VZCZCXRO8642
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #0450/01 0880938
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 290938Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8633
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000450 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/IR AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2022 
TAGS: PREL IZ IR KU KUWAIT IRAN REALTIONS
SUBJECT: KUWAIT'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAN: APPROACHING THE U.S. 
IRAN'S TOP PRIORITY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: Kuwait's Ambassador to Iran, Majid 
Al-Thufiri, who claims good access to senior Iranian 
officials, shared his impression of Iran's views towards the 
U.S., regional policies, and domestic political and economic 
situation in a March 28 meeting with the Ambassador.  His key 
points were: finding a way to approach the U.S. is Iran's top 
priority and this pervades the leadership's thinking on 
nearly every other issue.  Iran views Iraq as an opportunity 
to approach, not confront the U.S.  Iran's desire to see Iraq 
succeed is an important shared objective that could serve as 
the basis for dialogue, but the Iranians want assurances on 
the continued survival of their regime.  U.S. pressure on 
Iran is having an impact and forcing the regime to reconsider 
its policies.  Criticism of the regime, and even Khamenei, is 
reaching unprecedented levels.  Iranians are "very 
frustrated" with Ahmadinejad's failed economic policies and 
Iran's increasing isolation in the international community. 
Public statements by Iranian officials are "completely 
different" than their private views and are motivated 
primarily by domestic considerations.  Iran is looking for a 
face-saving way to resolve tensions over its nuclear program 
and will ultimately back down rather than risk a 
confrontation that could threaten the regime's survival.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) On March 28, the Ambassador met for more than an 
hour with Majid Al-Thufiri, Kuwait's Ambassador to Iran since 
September 2001.  Al-Thufiri, who speaks English, Arabic, and 
Farsi, is a experienced diplomat and a sharp, insightful 
observer of Iranian affairs.  He claimed to have "good 
access" at the senior-most levels of Iranian government, 
including with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.  Al-Thufiri said 
he had gained the Iranians' trust and was often asked by 
Iranian officials for advice, which he gave openly and 
bluntly.  He admitted, however, that it was "not easy to work 
with the Iranians" because they "lack a clear-cut vision" and 
often "hide their real intentions." 
 
"Approaching" U.S. Iran's Top Priority 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Al-Thufiri claimed that "the top priority of 
Iran's foreign policy is the question of how to approach the 
United States."  "I have seen this in numerous meetings on 
every level," he said.  Al-Thufiri believed the environment 
in Iran was more favorable to dialogue now than before, 
noting that Ahmadinejad had broken "taboos" by writing 
letters to President Bush and the Iranians had "worked very 
hard to meet you in Iraq."  He claimed Iranians were 
"shocked" when the U.S. halted attempts to begin a dialogue 
with Iran last year and noted that Iranian officials had been 
"so proud of themselves that they were going to meet with the 
Americans," something that they took as confirmation of their 
regional importance.  Al-Thufiri believed the Iranians viewed 
Iraq as an opportunity to approach rather than confront the 
U.S. and saw their desire to "see Iraq succeed" as a common 
ground upon which dialogue could be built.  He claimed that 
despite their contradictory and belligerent public 
statements, the Iranians were carefully studying the P5 1 
proposal and asking questions about how they could agree to 
it, something Al-Thufiri took as "a good indication that they 
are looking for a way out (on the nuclear issue) that will 
allow them to save face." 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) According to Al-Thufiri, the three "pillars" of 
Iran's foreign policy are: 1) ensuring regime survival, 2) 
achieving recognition of its role as a regional power, and 3) 
maintaining its "distance" from the superpowers, primarily 
the United States.  He said the Iranians were "very 
pragmatic" and carefully avoided taking actions against the 
U.S. that could provoke a regime-threatening confrontation. 
But Iran values its influence in the region and uses this 
influence to elicit concessions from the international 
community and recognition of its role as a regional power. 
Al-Thufiri said Iran's main desire was for assurances that 
there would be no attempts to overthrow the regime.  "Give 
the Iranians a hint of these assurances and they will be very 
grateful and act in a different way," he argued. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Al-Thufiri believed U.S. pressure on Iran was 
having an impact on its policies.  He said the Iranians "took 
(the deployment of a second aircraft carrier in the Gulf) 
very seriously and are scared to death."  Al-Thufiri believed 
this sort of pressure was "very useful" and said any actions 
that restrict their ability to project power in the region 
"affect them very much."  He said the unanimous adoption of 
UNSCR 1747 sent a clear message to Iran that the 
 
