support for regionally "home-ported" U.S. Navy forces. 
Bahrain remains the only country in the region that hosts a 
permanent component command headquarters. 
 
¶6.  (C) Bahrain's relatively stable and secure political 
environment allows deployed U.S. Navy ships to stop, 
replenish supplies, and provide crews much needed onshore 
rest and recreation opportunities.  Bahrain is currently one 
of the U.S. Navy's busiest overseas ports. In direct support 
of OEF and OIF, Bahrain in 2003 deployed 1,500 troops, a tank 
battalion task force, and its frigate the RNBS Sabha to 
defend Kuwait.  Bahrain also flew combat air patrols over 
Kuwait and Bahrain and continues to keep F-16s on 24-7 strip 
alert.  A special operations unit embedded in a UAE 
contingent deployed to Afghanistan in 2005.  Bahrain assigned 
three shore-based naval officers to work in the command post 
for maritime task force CTF-150, which covers the Strait of 
Hormuz to the Sea of Aden.  For CTF-152, which covers central 
Gulf waters, Bahrain has provided one frigate and two 
corvettes.  Bahrain was the first GCC country to participate 
in the CTFs. 
 
¶7.  (C) With limited petroleum resources, Bahrain faces 
greater budget constraints than its large Gulf neighbors and 
does not have the financial ability to fund military 
equipment sustainment and upgrades needed to maintain 
interoperability with the U.S. and to purchase equipment to 
defend the country.  We have had active FMF and IMET programs 
in Bahrain for several years but the FMF program in 
particular has declined precipitously in recent years, from 
$90 million in 2003, to a budgeted $15 million for FY 2007, 
to a projected $4 million for FY 2008.  We are working 
closely with the Bahrainis on the CENTCOM Bilateral Air 
Defense Initiative and an upgrade for their early warning and 
air defense radar systems, a program that has been promoted 
in the Gulf Security Dialogue.  Future programs include the 
sale of nine Blackhawk helicopters to the Bahraini Air Force 
($200 million) and six Bell helicopters to the Ministry of 
Interior (approximately $70 million).  A proposal to provide 
two MK-V Fast Patrol Boats to the Bahraini Navy through 
counter-terrorism (1206) funding is awaiting signature by the 
Secretaries of State and Defense.  Six Boston Whalers that 
 
SIPDIS 
were originally programmed for Thailand will be diverted to 
Bahrain.  This transfer has been approved by the Departments 
of State and Defense and is pending congressional approval. 
 
---------------------- 
Gulf Security Dialogue 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Crown Prince Salman led the Bahraini delegation to a 
March 8 session of the interagency Gulf Security Dialogue in 
Washington (reftel).  Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte 
opened the meeting and Acting Assistant Secretary of State 
for Political Military Affairs Mull and Acting Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Long 
 
SIPDIS 
headed the U.S. delegation.  The two sides discussed Iran, 
Defense Cooperation, Counter-Terrorism, 
Counter-Proliferation, and Iraq.  During the meeting, the 
Crown Prince said that air defense is the major hole in 
Bahrain's defenses and he requested USG consideration for 
providing Patriot missiles.  Acting A/S Long explained that 
the USG supply of Patriots does not meet current demand, but 
she undertook to explore creative solutions. 
 
------------------ 
Next Steps on Iraq 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) The GOB publicly supports U.S. operations in Iraq, 
but as King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman have said several 
times, it believes Iraqi forces should be moving to the front 
lines in place of coalition forces.  This would force Iraqis 
to take responsibility for their own security and put the GOI 
into the position of requesting assistance from its Arab 
neighbors, which the Bahrainis feel it has not yet done in a 
meaningful way.  The Crown Prince suggested that PM Maliki 
visit the GCC countries to establish better ties.  Bahrain is 
 
MANAMA 00000257  003 OF 004 
 
 
mistrustful of the Iraqi government and it would like to see 
Maliki make greater moves to reconcile with Iraq's Sunnis. 
Bahrain participated in the recent sub-ministerial Iraq 
Neighbors meeting in Baghdad and will participate in the 
upcoming Iraq Neighbors Ministerial.  The GOB's greatest 
concerns related to Iraq are excessive Iranian influence over 
the government of Iraq, and that sectarian violence could 
spill over into Bahrain, which has a Shia-majority population 
ruled by a Sunni-controlled government.  GOB officials will 
support long-term measures to reduce sectarian violence while 
recognizing that the near-term situation in Iraq is extremely 
difficult. 
 
----------------- 
Dealing With Iran 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The Bahraini leadership is greatly concerned about 
the threat posed by Iran and increased tensions between Iran 
and the international community.  Crown Prince Salman has 
suggested several times that the U.S. and GCC countries hold 
a significant military exercise in the Gulf, which would send 
a strong signal to Iran.  Bahrain hosted and participated in 
PSI exercise Leading Edge in October, and the 
boarding/interrogation portion took place just outside its 
territorial waters.  NAVCENT personnel were impressed with 
the Bahraini Navy's professionalism and aggressiveness during 
the exercise. 
 
¶11.  (C) The Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion 
of Iranian intentions regarding Bahrain and often sees an 
Iranian hand in incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, 
which comprises some two-thirds of the country's citizens. 
They are convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and 
assert its influence around the region.  Bahrain supports UN 
Security Council resolutions applying sanctions on Iran.  At 
the GSD meeting, the CP suggested launching multiparty 
negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, modeled on the 
Six Party Talks with North Korea.  He thought it would be 
useful for a regional power, such as Saudi Arabia, to join 
the major world powers in negotiating with Iran. 
 
¶12.  (C) At the same time, Bahrain faces the reality that it 
must live with its large neighbor across the Gulf.  Bahrain 
maintains "correct" but not warm diplomatic relations with 
Iran, with Bahraini leaders meeting with Iranian officials 
when they visit and occasional Bahraini visits to Tehran. 
Bahraini officials repeatedly assert their strong view that 
the international community should engage in diplomacy to 
deal with Iran, and not resort to a military solution.  They 
recognize, however, that a robust military posture can 
facilitate diplomacy. 
 
-------------------------- 
Return of U.S. Dependents 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Bahraini officials often reiterate their request 
that the U.S. Navy permit dependents to return to Bahrain. 
Crown Prince Salman, who is a graduate of the DOD Bahrain 
School and whose children now attend the school, is a 
particularly strong advocate for the everyday, 
people-to-people contact that is fostered by the presence of 
dependents.  Bahraini officials may urge your support in 
reconsidering the Navy's 2004 decision removing dependents 
from Bahrain. 
 
--------- 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Bahrain in November/December 2006 conducted its 
second set of parliamentary and municipal elections since the 
adoption of the 2002 constitution.  Some 70 percent of 
registered voters and all political societies participated in 
the elections, with oppositionists winning 18 of 40 seats in 
the elected lower house Council of Representatives. 
Thirty-two seats are held by Islamists (Sunni and Shia) and 
membership is marked by a stark Sunni-Shia divide.  One 
woman, Lateefa Al Qaoud, ran unopposed and is Bahrain's first 
female elected member of parliament.  Local election monitors 
reported that although there were allegations of the 
government rigging election outcomes, they uncovered no 
tangible evidence of such activity.  However, they said that 
Bahrain's electoral constituencies were not drawn in 
accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote," 
resulting in a parliamentary majority of 23 Sunnis 
representing a group estimated to comprise one-third of the 
population.  The elections are, however, seen as a major step 
forward in the King's democratic reform program. 
 
MANAMA 00000257  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
********************************************* ******** 
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
********************************************* ******** 
MONROE