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FM AMEMBASSY LOME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7812
INFO RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 2088
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 3917
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 8854
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0529
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LOME 000176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDED PARA MARKINGS) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR TO
SUBJECT: UFC LEADERSHIP IN CAMPAIGN MODE, UNLIKELY TO ENTER 
UNITY GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: 06 LOME 1277 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Dunn, Reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. The Union of Forces for Change (UFC), arguably 
the largest opposition party in Togo, has ruled out 
participating in the national unity government formed last 
September. The unity government's primary mandate is to 
prepare for free and fair legislative elections in 2007. 
Although the UFC has declined to join government, it will 
continue to have a role in other transitional institutions, 
notably the national electoral commission (CENI) and the 
follow-up committee to the National Dialogue. Party leaders 
prefer this half-in, half-out status for reasons of 
principle, practicality, and political expediency, but it is 
not without risks for Togo and the UFC itself. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Conversations with UFC party leaders have revealed that 
the party will not join the unity government formed in the 
wake of last year's National Dialogue and is aligning its 
campaign strategy for upcoming legislative elections 
accordingly. In an unguarded moment, Eric Amerding, the 
brother-in-law, confidant, and close adviser ("the only 
person who can tell Gilchrist what he doesn't want to hear") 
of party president Gilchrist Olympio told Ambassador in 
mid-January that, "From the beginning, we did not want to 
join government." 
 
¶3. (C) Olympio, too, has told us that he sees a tactical 
advantage in remaining outside government (ref). Indeed, in 
an interview published in the February 5 edition of the 
opposition biweekly "Forum de la Semaine," he declared that 
the opposition was more effective on the outside, where it 
could freely criticize the government's policies. He 
distanced himself in the interview from the other two 
"radical" opposition parties (and erstwhile UFC running 
mates), the CAR, headed by PM Yawovi Agboyibo, and the CDPA, 
headed by Leopold Gnininvi, both of whom have joined the 
national union government. Should one or both decide to leave 
government, Olympio added, they would be welcomed with open 
arms by the UFC. 
 
¶4. (C) Olympio's initial, angry reaction to the appointment by 
President Faure of Agboyibo as prime minister last September 
-- when Olympio told a French journalist that the UFC would 
not accept a seat in a cabinet led by anyone other than a UFC 
prime minister -- prompted a series of contacts and 
negotiations between the Togolese presidency and the UFC over 
the possible inclusion of UFC members in Agboyibo's 
government. Regional leaders, notably Obasanjo and Compaore, 
pressed the Togolese parties for such an outcome, a message 
we reinforced. The negotiations eventually floundered over 
the proximate issue of exactly which ministerial portfolios 
would go to the UFC. Despite having told Ambassador Dunn and 
Embassy Paris Africa watchers in October that he would join 
government in return for a "super" ministry with 
responsibility for implementing the National Dialogue's 
Global Political Agreement, when offered just that (plus two 
lesser ministries), Olympio declined. This was confirmed to 
us separately by Amerding, Cooperation Minister Gilbert 
Bawara, and Olympio himself. Bawara recently told us that the 
GOT has not given up its efforts, even if the UFC is not 
receptive. 
 
¶5. (C) The decision by the UFC leadership to forego a role in 
government was not embraced universally within the UFC. Party 
chapters outside Lome in particular voiced unhappiness with 
Gilchrist's hasty reaction, which in their view was a missed 
opportunity both to help shape the electoral framework and to 
provide jobs and benefits to UFC activists long-excluded from 
the benefits of office. Eric Amerding (protect) told the 
Ambassador before the UFC's executive committe meeting 
February 3 and 4 that the party leadership had to squelch an 
attempt by younger members to include the topic of party 
"modernisation" on the agenda, which he described with a 
nervous laugh as a euphemism for a critical appraisal of 
Gilchrist's leadership. He added that the rank-ordering of 
candidate lists for each of Togo's constituencies 
(prefectures under the new, list-based proportional voting 
system) for the upcoming legislative elections will be 
decided by Gilchrist himself, an exercise that promises to be 
a further "headache" for the UFC leadership. 
 
¶6. (C) Nor has the UFC's decision to boycott cabinet 
participation captured the imagination of the wider 
electorate. Gilchrist's visit to Togo from February 3 to 9 
 
had two purposes -- to preside over the UFC executive 
committee meeting (above) and as a pre-launch of the party's 
legislative election campaign. Throughout his stay -- his 
longest in Togo since the early 90's -- Gilchrist's public 
appearances failed to attract the large crowds that 
characterized his infrequent visits to Lome in years past. 
About 250 greeted him when he arrived by road at the main 
Ghana border crossing, compared to past visits when his 
greeters were so numerous that the border was effectively 
shut down. A crowd estimated at 2500 to 3000 attended the 
only scheduled public rally of the visit, at a square in 
downtown Lome at the conclusion of the executive committee 
meeting. Spontaneous gatherings in Aneho, a UFC stronghold at 
the coastal border with Benin, and in the central city of 
Atakpame, which experienced some of the worst of the 
political violence in 2005, attracted limited but 
enthusiastic throngs. 
 