KUWAIT 00000450  002 OF 004 
 
 
international community was united against it and signaled 
that its strategy was not working, something Al-Thufiri hoped 
would cause Iran to change its policies.  He claimed that 
when UNSCR 1737 was passed, "those close to the leader began 
exerting more pressure on him not to confront the 
international community."  Al-Thufiri predicted Iran would 
back down before a full scale embargo was imposed, because 
Iranian officials understood that while they could survive 
stronger sanctions, eventually sanctions would have an impact 
and this could affect people's confidence in the regime. 
Commenting on Iranians' perceptions of the U.S., Al-Thufiri 
said he "never saw a people love America like the Iranians. 
It's unbelievable!" 
 
Iran's Two Contradictory Faces 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Iranian officials' public statements are "180 
degrees different" from their private views and "have nothing 
to do with their actual stance on issues," Al-Thufiri said. 
He explained that these statements were primarily intended 
for domestic consumption or were driven by disputes between 
different factions within the Iranian government.  "If you 
understand their intentions, you will not be shocked (by 
their public comments)," Al-Thufiri noted.  As an example, he 
claimed that in private Iranian officials were completely 
opposed to U.S. troops leaving Iraq before the country was 
stable and secure. Al-Thufiri acknowledged, however, that 
Ahmadinejad was different and tended to believe more in what 
he said.  Ultimately, though, Ahmadinejad was responsible to 
Khamenei and made controversial public statements when the 
Supreme Leader allowed him to do so, Al-Thufiri argued, 
noting that Ahmadinejad has been more subdued over the last 
several months because Khamenei reigned him in. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Despite the sectarian nature of Iran's regime, it 
acts based on calculations of power, not religion, Al-Thufiri 
argued.  Iranian officials "never talk to me on a sectarian 
basis, but rather as a state."  For example, Al-Thufiri 
claimed Iran viewed Hizballah solely as a useful bargaining 
chip.  "Fundamentally, the Iranians are bazaaris," he 
explained.  "Everything has a value," including Hizballah. 
 
Economic and Social Climate in Iran 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Iran's economic problems and increasing isolation 
from the international community were having a profound 
affect on internal political dynamics in the country, 
Al-Thufiri said.  In particular, Ahmadinejad's failed 
policies are generating considerable criticism from all 
sides.  He claimed that Ahmadinejad was "a pain in the neck 
for everyone, including Khamenei."  According to him, some 
people had even asked Khamenei to remove Ahmadinejad from the 
presidency, something Al-Thufiri believed the Supreme Leader 
would not do this "because it would reveal to the 
international community that Iran is having domestic 
problems."  Al-Thufiri said criticism of Ahmadinejad was 
beginning to affect Khamenei as well.  "Before, people would 
talk (disparagingly) about the competency of the government, 
but now they are questioning the (Supreme) Leader's 
competency," he explained. 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) Al-Thufiri said this perception extended to the 
highest levels of government, citing a private meeting with 
former president Khatami in which Khatami characterized 
Ahmadinejad as a "child" and asked "how (could) the Supreme 
Leader allow him to do this."  Al-Thufiri said he was also 
hearing unprecedented criticism of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei 
in private gatherings of Iranian business leaders, 
ex-Ambassadors, parliamentarians, and even retired 
politicians associated with the Supreme Leader.  He claimed 
the business community was "very frustrated" with both 
leaders, and said he had never heard this level of criticism 
before.  One friend close to Khamenei told Al-Thufiri that he 
still believed the Supreme Leader would resolve Iran's 
problems peacefully, but noted that the Revolutionary Guard 
and other security forces exerted a negative influence on the 
country's leadership. 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) According to Al-Thufiri, "the impact of religion 
in Iran is zero or below zero."  He claimed Iranians, even 
outside Tehran, "have nothing to do with religion" and noted 
the strong public reactions to Ahmadinejad's attempts to 
enforce stricter religious standards of conduct.  There was a 
pervasive, strong resentment in Iran towards the religious 
establishment, he reported.  As an example, Al-Thufiri 
related a conversation he had had with the son of an 
ayatollah.  The young man asked Al-Thufiri if he drank and 
 
KUWAIT 00000450  003 OF 004 
 
 
then told him, "I drink (alcohol).  I never pray, I drink." 
The young man, indicating his father, continued, "I hate this 
man.  He is the most opportunistic person I ever saw.  He 
uses religion to get whatever he wants."  Expressing the 
extent of his disillusionment, the young man concluded, "I 
want to die as an infidel, not a Muslim." 
 
