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DE RUEHKL #0447/01 0670901
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O 080901Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8712
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 000447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP AND DS/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2032 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR MOPS ASEC TH MY
SUBJECT: FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY FORMER MEDIATORS 
 
REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 263 - MALAYSIA SAFE HAVEN FOR 
        INSURGENTS 
     ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 318 - CONCERNED BUT NOT ALARMED BY 
        VIOLENCE 
 
KUALA LUMP 00000447  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Mark D. Clark for reasons 
 1.4 (b and d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) Southern Thai militants recently asserted they will 
pursue more violence and reject talks, according to two 
Malaysian mediators from the defunct Mahathir peace process. 
The Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah 
(protect throughout), joined by retired head of the Malaysian 
Royal Police, Norian Mai (protect throughout), told A/DCM he 
met with a group of seven young Thai Malay militant leaders 
in late February and they explicitly ruled out dialogue with 
the Thai government.  Instead, in a hardening of their 
position, the insurgents explained their intention to carry 
out further violence in pursuit of their goal of secession 
under the banner of Pattani Darussalam.  Norian, who also 
served as Malaysia's internal intelligence chief under 
Mahathir, stated the Thai Malay insurgents were better 
organized than previously thought.  The militants were 
benefiting from some Middle East funding, via Singapore and 
Malaysia, possibly money solicited under false pretenses or 
diverted from humanitarian projects.  Eskay, fresh from 
meetings with senior Malaysian officials, described a joint 
Malaysian-Thailand decision to stand up respective committees 
to work on the insurgency issue, with Malaysia's group headed 
by retired military intelligence chief Lt. General Wan Abu 
Bakar.  Eskay and Norian appeared pessimistic the Malaysian 
committee would be effective, while noting GOM doubts about 
the longevity of the current Thai government.  End Summary. 
 
GOM Consults Former Mediators 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) A/DCM and poloff met in Kuala Lumpur on March 6 with 
the Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, 
and retired head of the Malaysian Royal Police, Norian Mai, 
as a follow-up to our initial meeting with Eskay in early 
February (ref A) that focused on the southern Thailand 
insurgency.  Both Malaysians had served as lead mediators in 
the now defunct 2004-2006 peace process carried out under 
former Prime Minister Mahathir's name.  The two men explained 
that the Malaysian government had not included them in a 
formal way in the GOM's current approach to the southern 
Thailand issue because of their association with Mahathir (a 
frequent critic of PM Abdullah).  Nevertheless, the GOM 
consulted them, in particular because of their past 
experience and their continued contacts with Thai Malay 
militants, as well as old guard leaders.  Eskay explained he 
had completed two days of consultations in Putrajaya, which 
included a March 6 meeting with the deputy chief of the 
external intelligence agency, MEIO.  Eskay said he was 
scheduled to meet MEIO chief Fauzi on March 7. 
 
Insurgents Will Fight for Malay/Muslim State 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Eskay and Norian stated that there had been a clear 
hardening of position by the southern militants this year. 
Eskay explained he had met in late February with a contact 
group of seven young militant leaders somewhere along the 
Kelantan state border with Thailand (an eighth member of this 
group could not travel, while a ninth had been killed in 
fighting earlier in February).  Eskay carried out the meeting 
with the knowledge of the Malaysian government, but without 
the participation of Malaysian officials, and recorded the 
encounter.  In a departure from previous meetings, the young 
leaders rejected any possibility of political dialogue. 
Instead, they declared they had taken a vow to establish an 
independent Muslim Malay state, Pattani Darussalam, and would 
continue to carry out violence to achieve their aims.  The 
militants believed they could not trust Thai authorities and 
that in any event the Thai security services and civil 
authorities were so fractured that they had no confidence in 
those who might sit across the table.  Any major, seemingly 
positive gestures by Bangkok to reach out to ethnic Malays 
likely would be followed by fresh attacks by the militants in 
order to destroy any good will.  Given their disinterest in 
dialogue, the militants might become increasingly difficult 
to contact, Eskay stated. 
 
¶4.  (S) Eskay complained that the Thai government had widely 
circulated in the Thai Malay communities the February 2006 
"Peace Proposal for Southern Thailand" that resulted from the 
Mahathir peace process (ref A).  Bangkok had not responded to 
the proposal.  Thai authorities, however, employed this as 
part of their psychological operations campaign to undermine 
the insurgency with a document that implied a peace deal - 
carrying the signatures of the old guard leaders - had been 
agreed to, but was being undermined by the militants.  This 
further hurt Thai government credibility, in Eskay's view. 
 
Militants Better Organized 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Norian commented that the militants employed a more 
sophisticated organization than most observers realized.  The 
seven members of Eskay's contact group operated in concert, 
but in different areas.  Bombers and shooters who carried out 
attacks seemed to come from a central pool, relying on local 
cells to set up and guard the scenes of the attacks.  Brokers 
carried out a linkage role by conveying instructions and 
money to the cells, with a standard fee schedule in place for 
assisting in bombings and drive-by shootings.  As if on cue, 
women and children quickly gathered to protest arrests of 
suspects by Thai authorities.  Eskay believed it likely the 
southern insurgents would try to destroy targets of more 
economic importance in the south, as the militants sought to 
create a situation of chaos and dependence upon the 
insurgents themselves.  Norian added that the violence is 
very localized, and not as widespread as some media reports 
suggest. 
 
