VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKU #0419/01 0831336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241336Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8574
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 1652
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2343
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, DS/ATA, S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC; LONDON FOR TSOU 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FOR IE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2015 
TAGS: ASEC BEXP ECON ENRG EPET KCIP KU PTER
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITS KUWAIT, 
MARCH 13-22 
 
REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 4581 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 177 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  Summary:  A multi-agency USG Critical Energy 
Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) team visited Kuwait March 
13-22 to assess security vulnerabilities in Kuwait's energy 
infrastructure and make recommendations on improvements (see 
para 8 for a complete list of the U.S. delegation).  The team 
found significant security vulnerabilities from both land and 
sea approaches to the refineries.  Essential controls at a 
number of critical points in and around the three refinery 
complexes were lacking, rendering key installations open to 
terrorist attack.  Throughout four days of meetings and site 
visits, the team found the security orientation at the 
refineries to be limited to safety concerns such as fire and 
industrial accidents -- which have occurred in recent years 
-- but with inadequate focus on threats from terrorists. 
Kuwait's refineries and associated electrical power lines 
need immediate and basic security upgrades.  Over the 
long-term, the GOK needs to create a mechanism -- the team 
recommended a joint operations center staffed by 
representatives of relevant security agencies at the national 
and refinery level -- to ensure better coordination and 
communication between security agencies.  The Kuwaitis, who 
were engaged and cooperative throughout the visit (the U.S. 
delegation was able to see anything it requested and to 
photograph extensively within the facilities), were sobered 
by the recommendations and appeared eager (at the technical 
level) to make both short and long-term enhancements to their 
energy infrastructure, but orientating the Kuwaitis toward a 
greater focus on terrorism and reduced stove-piping is a very 
long-term project that will require commitment from the 
highest levels of the GOK.  We will follow up (before 
receiving the delegation's final report in approximately one 
month) with senior petroleum and security officials to make 
sure that the delegation's call for immediate improvements is 
heard beyond the working level and that the Kuwaitis are 
clear about the delegation's recommendation to make security 
changes now.  The mid-April visit to Kuwait of U.S. Deputy 
Energy Secretary Sell should also provide momentum.  End 
Summary. 
 
Program 
------- 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) From March 13-22, an eleven-member team 
representing four USG agencies -- State, Energy, Homeland 
Security, and the Coast Guard -- conducted the most thorough 
assessment to date by the USG of Kuwait's critical energy 
infrastructure.  The assessment built upon previous visits to 
Kuwait by APHSCT Townsend in November (Ref A) and by CENTCOM 
in January (Ref B). 
 
¶3.  (C/NF) The delegation undertook the following activities 
during the visit: 
 
-- Day 1:  GOK energy sector officials briefed the CEIP team 
on the structure of Kuwait's vital installations protection 
scheme, including the responsibilities of various 
organizations and ministries.  Muhammad Al-Faresi, Advisor to 
the Security Decision and Follow Up Committee (SDFC), which 
reports directly to the Council of Ministers, led the 
briefing.  Also participating were Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC) Manager for Safety and Health Fadhel Al-Ali 
and Oil Sector Services Company (OSSCO) Security Manager 
Abdullah Al-Ajmi.  (Note:  KPC is the parent company of all 
Kuwaiti oil sector companies, collectively known as the "K 
Companies.")  Al-Faresi's presentation highlighted 
communication and mandate gaps between the various KPC 
subsidiaries and the Ministry of Interior, which holds 
responsibility for perimeter security at all oil 
installations, and the fragmented nature of responsibility 
for security in general.  Al-Faresi discussed several 
initiatives that the SDFC is pursuing, including a joint 
operations center to bring together the KPC subsidiaries, 
MOI, and the Kuwait Coast Guard.  He stated that Kuwait's 
facilities are most vulnerable from the seaside, and that the 
most fundamental problem is an unclear chain of command, with 
"too many bosses." 
 
-- Day 2:  The CEIP team delivered a series of presentations 
covering basic security threats and how to prepare for them, 
as well as a video presentation on physical security barriers 
 
and blast mitigation techniques.  The presentations were 
attended by representatives from KPC, the Kuwait National 
Petroleum Company (KNPC), Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), OSSCO, 
the MOI, National Security Bureau (NSB), and the Coast Guard. 
 In the evening, SDFC officials gave the U.S. delegation an 
unscheduled presentation highlighting the need for Kuwait to 
make energy infrastructure protection a national priority. 
The officials indicated that the highly compartmentalized 
nature of the Kuwaiti government and poor communication both 
between and within ministries made it essentially impossible 
to implement a broad interagency approach to improving 
critical infrastructure protection in Kuwait.  In order to 
overcome these obstacles, the officials proposed the 
establishment of a Kuwait Homeland Security Institute that 
would combine local private sector support and USG expertise 
in homeland security to advise GOK decision makers, educate 
Kuwaiti policy makers, and prepare the Kuwaiti civil 
community to address homeland security issues in an informed 
manner. 
 
-- Day 3:  The CEIP delegation, which split into land and sea 
teams, toured energy infrastructure sites controlled by KNPC, 
which runs Kuwait's three refineries and export terminals. 
The land team toured the large Al-Ahmadi refinery, focusing 
on perimeter barriers and entry controls at the gate and met 
with fire and emergency personnel to review their ability to 
respond to a terrorist incident.  The maritime team toured 
seaside installations such as the sea island loading 
facility, the maritime perimeter of the secure area, and oil 
piers and met with the harbormaster to discuss his equipment 
and security procedures. 
 