Iran's Muddled Iraq Policy 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S/NF) Al-Thufiri argued that Iran had two contradictory 
strategies in Iraq: one led by Iran's intelligence apparatus, 
and the other by the Iranian government.  For example, none 
of the Iranian government officials he talked to could 
rationalize Iran's support of Moqtada Al-Sadr and the Mahdi 
Army, and some even admitted that this was a "mistake." 
Al-Thufiri believed Iran was more coherent and consistent in 
its support for the political process (which brought Iraq's 
Shi'a into power) and opposition to any breakup of Iraq into 
autonomous regions that could embolden Iran's own 
ethnic/religious minorities.  He said Iran was also very 
careful not to be seen as supporting just one faction in 
Iraq, because it believed Iraq would eventually re-emerge as 
a strategic rival and wanted to ensure that it continued to 
have good access.  "And the only way to have good access is 
to have good relations with everyone," he argued.  Al-Thufiri 
claimed the Iranians recognized that despite being Shi'a 
Iraq's leadership was ultimately loyal to Iraq and noted that 
former PM Ibrahim Al-Jaafari's first visit to Iran was 
characterized by "major disagreements." 
 
Kuwait/GCC-Iran Relations 
------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S/NF) Al-Thufiri said five years ago Kuwait adopted a 
new strategy of "positive engagement" with Iran aimed at 
supporting moderates within the regime and encouraging the 
Iranian leadership to adopt more pragmatic, responsible 
policies, a strategy that worked well under Khatami but 
became more difficult after Ahmadinejad was elected 
president.  Kuwait's leadership told the Iranians that 
developing nuclear weapons would be a "disaster" and could 
provoke a regional arms race, and encouraged them to be more 
cooperative and transparent with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA).  The Kuwaitis also warned Iran not to 
underestimate the U.S.: despite the problems it faced in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, the U.S. still had the 
capability to inflict significant damage on Iran, and there 
was little divergence of view in Washington about the threat 
Iran could pose.  Kuwait repeatedly urged Iran to demonstrate 
that it was a responsible regional power and had the ability 
to play a positive, stabilizing role in the region, 
Al-Thufiri reported.  "Sometimes they listen and sometimes 
they act negatively, particularly in Lebanon," he said.  He 
said there was no movement on the bilateral continental shelf 
dispute and reported that the Amir was unlikely to visit Iran 
in the near future. 
 
¶14.  (S/NF) According to Al-Thufiri, two years ago Kuwait 
conducted an assessment of how to limit Iran's rising power 
in the region and concluded that 1) there should be more 
engagement with Iran and 2) the Saudis should be convinced to 
act as a stronger strategic balance to Iran.  "We worked very 
hard (to convince) the Saudis, and finally they agreed," 
Al-Thufiri said, noting that Saudi Arabia was now taking a 
stronger stance against Iran and, as a result, the Iranians 
were moderating their policies.  He cited as specific 
examples their clear commitment to not withdraw from the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and what he saw as their 
willingness to find a peaceful solution to tensions over the 
nuclear program.  "Iran will not push this to the brink of 
war, because they know they will lose and the regime will 
vanish," he argued.  "Iran also knows that if they go too 
far, they could lose the generous (P5 1 incentive package). 
And they know it is a generous offer."  He believed the Saudi 
policy of ignoring Ahmadinejad and dealing directly with 
Khamenei was effective in emphasizing the Supreme Leader was 
ultimately responsible for Iranian policy and signaling 
disapproval of the president. 
 
¶15.  (S/NF) The Iranians tend to view everything through the 
prism of the Iran/U.S. dynamic, including their relations 
with other countries in the region, Al-Thufiri said.  For a 
long time the Iranians were convinced that Kuwait was part of 
a U.S. "siege" on Iran and that Kuwait and other Gulf 
countries' positions on bilateral issues were dictated by the 
Americans.  Al-Thufiri told the Iranians that this was not 
the case, but stated bluntly that "we will not jeopardize our 
relations with the U.S. for your interests."  He said Iran 
 
KUWAIT 00000450  004 OF 004 
 
 
had at times asked Kuwait to convey messages to the U.S., but 
the Amir refused because Iran did not have a clear policy. 
Al-Thufiri claimed that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries had agreed that Iran must not be allowed to become 
a nuclear power.  He said he routinely encouraged GCC 
counterparts to engage Iran more openly, explaining that "the 
more open we are, the more relaxed Iran is." 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
LeBaron