Militants Move Through Kelantan 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Eskay described Kelantan state as the primary 
Malaysian transit and sanctuary area for southern Thai 
militants (ref A).  In response to our direct question, Eskay 
and Norian said they had not seen indications of foreign 
militants in southern Thailand or Kelantan. 
 
Alleged Foreign Funding Takes Another Route 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) The insurgents did benefit from some foreign funding, 
Eskay and Norian noted while also suggesting that at least 
some of the funds were collected for humanitarian purposes 
and diverted to the insurgents.  This funding generally did 
not pass through Kelantan but rather through the states of 
Perlis and Kedah.  Building on remarks from early February 
(ref A), Eskay said militants received some money via a 
Singapore bank and he promised to supply us with more 
information on the bank in subsequent communications.  The 
money reached southern Thailand through the informal, 
traditional banking networks operated by money changers at 
the border points of Padang Besar (Perlis) and Bukit Kayu 
Hitam (Kedah).  Some of the money went to ethnic Malay 
political figures in southern Thailand, who then dispersed it 
to militants.  Eskay named Yala province political leader 
Arifin (NFI) as one recipient who used the funding to support 
the insurgency.  As to the origin of foreign funding, Eskay 
said some of the money came from the Middle East in response 
to Thai Malay appeals to support humanitarian projects for 
fellow Muslims.  He pointed out that a number of the 
militants had studied or visited the Middle East in past 
years.  Regarding foreign travel, several old guard leaders 
based in Malaysia traveled overseas on Malaysian passports, 
he explained. 
 
¶8.  (S) Note:  An international journalist told us that Eskay 
had informed him of a December 2006 visit to Dubai by old 
guard separatists from the Pattani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), 
during which they collected Arab donations.  In early 
February Eskay told us he did not believe the Thai insurgents 
had linked up with external terrorist groups.  End Note. 
 
Ending Dual Citizenship Threatens Militants 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Norian and Eskay noted that a decision by Malaysia 
and Thailand to end the practice of dual citizenship (by 
employing biometric identification and requiring individuals 
to choose one nationality) appeared to threaten the Thai 
militants, who were angry at this decision by Malaysia. 
Eskay said the GOM had not thought through the consequences 
of this approach, which might spark a large influx of 
southern Thais into Malaysia because many Thai Malays would 
opt to leave for their southern neighbor if forced and able 
to choose. 
 
Abdullah in Bangkok Not Offered Mediation Role 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10.  (S) Norian and Eskay, speaking as private citizens but 
coming out of meetings with senior GOM officials, said the 
Malaysian government recognized its clear interest in seeing 
an end to the violence in southern Thailand.  While there 
were sympathies for the plight of fellow Malays, secession 
was a non-starter.  Prime Minister Abdullah's mid-February 
meeting in Bangkok, however, did not result in Thailand 
offering any mediation role to Malaysia.  In private 
conversation with Eskay, Deputy Prime Minister Najib insisted 
that Malaysia would need something official and in writing 
from Thailand in order to engage in any process.  Uncertainty 
about the durability of the current Thai government factored 
into Malaysia's interactions with Bangkok at this stage, 
making Malaysians less enthusiastic for working on southern 
Thailand issues, outside of border security. 
 
Malaysia and Thailand Stand Up Security/Intel Committees 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11.  (S) On the margins of Abdullah's Bangkok visit, Malaysia 
and Thailand did agree to stand up security-focused 
committees tasked with examining bilateral approaches to 
ending the insurgency, Eskay explained.  Lt General (retired) 
Wan Abu Bakar, former Chief of Defense Intelligence, headed 
the Malaysian side, which included representatives from four 
agencies:  military intelligence, Police Special Branch, the 
external intelligence agency (MEIO), and the National 
Security Division of the Prime Minister's Office.  General 
Vaipot Srinual headed the Thai counterpart committee.  Norian 
and Eskay said the Malaysia committee had yet to meet and 
they were not sure it would become an effective body. 
 
Comment and Biographic Notes 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Eskay and Norian do not speak for the Malaysian 
government and are "outsiders" to some extent by virtue of 
their close association with Mahathir.  Nevertheless, they 
have significant interaction with Malaysia's most senior 
officials dealing with southern Thailand.  Their pessimistic 
outlook on southern Thailand, and the likelihood the violence 
will continue or escalate, tracks with the views of many 
Malaysians in and out of government (ref B).  Eskay credibly 
appears to have met with hundreds of Thai insurgents and 
sympathizers since 2004, and claims to have audio and video 
recordings of many encounters.  Eskay travels frequently to 
southern Thailand, while Norian said he rarely crosses the 
border.  Eskay explained that to maintain the trust of Thai 
militants he does not provide their full information (e.g., 
cell phone numbers, exact physical locations of militants) to 
the GOM or Thai government. 
 
¶13.  (S) Though describing themselves as part of Mahathir's 
inner circle of friends, Eskay and Norian claimed they are 
not involved in party politics.  They readily admitted to 
being wealthy by virtue of their businesses.  Eskay said he 
sells diesel fuel to China and owns a large ranch in Kedah 
state.  Eskay and Norian are partners in some ventures, 
including a fertilizer plant in southern Thailand.  As the 
child of a Malay-Thai marriage, Eskay speaks Thai and Malay, 
as well as fluent English.  He spent some 10 years studying 
and working in Oklahoma and Texas, and speaks fondly of the 
United States.  According to the Royal Malaysian Police 
website, Norian Mai served as Police Special Branch chief 
from 1994 to 1997, and as Inspector General of Police from 
1999 to 2002.  We believe Washington possesses substantial 
biographic information on Norian. 
SHEAR