¶7. (C) While returning to Lome from Atakpame, Olympio's motorcade 
was involved in a high speed accident. It occured when one of 
the vehicles braked to avoid an errant motorcyclist and was 
struck by another vehicle in the motorcade, causing one to 
overturn. Amerding suffered painful but not life-threatening 
injuries to his chest. The incident initially raised fears 
that history might be repeating itself, in light of an armed 
attack on Olympio's motorcade by Eyadema loyalists during a 
visit to central Togo in 1992 that left several people dead 
and Olympio seriously injured. When Olympio and his senior 
advisors met with us just prior to his departure from Togo on 
February 9, they characterized the recent incident as an 
accident and nothing more and noted that protection from GOT 
security services had been irreproachable throughout 
Olympio's stay. 
 
¶8. (C) Olympio's address marking the opening of the executive 
committee was the major policy pronouncement of his visit. It 
was a nuanced speech, alternating between criticism of the 
RPT's policies of exclusion and discrimination over the years 
and qualified support for last year's national dialogue and 
global polical agreement, which he labelled as the "last 
chance to reestablish confidence and peace among the Togolese 
people." He defended the UFC's decision to remain outside 
government and characterized the period leading up to 
legislative elections as one of "consultation and shared 
management" among the various Togolese parties. Olympio made 
no mention by name of President Faure Gnassingbe, which is 
just as well given his inclination to refer to Faure as "that 
boy" in private conversations. Uncharacteristically, he 
avoided the issues of military reform and bringing to justice 
those responsible for human rights abuses in the past, 
including attacks by security forces and militias loyal to 
the regime against opposition supporters during the protests 
that followed the 2005 presidential elections. Describing 
tactics, Olympio defined the UFC's pre-electoral priorities 
to include mobilizing resources, improving communications, 
protecting its candidates, and ensuring the security of 
polling materials and election results on the day of 
elections. He said the party would favor the role of youth, 
women, and Togolese abroad in its campaign platform, whose 
central theme would be ending the clan-based politics of 
repression of the past. 
 
¶9. (C) Following its executive committee meeting, the UFC sent a 
letter to the Prime Minister's office recommending that the 
government undertake certain actions pertaining to 
implementation of the global political agreement. These 
included inviting the EU to help train Togolese security 
forces before the legislative elections. The PM's office 
responded with a letter questioning the appropriateness of 
the UFC's demarche, in light of its decision to boycott 
government and Olympio's comment to the press, clearly aimed 
at Prime Minister Agboyibo, that he preferred not to join 
those members of the opposition opting to try to change 
things from within. The PM's office made public its response, 
widening the controversy and prompting a barrage of 
editorials in the Togolese media. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment. The UFC is feeling pressure from a number of 
fronts -- from the RPT, happy to exploit opposition missteps 
and divisions, e.g., the exchange of letters between the UFC 
and Agboyibo's office, from the other opposition parties, who 
are vying with the UFC for the broader opposition vote, from 
its own rank and file, who may be losing patience with 
Olympio's impulsive leadership, and from the broader Togolese 
population, hard pressed to understand why the UFC  has not 
exploited what many see as an unprecedented opening as well 
 
as why it appears intent on violating the spirit of the 
popular global political agreement. Exacerbating the UFC's 
problems is the credibility problem it created for itself 
when it declined to join the national unity government and, 
more recently, when it declared it would not abide by an 
agreement to settle differences within the national electoral 
commission by vote rather than consensus. This measure was 
adopted at the last meeting of the follow-up committee to the 
national dialogue chaired by President Compaore in 
Ouagadougou and was widely seen as the opposition's 
concession in a trade-off with the RPT over the question of 
photo-ID registration cards (Lome 0085). 
 
¶11. (C) Comment continued. In our meeting with the UFC leadership 
at the conclusion of Olympio's visit, it was clear that in 
the face of these setbacks, the party has decided to dig in 
its heels rather than opt for a more conciliatory approach. 
Indeed, since its executive committee met, the UFC has become 
more contentious. If the UFC's electoral fortunes were all 
that mattered, we would not be overly concerned. It is the 
nature of politics for parties to take broad gambles, reaping 
the benefits if right and paying the price if wrong. The 
UFC's contrariness, however, has broader implications for 
democracy and stability. First, whether intentional or not, 
the UFC has created a stake for itself in the failure of the 
unity government and, by extension, the free, fair, and 
transparent electoral process that is the new government's 
primary mandate. This raises the prospect of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, and related to the first, 
the UFC has made no effort to find common ground with the 
other parties, particularly the RPT, on issues related to the 
elections. Squabbling among the parties has slowed electoral 
preparations, increasing the likelihood of mistakes and/or 
manipulation as work plans become compressed. Rather than 
negotiating solutions among themselves, the Togolese parties 
are relying on President Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso to 
force compromises. Not only are the Togolese denying 
themselves an important part of the democratization process, 
one must wonder how much time and patience Compaore, the 
national dialogue facilitator, will continue to demonstrate. 
Third, the UFC has estranged itself from its natural allies 
in the opposition, the CAR and CDPA. Opposition unity proved 
to be an important force in moving the RPT-dominated regime 
in the direction of democratic reform, i.e., through the 
national dialogue and global political agreement. Solidarity 
among the three main opposition parties may be needed once 
again to prevent backsliding, e.g., if the RPT fares poorly 
in the legislative elections and there is a backlash against 
Faure's policies from party hardliners.  End comment. 
DUNN