-- Day 4:  The CEIP land team toured the Shuaiba and Abdallah 
refineries.  As at Al-Ahmadi, the focus was mainly on entry 
gate and perimeter security, although the team did tour the 
fire station and refinery health clinic.  The sea team met 
with Coast Guard officials toured the control center and 
facilities at the Coast Guard headquarters. 
 
-- Day 5:  In a briefing attended by representatives from the 
various K companies, MOI, NSB, and two consulting companies 
hired by KOC and KNPC (The Armor Group and Global Villages, 
respectively), the CEIP team delivered a recap of the visit 
and provided a series of recommendations covering Kuwait's 
immediate physical security needs and its long-term 
structural needs in decision-making and chain of command. 
The team provided discs to several of the agencies present 
with specifications and diagrams on security upgrades they 
could consider. 
 
-- Day 6:  The CEIP team de-briefed its findings to the DCM 
and representatives from Econ, Pol, RSO, FCS, and NCIS at the 
U.S. Embassy. 
 
Findings and Recommendations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  The team expects to finalize its report within a 
month and send a set of detailed recommendations to the GOK. 
Foremost among them will be recommendations to immediately 
install fortified concrete vehicle barriers along the 
exterior fence-line, anti-ram barriers at all access gates 
and emergency perimeter gates, and provide hardened control 
booths for MOI personnel.  MOI personnel who inspect vehicles 
entering the facilities need training in basic bomb 
detection.  On the maritime side, recommendations include 
prioritizing which facilities are the most critical to oil 
export and implementing enforceable security zones around 
them, establishing a joint operations center with Port 
Control and the Coast Guard with clear procedures for 
reporting and responding to threats, and conducting pilot 
boat authentication during outbound liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) transits. 
 
Reaction from the Kuwaitis 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  The Kuwaitis assembled for the almost three-hour 
de-brief and question and answer session on March 20 appeared 
to find the presentation sobering.  Graphic images of flimsy 
gates protected only with padlocks separating refinery 
installations from a major expressway -- from which a truck 
or even a passenger vehicle could gather speed and plow 
through the fence and enjoy unimpeded access into the 
interior of the refinery -- were powerful.  Photographs of 
 
vehicle exit routes protected only by tire spikes were 
similarly unnerving to the audience.  The Kuwaitis absorbed 
the recommendations in a non-defensive manner and asked 
numerous questions about specifications of recommended 
improvements that demonstrated a level of concern and 
indicated that the urgency of the message penetrated.  Some 
attendees expressed concern about the costs of installing 
more physical barriers around facility perimeters. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF) Of equal concern to the Kuwaitis was how to 
overcome the lack of inter-agency cooperation and 
coordination, particularly with the MOI and Coast Guard.  As 
one Kuwaiti participant put it, the fragmented nature of the 
GOK's security apparatus, with responsibility divided among 
numerous organizations, is "the biggest challenge Kuwait 
faces."  The CEIP team concurred, and suggested the 
establishment of a joint committee composed of 
representatives from all GOK and K company elements involved 
in securing critical facilities.  This committee would 
clearly define each organization's roles and 
responsibilities, and would establish basic security 
standards to be employed across all critical facilities.  In 
addition, the CEIP team suggested the creation of a joint 
operations center staffed by representatives of these same 
agencies, which would be a central control center in the 
event of an emergency or terrorist attack.  Lastly, the team 
suggested that all the K companies create dedicated security 
offices supervised by a Deputy Managing Director-level 
security officers, each with its own dedicated staff, budget, 
and authority to make security-related decisions. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶7. (C/NF) We believe it is essential for the GOK to act 
immediately on the basic perimeter upgrades on both the land 
and sea sides, which can be done relatively easily and 
inexpensively.  The delegation's full report, which we 
anticipate receiving in approximately one month, should help 
guide the GOK's planning.  In the meantime, we will follow up 
directly with senior petroleum officials, Ministry of Energy 
and security agency officials to further debrief the visit 
and to ensure that the most important recommendations reach 
beyond the technical level.  The delegation mentioned to the 
Kuwaitis additional training in conducting assessments -- 
that would train the Kuwaitis to conduct their own 
assessments -- available through Sandia Laboratories, which 
the Kuwaitis expressed interest in.  While there are 
immediate steps that can be taken, the longer-term and 
ultimately more challenging goal of creating an integrated, 
multi-agency security apparatus that encompasses critical 
energy sites will require considerable political commitment 
from the highest levels of the GOK. 
 
Participants from the U.S. Delegation 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The U.S. delegation included the following 
individuals: 
 
¶1.  Richard P. Soler, DS/T/ATA - Team Leader 
¶2.  Bruce A Averill, CEIP Policy Coordinator, S/CT 
¶3.  Donald C. Grant, Captain, US Coast Guard, Chief, Port 
Security Evaluation 
¶4.  Randy Rhodes, Port Security Specialist, US Coast Guard 
¶5.  Walter Lewis Edwards, Operations and Training 
¶6.  Kevin Maloy, DS/T/ATA 
¶7.  Patrick Willging, Office of Energy Delivery and 
Reliability, DOE 
¶8.  Donald L. Moffett, DS/PSD/PSD - Anti-Ram/Blast Mitigation 
Specialist 
¶9.  Gary Risden, DS/PSD/PCB - Physical Security Specialist 
¶10.  Patrick Whelan, DS/PSD/PCB - Physical Security Specialist 
¶11.  William Spencer, DHS 
 
¶9.  (U) This cable was cleared by CEIP Team Leader Rich Soler. 
 
********************************************* * 
 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
 
********************************************* * 
LeBaron